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—ABSTRACT— 
 
This study analyzes the prefaces of four Romantic-period writers:  William Godwin, Mary 
Hays, William Wordsworth, and Percy Bysshe Shelley.  Historically, the preface can be traced 
back to the insinuatio of classical rhetoric, the purpose of which is to evade audience hostility 
for writers presenting a bad case.  Given the repressive political and cultural atmosphere of 
the Romantic period, writers like Godwin, Hays, Wordsworth, and Shelley, idealists who 
seek to disseminate radical ideas in an era of state censorship, must devise a strategy to 
convey their messages without attracting attention to their subversiveness.  Thus, all four 
writers continually preface their works with ‘elusive’ prefaces, a strategy through which they 
seek to downplay or elide their radical subject-matter. 
 
Chapter One analyzes William Godwin’s prefaces to Enquiry Concerning Political Justice as a 
prototype of the elusive preface, through which the urgency and force of his prefatory 
rhetoric contrasts with the message of gradualism he seeks to convey in the treatise.  His 
novel Caleb Williams, whose first edition preface was suppressed by the publisher for its 
seditious content, incorporates its preface as an extradiegetic layer of the novel, a technique 
that Mary Hays will also incorporate in her Memoirs of Emma Courtney, a novel that deploys its 
elusive preface to placate a middle-class reading audience and to address simultaneously a 
Dissenting public sphere.  Tracing the evolution of Hays’ prefatory author-figure from her 
early pamphlet Cursory Remarks on an Enquiry into the Expediency and Propriety of Public or Social 
Worship:  Inscribed to Gilbert Wakefield to her last novel, The Victim of Prejudice, Chapter Two 
demonstrates how Hays’ rhetorical subterfuge allows her to assert her right to philosophy 
while ostensibly adhering to conventional poses of femininity. 
 
Prose writers like Godwin and Hays seek to convey their idealistic messages to a generally 
prosaic reading public, making their prefatory insinuatio especially significant.  But poets like 
Wordsworth and Shelley face an especially difficult task in establishing themselves as socially 
relevant in an age during which poetry is becoming an outmoded form of discourse.  Thus, 
Chapter Three demonstrates how Wordsworth in his preface to Lyrical Ballads becomes 
increasingly absorbed with the task of establishing the poet’s professional autonomy as he 
argues for his poetry’s power to rouse a degraded nation from its moral and cultural lethargy.  
Throughout the four editions of the Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth continues to expand his 
preface and his poetic persona.  By the time of his 1815 Poems, he has abandoned the mass 
audience he once sought to enlighten, instead appealing to a future generation of readers 
whom he calls upon to vindicate him.  Shelley also faces audience hostility, and his attempts 
to convey his radical beliefs are thwarted by a public sphere whose ad hominem attacks against 
him hinder his ability to achieve his goals.  Chapter Four chronicles Shelley’s immersion in 
romantic irony, through which his prefaces are characterized by a disjunction between his 
idealism and his dissociation from his given actuality.  
 
Keywords:  (1) Godwin, William 1756-1836.  Criticism and Interpretation.  (2) Hays, Mary 
1759 or 60-1843.  Criticism and Interpretation.  (3)  Wordsworth, William 1770-1850.  
Criticism and Interpretation.  (4)  Shelley, Percy Bysshe 1792-1822.  Criticism and 
Interpretation.  (5) Literary Form.     
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—INTRODUCTION— 
 
 
“A Preface is written to a public; a thing I cannot help looking on as an Enemy, and 
which I cannot address without feelings of hostility” (129). 
 
       — John Keats To John Hamilton Reynolds, 9 April 1818 
 
  
But Does a Preface Exist? 
Keats’s remarks, the result of considerable anxiety over his preface to Endymion, 
embody many of the key aspects of preface writing in the Romantic period.  The feelings of 
hostility towards his “Enemy”—the “public”—are typical of many of the period’s writers, 
whose unease about presenting their texts to the public is overdetermined by a complex 
nexus of institutional, ideological, and demographic factors.  Keats’s remarks also perpetuate 
a facet of the Romantic poet myth, classifying him as a sensitive plant who loathes deigning 
to present his works to the public, a sentiment revealed elsewhere in his letter to Reynolds:  
“among Multitudes of Men—I have no feel of stooping, I hate the idea of humility to them” 
(129).   And the fact that Keats cathects this anxiety onto the preface reveals its significance 
as a mediating device, the site within which the ‘author’ steps out to plead his or her case 
with the reader in an effort to influence interpretation.  The liminality of Endymion’s preface, 
foregrounded by the stark juxtaposition between the preface’s prosaic terseness and the 
poem’s lavish versification, embodies the paradoxes of the prefatory figure constructed by 
Keats.  The preface is separate from the poem, yet inextricably linked to it:  having 
encountered the ‘Keats’ of the preface, the reader identifies the ‘I’ of the poem with the 
hesitant prefatory figure, who has admitted to “a feeling of regret” for publishing a poem 
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characterized by its “great inexperience, immaturity, and every error denoting a feverish 
attempt” (11).   
Paradoxically, however, the very presence of Endymion’s preface undermines Keats’s 
desire to construct the figure of a chameleon poet within its space.  The original, 
unpublished, preface expresses Keats’s disdain for prefaces generally:  the work of an 
individual is so insignificant that a preface “seems a sort of impertinent bow to strangers 
who care nothing about it” (13).   The function of a preface, according to Keats, is to “catch 
an idea of an Author’s modesty, and non opinion of himself” (13).  Ironically, then, Keats 
crafts two versions of a preface whose purpose is self-negation, to present a version of 
himself characterized, negatively, by his “non opinion.”  As if to recognize the rhetorical 
potential of prosopopoeia, etymologically defined by Paul de Man as the “giving and taking 
away of faces” (“Autobiography” 76), Keats gives himself a face through his prefatory 
persona while simultaneously de-facing himself through repeated reference to the poet’s lack 
of identity.  Revealed through Keats’s elaborate prefatory attempts to posit his (non) identity 
are the factors that generate his anxiety about publishing.  Keats’s anxieties about the 
imminent likelihood of hostile critical reception necessitating the preface are exposed by 
repeated references to critical reception in the unpublished preface (“In case of a London 
drizzle or a scotch Mist,” an anticipation of negative reviews from the Quarterly or the 
Edinburgh Review) and in the published preface (“This is not written with the least atom of 
purpose to forestall criticisms of course,” Keats disingenuously writes).  And the final lines 
of the published preface—”I hope I have not in too late a day touched the beautiful 
mythology of Greece, and dulled its brightness” (11)—not only evince Keats’s uncertainty 
about attempting to compose a poem in the epic mode, but also encapsulate a more general 
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reticence about belatedly publishing poetry in a prosaic age, a concern symptomatic of his 
stubborn compulsion to introduce a poem with a prose preface.  
Keats’s suspicion of prefaces, however, is very much in keeping with a more general 
critical tendency of questioning the preface’s necessity, validity, or even its desirability.   
Jacques Derrida’s “Outwork,” the self-critical preface to his Dissemination, is perhaps the 
seminal poststructuralist analysis of prefaces; in its pages, Derrida exposes the paradoxical 
nature of the preface.   Throughout his rigorous analysis of Hegel’s preface to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Derrida continually interrogates the textual status of prefaces.  “But 
does a preface exist?” (Dissemination 8), asks Derrida, in the context of an argument that 
repeatedly negates the very existence of prefaces as always having been written “in view of 
their own self-effacement” (7).   Throughout his “Outwork,” Derrida describes prefaces as, 
variously, “an empty husk, a piece of formal refuse, a moment of dryness or loquacity” (8), a 
“residue of writing” (8), “the site of . . . gossipy small talk” (9), “neither useful or even 
possible” (9), and the “excrement of philosophical essentiality” (10).  With his skepticism 
about the use-value of prefaces, Derrida follows Hegel, who, in his preface to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, chides prefaces for their irrelevance, accusing them of being 
“superfluous . . . even inappropriate and misleading“ (qtd. in Derrida, Dissemination 10).  The 
philosophical concept, which should be capable of presenting itself, finds itself expounded 
by an external form of discourse that objectifies what should have been spontaneously 
produced by its own workings.  Derrida asks:  “isn’t the preface both negated and 
internalized in the presentation of philosophy by itself, in the self-production and self-
determination of the concept?” (11).  The irony, of course, is that both Hegel’s and Derrida’s 
criticisms of prefaces—like Keats’s original preface to Endymion—are contained within 
prefaces, thus implicitly negating the content of their arguments through their association 
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with an allegedly redundant and superfluous form.  Even more ironic is the fact that Hegel’s 
preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, which expresses Hegel’s contempt for prefaces, has 
become a sort of general introduction to Hegel’s philosophical system,1 embodying the 
prefatory logic described by Charles Eliot in his introduction to Prefaces and Prologues to Famous 
Books (1910):  “each of them [the selected prefaces] has a value and significance independent 
now of the work which it originally introduced” (3).  In this sense, prefaces certainly do exist, 
especially if they are capable of taking on a life of their own, extricated from the texts upon 
which their very existence has been predicated. 2 
Integral to Derrida’s analysis are the paradoxes inherent within the preface’s form, 
particularly its spatial and temporal violations.  The preface “recreates the intention-to-say 
after the fact” (7), and although spatially and temporally detached from the work it presents, 
the preface nonetheless pretends to be part of it.   The question of whether the preface 
exists inside or outside the work preoccupies Derrida in his “Outwork,” and it also informs 
Gerard Genette’s concept of the paratext.  As defined by Genette, paratexts are “those 
liminal devices and conventions both within the book (peritext) and outside it (epitext), that 
                                                        
1 Hugh Pyper points out this irony, noting that Walter Kaufmann’s Hegel:  Texts and Commentary includes the 
Phenomenology of Spirit’s preface as a stand-alone text with commentary and epigraphs from Rudolf Haym and 
Hermann Glockner claiming that “whoever understands this preface has mastered Hegel’s philosophy” (74).  
Thus, the Phenomenology becomes an “appendix to the self-sufficient preface” (74).  Derrida’s tongue-in-cheek 
claim in Dissemination that “the preface is everywhere; it is bigger than the book” (42) is realized in this instance.  
One could also classify Wordsworth’s preface to Lyrical Ballads as such an instance, in which the preface is 
“everywhere,” taking on a life of its own, subsuming not only the individual poems and the book to which it is 
affixed, but even in some cases subsuming the entire Romantic period for those who pinpoint the Ballads’ 
publication as an origin of British Romanticism. 
 
2 Kierkegaard, in his 1844 book Prefaces, takes the preface to its ad absurdum limit, writing a book of prefaces 
that, although labeled as prefaces, do not actually introduce anything.   In his preface to Prefaces, Kierkegaard 
writes, “In relation to a book a prologue [preface] is a triviality, and yet by means of a more careful comparison 
of prologues, would not one gain an opportunity for observation at a bargain price! . . . Yet no one thinks 
about what might be gained if one or another literatus could be trained only to read prologues, but to do it so 
thoroughly that he would begin with the earliest times and advance through all the centuries until our own day” 
(3).  Kierkegaard’s remarks playfully contradict Hegel’s worry, expressed in his preface to the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, that a reader who relies on reviews, introductory paragraphs, and prefaces for an understanding of a text, 
takes an intellectual journey “in his dressing-gown” (40) in contrast to the serious reader who, in search of 
“spiritual elation in the eternal, the sacred, the infinite, moves along the highway of truth in the robes of the 
high priests” (40).   
  5 
mediate the book to the reader,” framing elements such as “titles and subtitles, pseudonyms, 
forewords, dedications, epigraphs, prefaces, intertitles, notes, epilogues, and afterwords” 
(xviii).   In essence, paratexts are what make a text into a book, the means through which a 
writer presents his or her text to the public.  Paratexts surround and extend a book in order 
to present it, “in the usual sense of the verb, but also in its strongest sense:  to make present, 
to ensure the text’s presence in the world, its ‘reception’ and consumption in the form . . . of 
a book” (1).  Characterized by Genette as a site of “transaction” (2) between reader and text, 
paratexts contain within themselves the very contradictions elaborated by Derrida.  In his 
preliminary definition of the concept of paratextuality, Genette cites J. Hillis Miller’s gloss on 
the prefix ‘para-’, teasing out the array of paradoxes associated with its “ambiguous 
meaning” (1):  “‘Para’ is a double antithetical prefix signifying at once proximity and 
distance, similarity and difference, interiority and exteriority . . . something simultaneously 
this side of a boundary line, threshold or margin, and also beyond it” (qtd. in Genette, 1).  
Crucial, therefore, to theoretical discussions of paratexts is this problematical notion of the 
preface’s location in relation to the text it introduces.  But as I hope to demonstrate 
throughout this study, the spatio-temporal indeterminacy of the preface’s textual status is 
precisely what generates its peculiar effects.  My readings are predicated on the hypothesis 
that prefaces, because of their liminality, inscribe the occasional, particular exigencies of their 
texts’ historical moment ‘inside’ the text even in situations when the texts seek to detach 
themselves from their own historicity, through a narrative method I outline in Chapter One.  
Keats’s preface to Endymion, for instance, recontextualizes the poem as a rather belated 
attempt at composing a poem in the style of a Greek epic, by a poet well aware of its defects 
and of the probability of negative reception.  Without the preface, this subtext would be 
completely absent, as would the insertion of the nervous poet-figure into the space of the 
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poem; despite its paucity relative to the poem it introduces, the preface radically alters one’s 
reading of the poem. 
Within this context of the preface’s paradoxical interiority and exteriority, I will 
briefly distinguish prefaces from two other common ‘front-matter’ paratexts:  the 
introduction and the prologue.  For the purposes of this study, I designate any body of text 
separated from the main text and marked as a preface or advertisement3 as a preface 
(although in one case, Mary Hays’s preface to her Cursory Remarks, the preface is not marked 
as such, but it does function exactly like a preface as I will demonstrate in Chapter Two).   
The fundamental distinction between prefaces, on the one hand, and introductions and 
prologues on the other, stems from what William Harmon and Hugh Holman identify as the 
preface’s defining characteristic:  the preface is a “statement at the beginning of a book or 
article—and separate from it” (406).   The separateness of the preface distinguishes it from 
the prologue and introduction, as the latter two tend to be less ambiguously incorporated 
into the texts they introduce.  Introductions, for instance, differ from prefaces because an 
introduction, unlike the more liminal preface, is linked to the text it introduces as a 
systematic preview of the text’s structure.4  Prologues, similarly, also differ from prefaces 
                                                        
3 Paul Magnuson’s gloss on the advertisement emphasizes its connection with elusive prefaces as a rhetorical 
reaction to a hostile publishing climate:  “Advertisement is a trope of public mediation, an adverting toward the 
subject but at the same time an averting (from its medieval French origins in avertissement), a turning away.  The 
OED thus lists one historical meaning of advertisement as a warning or admonition.  For example, the 
Advertisement to Lyrical Ballads warns a reader against expecting traditional poetry.  The word advertisement thus 
alerts a reader, not only to the public location of the themes, but also a certain evasiveness in the poem itself—
a turning away at the same time—an evasiveness required by the political pressures of the day.  The adverting 
and averting announce its rhetoric” (55).   I will return to this notion of the advertisement in Chapter Three, 
linking the term’s economic denotations with Magnuson’s emphasis on the evasiveness of the avertissement.  
 
4 A concise, modern distinction between introduction and preface is provided by Marjorie Skillin and Robert 
Malcolm Gay:  “A preface or foreword deals with the genesis, purpose, limitations, and scope of the book and 
may include acknowledgments of indebtedness; an introduction deals with the subject of the book, 
supplementing and introducing the text and indicating a point of view to be adopted by the reader. The 
introduction usually forms a part of the text [and the text numbering system]; the preface does not” (46).   
Following a similar scheme, Derrida distinguishes the two terms:  “The introduction [Einleitung] has a more 
systematic, less historical, less circumstantial link with the logic of the book.  It is unique; it deals with general 
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through their connection with the play they introduce.  In ancient drama, the prologue 
denotes everything that happens before the entrance of the chorus; its function, according to 
Genette, is not to make a presentation, but to “provide an exposition in the dramatic sense 
of the word – most often . . . in the form of a scene in dialogue, but sometimes . . . in the 
form of a character’s monologue” (166).  Prefaces to dramatic works certainly do exist—in 
the Romantic period, for instance, Baillie’s Plays on the Passions are prefaced by a lengthy 
“Introductory Discourse”; Shelley’s dramas Hellas, The Cenci, and Prometheus Unbound are all 
prefaced, as is Byron’s Cain.  But what distinguishes prefaces from prologues is the fact that 
prefaces, unlike prologues, are not part of the play’s action.  Rather, they are part of a play’s 
published edition, appearing as an author’s discussion before the text of the play.  In this 
sense, the preface to a drama functions somewhat differently from a preface to a poem or a 
novel, as the novelistic and poetic prefaces can more easily be incorporated within their 
narrative structure as a distinct narrative level, whereas the preface to a drama is sealed off 
from its dramatic exposition.   This distinction, however, only applies to a drama that is 
being performed; a prefaced drama being read functions exactly like any other type of 
prefaced text.   
Of course, the practice of preface writing did not begin with the romantic period. 5  
The act of prefacing is, in various guises, as old as classical rhetoric itself:  the preface can be 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and essential architectonic problems; it presents the general concept in its division and in its self-differentiation.  
The Prefaces, on the other hand, are multiplied from edition to edition and take into account a more empirical 
historicity; they obey an occasional necessity” (Dissemination 14). 
 
5 There is no comprehensive, definitive history of preface-writing.  Genette traces the prefatory function (as 
distinct from its presentation, in book form, as demarcated from the text it introduces) as far back as the Iliad 
and the Odyssey, as their opening lines invoke the muse, announce the subject, and establish the narrative 
starting point (164).  In several of Livy’s Roman History books (59 BC – AD 17)—introduced by remarks 
traditionally called the praefatio (identified by Genette as the origin of the term preface)—he introduces himself, 
justifies the importance of his work, and lays out his method, commenting on his work in the first person, a 
“stance that would become characteristic of the modern preface” (165).   See also Totosy de Zepetnek (5-21) 
for a related discussion of the history of preface-writing.  Collections of prefaces include Gray’s The Book of 
  8 
traced to the exorde of Classical Greek and Roman rhetoric, 6 which include some 
“characteristically prefatorial” commonplaces, including “the difficulty of the subject, the 
statement of purpose, and the approach the speaker will take” (Genette 164).  According to 
Genette, most of the “themes and techniques of the preface are in place as of the mid-
sixteenth century” and the “subsequent variations do not reflect a true evolution but rather a 
set of varying choices within a repertory that is much more stable than one would believe a 
priori” (Paratexts 163).  Given the significance of Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads to a 
Romantic-period poetics, and the undeniable popularity of prefaces in the period’s poetic, 
philosophical, novelistic, and dramatic productions, one would assume, as Scott Simpkins 
does, that there was an unprecedented “proliferation of textual supplements used by the 
English Romantic poets” (17).   But if there was a “proliferation” of prefaces throughout the 
Romantic period, it has not been documented as no evidence yet exists to support such a 
claim, and I make no attempt at a comprehensive, statistical comparison of the era’s 
prefatory productions relative to, say, those of the eighteenth century and the Victorian 
period.  Suffice it to say, however, that prefaces were certainly prevalent in the eighteenth 
century; in this sense, the Romantics inherited a textual tradition practiced by many of their 
most prominent predecessors.  Individual poems, collections of poems, novels, journals, 
philosophical treatises, pamphlets, and dramas were all prefaced throughout the eighteenth 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Prefaces, Wheatley’s The Dedication of Books to Patrons and Friends (1887), Lyle’s Praise From Famous Men (1977), and 
Grierson and Watson’s The Personal Note (1946).   
 
6 See also Dunn, who situates his study of Renaissance preface-writing within the context of classical rhetoric, 
noting that its influences “account for the specific shape of not only early modern prefatory writing but 
modern ideas of authorship and rhetorical practice” (1) and Schell, who characterizes the Romantic preface as a 
version of the classical exordium. 
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century—not in all cases of course, but frequently enough to make prefaces a 
commonplace.7    
As a strategy for mediating8 a text to its reading public, a preface necessarily 
entangles itself in the exigencies of the historical moment of its publication.  Because they 
“obey an occasional necessity” and account for an “empirical historicity” (Derrida, 
Dissemination 14), prefaces provide an especially rich index of the intellectual climate within 
                                                        
7 Berkeley, for instance, prefaces his 1710 Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge with a challenge to 
readers “tainted with Scepticism, or want[ing] a Demonstration of GOD” (43) to “impartially Examine” the 
treatise’s conclusions to perceive the “Truth.”   Even journals could be prefaced:  Richard Steele begins 
Volume 4 of The Tatler with a preface that defends his journal against allegations of bias, combined with a brief 
moral diatribe against the “Gamesters” and “Duellists” who threaten the earnest English gentleman (346).  
Pope prefaces his Iliad with an elaborated gardening metaphor that roots the “wild Paradise” of Homer’s work 
in a relatively primitive Greek society, contrasted with a more cultivated “judicious and methodical” 
contemporary English poetic that parallels the development of a more refined social order, along with an 
extended discussion of Greek to English translation.  Pope also prefaces his 1717 collected edition The Works 
with a preface denouncing malicious critics, defending himself against ad hominem attacks, and considering the 
relation of contemporary to ancient poets.  His Essay on Man contains a prefatory “Design” and An Epistle to 
Dr. Abuthnot also contains an Advertisement that again responds to ad hominem attacks against him.   Swift’s 
1732 The Beasts Confession contains a preface and an advertisement. The first printed edition of Dryden’s drama 
An Evening’s Love was prefaced with a discussion of genre; his poem Religio Laici Or A Laymans Faith was also 
prefaced, as was his Fables Ancient and Modern:  Translated into Verse, from Homer, Ovid, Boccace and Chaucer:  with 
Original Poems, which ruminated on the translator’s task while presenting an extended critical comparison of 
Homer, Ovid, Chaucer, and Boccaccio.  Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature contains a brief preface informing the 
reader that “my design in the present work is sufficiently explain’d in the introduction” (i) and pointing out that 
“the approbration of the public I consider as the greatest reward of my labours” (i).  Not only was Samuel 
Johnson’s preface to the Plays of William Shakespeare a landmark in Shakespeare criticism, but the first edition of 
his Lives of the Poets was entitled Prefaces, Biographical and Critical, to the Works of the English Poets.   Johnson’s 
Dictionary of the English Language also contained a lengthy preface that elaborates his method and delineates the 
book’s faults.  Many influential novels were prefaced as well.  The first edition of Walpole’s Castle of Otranto, for 
example, contains a fictional preface that claims the novel is the translation of a found artifact from sixteenth-
century Italy, depicting events from, the translator conjectures, between 1095 and 1243.  Fielding’s Joseph 
Andrews is prefaced, as is Richardson’s Clarissa, and Defoe’s Moll Flanders.  Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, 
characterized by its paratextual playfulness, begins with a “Memoir of the Author” and inserts ‘The Author’s 
Preface’ midway through chapter sixty-four.  This is, of course, not a comprehensive index of eighteenth-
century prefaces, but it does demonstrate that prefaces were frequently used by writers of various genres.  See 
also Jon Rowland, who analyzes some instances of the period’s prefaces in Swift and Marvell. 
 
8 Frederick Jameson defines mediation, in the Marxist sense of the word, as the relation between levels and the 
adapting of findings from one level to another, or “the establishment of relationships between . . . the formal 
analysis of a work of art and its social ground, or between the internal dynamics of the political state and its 
economic base” (39).  The analysis of mediations “aims to demonstrate what is not evident in the appearance 
of things, but rather in their underlying reality” (39).  In this sense, my analysis of prefaces as mediating texts 
does consider the “underlying reality” revealed through prefatory nervousness, the uncovering of “social 
ground” otherwise buried or obscured without the mediating presence of the preface.  My theoretical approach 
in this study could be labeled as formalist, in the sense that I seek to distinguish genera and species of 
introductory material; and broadly deconstructive, in the sense that I explore prefaces’ unsettling and unsettled 
relation to their texts. 
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which individual works are published.  In this sense, even despite their formal similarities, 
what necessarily distinguishes prefaces of one historical period from another is how they 
bear the imprint of their historicity. 9  Indeed, as Catherine Herrington-Perry remarks, the 
discrepancies between Romantic prefaces and earlier prefaces are “differences . . . of degree, 
not kind” (18). 10  In other words, Romantic prefaces are overdetermined by historical forces 
endemic to the moment of their texts’ publications, forces absorbed into the mediating space 
of the preface and whose presence—latent or manifest—subtly alters how readers approach 
the texts.  In keeping with Derrida’s emphasis on the “empirical historicity” of prefaces, I 
investigate how prefaces reveal their own historicity as a subtext11 otherwise absent from 
non-prefaced works.  Thus, my concern in this study is not with how the form of the preface 
changes in the romantic period—because, fundamentally, it does not—but rather how 
selected writers use a particular rhetorical strategy in their prefaces to negotiate their texts’ 
entry into a public sphere characterized, broadly, by three over-arching factors especially 
                                                        
9 Catherine Herrington-Perry notes that “The Romantic era preface did not diverge significantly from that 
handed down to it.  Because of the period’s emphasis on individuality, for example, we might expect its 
prefaces to have been the first to focus on the development of the self.  But this is not, strictly speaking, true.  
Using an author’s ethos to mediate a speech (or text) was a classical tradition, and filtering a text through a 
(conventionally defined) author was common long before the nineteenth century” (11).   Herrington-Perry’s 
dissertation is, to date, the only full-length study of Romantic-period prefaces.  In many ways, my study 
complements hers, as I am also interested in how the period’s writers rhetorically construct their prefaces to 
mediate their texts and I also use her observations about the historical consistency of prefatory form as a 
starting-point.  But in addition to dealing with different authors and different texts, my study focuses more 
specifically on how the period’s prefaces incorporate details of their historical moments into the space of the 
text. 
 
10
 Examples of this difference of degree include intensified anxiety about originality, defensiveness about 
plagiarism, along with excessive and unnecessary clarifications of meaning (Herrington-Perry 18). 
 
11 My use of the term “subtext” here is informed by Tilottama Rajan’s definition.  She defines the subtext as “a 
subversive and repressed text which is not consistent with the explicit text, in relation to which it stands as the 
subconscious to the conscious . . . the author is not wholly in control of his subtext” (Dark Interpreter 21).  The 
subtext revealed through the uneasy and often contradictory relation between preface and main work 
demonstrates how prefaces betray an overdetermined historicity frequently at odds with the semantic intention 
of the prefaced work, the preface functioning as a shadowy manifestation of the period’s political unconscious. 
 
 
  11
significant for writers of the period.   All three factors can be grouped under the rubric of a 
pervasive “anxiety of audience” (Bennett, Keats 41) afflicting the period’s writers, an anxiety 
symptomatic of any combination of these factors.   One factor is the uncertainty confronting 
authors publishing their works in a rapidly expanding print marketplace with a fragmenting 
readership, policed by a highly critical anonymous reviewing system.   A second factor is the 
always-looming threat of prosecution that characterized much of the Romantic period.  The 
first- and second-generation Romantics alike risked sedition charges for subversive 
publication, a reflection of the era’s perpetual political turmoil.  A third factor is the 
belatedness of writers seeking to reach a mass readership in a culture that has become, by the 
turn of the century, fundamentally prosaic. 12  
 
Insinuatio and the Elusive Preface 
As noted above, one can trace the preface’s roots back to the exordium of classical 
rhetoric.  The first of six sections of an oratory, the exordium “brings the mind of the 
auditor into a proper condition to receive the rest of the speech” (Cicero 41).  Like the 
preface, one of the exordium’s primary functions is to establish the speaker’s ethos for 
purposes of establishing credibility.   Roman rhetoricians such as Cicero, building on 
                                                        
12 I use the term “prosaic” in two senses.  First, I incorporate the socio-linguistic aspect of the prosaic age from 
Hegel, who, in his Aesthetics, characterizes the nineteenth century as an “age of prose,” in which the language of 
poetry becomes increasingly artificial and incapable of “hitting the truth” (I:  1006).  In this sense, the social 
function of the poet becomes increasingly vexed in the context of a linguistic disjunction between the 
discursive modes of poetry and prose, a difficulty I elaborate in Chapter Four.  Secondly, I use the term in the 
more general sense of a culture that is fundamentally utilitarian and pragmatic, or in the words of an OED 
definition, “unromantic, dull, flat, unexciting, commonplace, mundane.”  Goethe, in his 1817 essay 
“Geistesepochen” (translated as “Stages of Man’s Mind”) classifies his turn-of-the-century culture as “prosaic,” 
the final and lowest stage of a declining historical cycle, descending from the poetic to the theological to the 
philosophical to the prosaic.  Characterized by its “dissolution into the ordinary” (204), Goethe’s prosaic age, 
“stimulated by events in the world, retrogresses and abandons the guidance of the intellect” (204).   In a prosaic 
age, then, even prose writers like Godwin and Hays, who seek to mediate an idealistic project to a prosaic 
world, face considerable difficulty in disseminating their messages. 
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Aristotle,13 subdivided the exordium into two possible schemes:  the principium and the 
insinuatio.14  The principium serves as a straightforward introduction to a speech that presents a 
non-controversial case, in which the auditors are “not completely hostile” (Cicero 43), a 
situation requiring no rhetorical chicanery.  The insinuatio, however, becomes necessary in 
situations where the speaker anticipates hostility from his audience; as a result, he must 
resort to “dissimulation and indirection” (43) in order to insinuate his message into the 
auditor’s mind.   The principal reason for the insinuatio is “if there is something scandalous in 
the case” (47).  The concept of the insinuatio becomes especially relevant in the rhetorical 
situations of the four writers analyzed in this study:  William Godwin, Mary Hays, William 
Wordsworth, and Percy Bysshe Shelley.  All four writers, through the act of publishing texts 
antithetical to the prevailing hegemonic norms of their historical moments, are implicitly 
presenting a “bad” case.  Aware that they are addressing audiences likely to be hostile to 
their ideas, all four writers craft their prefaces in the spirit of Cicero’s insinuatio.  In this sense, 
I argue that what distinguishes the prefaces of Godwin, Hays, Wordsworth, and Shelley as 
distinctively ‘Romantic’—in the historical sense of a ‘Romantic’ period characterized by 
specific institutional and ideological discursive restrictions and interdictions—is their anxious 
and intensified recourse to insinuatio, as manifested in various ways through their prefaces.  
                                                        
13 In Book III of his Rhetoric, Aristotle elaborates the function of the exordium, highlighting its necessity in 
situations where the speaker with a “bad case” can anticipate hostility from his audience:  “They, too, employ 
exordia who have, or appear to have, the worse case; for it is better to pause any where than on the case itself.  
On which account servants tell not what is asked them, but all the circumstances, and make long preambles” 
(254).  This aspect of the exordium resembles certain types of polemical or defensive prefaces that employ such 
“long preambles” to deflect attention from potentially inflammatory texts.    
 
14 Cicero identifies five kinds of cases to determine whether one should proceed with a principium or an 
insinuatio:  honourable, difficult, mean, ambiguous, or obscure.  Of these five cases, the honourable—”one wins 
favour . . . without any speech” (41)—requires a principium.  The other four require insinuatio for a variety of 
reasons:  they have “alienated the [audience’s sympathy]” (41), or the case is “discreditable” and “engenders . . . 
ill-will” (41).    
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To classify this type of preface, I will borrow and modify a term of Genette’s:  the elusive 
preface. 15   These prefaces are “elusive” not only in the sense that they seek to elude 
potentially hostile readers by deflecting attention away from whatever subversive message 
the work may convey, but also in the sense that they often work against the grain of the texts 
they introduce, creating a dissonance between preface and main text that generates a degree 
of semantic indeterminacy.   
Readings that take these prefaces seriously at a narrative level thus uncover a tension 
between the moral of the preface and the diverse tendencies of the texts to which they are 
attached.  I use the terms moral and tendency as articulated in William Godwin’s 1797 essay 
“Of Choice in Reading,” a useful touchstone for discussions of the complex relation 
between text and reader as articulated during the turbulent Revolutionary decade of the 
1790s.  At stake is the question of the derivation of meaning and the hermeneutic role of the 
reader in interpreting the message of the text.  For Godwin, understanding is not a simple 
matter of the reader’s wandering into the text and plucking a ripe maxim for his or her own 
edification.  Rather, what Godwin calls the “moral” of the text is open-ended, promiscuously 
susceptible to as many subjective interpretations as there are readers.  Hence his valuable 
distinction between the “moral” and the “tendency” of a text:  whereas the moral signifies 
the “ethical sentence to the illustration of which the work may most aptly be applied,” the 
tendency denotes “the actual effect it is calculated to produce upon the reader” (109).  
Moreover, the tendency can be ascertained only by “experiment” and hinges on the “state of 
mind” of the reader.  In this essay Godwin reveals a sensitivity to the inevitability of 
                                                        
15
Although I borrow Genette’s terminology here, I have modified its meaning.  For Genette, the “elusive 
preface” denotes prefaces characterized by their “preterition,” which deny that they are prefaces or, in other 
cases, speak of something completely irrelevant to the main text’s subject matter (234-35).  My use of the term 
links “elusive” with the insinuatio and the methods of dissimulation through which writers seek to evade 
audience hostility in all its various guises. 
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semantic contingency.  The onus is on the reader to formulate his or her own interpretation, 
whether or not it harmonizes with the author’s intended moral, and as such no work can be 
condemned for exerting a corrupting influence.  Only a corrupt reader is prone to the 
contagion of textual vice; the virtuous reader is immune to any potential negative effects of 
reading.  Therefore, Godwin concludes that children (and by extension readers generally) 
should be permitted to read whatever they wish, without the prohibition of parental 
interference or the sort of institutional intrusion that led to the formation of what the 
Catholic Church calls the index expurgatorius.   
Godwin’s use of the term “experiment” to describe the reader’s role in ascertaining a 
text’s meaning opens up a way of thinking about how prefaces function in an ideologically 
repressive context.  For if part of the preface’s insinuatio derives from the necessity of 
deflecting attention away from a text’s potentially subversive nature, then the prefacing 
author implicitly imposes, or at least stages the imposing of, a moral on the prefaced text.   
The writers I have selected for analysis in this study—all of whom are chronic prefacers and 
all of whom recognize the rhetorical potential of what Hegel calls the “misleading” nature of 
prefaces—craft their prefaces in such a way as to cover themselves with a prefatory moral, 
while remaining aware of the potential for individual readers to formulate their own 
tendencies.  One way of managing a text’s entry in the public sphere, therefore, could be to 
characterize the text as an experiment, to emphasize the text’s speculative rather than its 
pragmatic intention.  One of the relevant OED entries for “experiment” defines the noun as 
“a tentative procedure . . . adopted in uncertainty whether it will answer the purpose” 
(OED). 16   
                                                        
16 Definition #3 from the OED presents a similar idea:  “An action or operation undertaken in order to 
discover something unknown, to test a hypothesis, or establish or illustrate some known truth.”  Again the 
texts’ speculative nature is emphasized, along with a quasi-scientific characterization.  
  15
Such a technique will form the method of Godwin’s preface to his Enquiry Concerning 
Political Justice, which he identifies in a deleted prefatory manuscript passage as an 
“experiment” (PJV 4).   In fact, all four writers analyzed in this study use the term 
experiment on at least one occasion in their prefaces when referring to their texts.  Mary 
Hays will refer to The Memoirs of Emma Courtney as a “hazardous experiment” (13) in the 
Memoirs; Wordsworth uses the term to characterize the poems in the 1798 Advertisement to 
Lyrical Ballads and then in 1802’s preface he refers back to the 1798 Ballads as an 
“experiment,” in both cases talking about the ‘linguistic’ experiment of appropriating the 
“real language of men” (LB 65); and Shelley calls Laon and Cythna an “experiment on the 
temper of the public mind” (PS 32).  The repeated use of the term emphasizes how these 
writers pay lip service to the idea of a determining prefatory moral.  In many cases the very 
ideas of a moral, a fixed morality, and a predetermined reading are implicitly put under 
erasure by prefaces that announce their texts’ experimental nature.  The prefaces analyzed in 
this study are defensively polemical for a variety of reasons, but one common denominator 
is that Godwin, Hays, Wordsworth, and Shelley face considerable public hostility with the 
publication of their works, not to mention the always-looming threat of censorship, sedition 
charges, or critical ridicule.  Thus experiment can become a convenient way of covering 
oneself by presenting the text as purely speculative, eliding the possibility that the text’s 
readers will actually be motivated to act according to the principles contained within the 
book, a way of subverting the logic of state censorship that plagued the period’s writers.  As 
experiments, these texts assert the logic of Kant’s distinction between the “public” and 
“private” use of one’s reason, in which citizens reserve the “public” right to criticize 
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government and religious practices in a speculative and scholarly way, even though they 
must otherwise follow their orders in a professional capacity.17  
 
Context:  Anxieties of Reception 
Coleridge, in an 1810 essay from The Friend, tackles the issue of print censorship in 
the early nineteenth century, exhorting, “Shame fall on that man, who . . . would render the 
Press ineffectual” (53).  In the spirit of Godwin’s “Of Choice in Reading,” Coleridge 
questions the logic of print censorship, pointing out the unlikelihood of any direct 
connection between reading and violent upheaval.  One must balance, according to 
Coleridge, the “incomparably greater mischief of the overt-acts, supposing them actually 
occasioned by the libel (as for instance, the subversion of government and property, if the 
principles of Thomas Paine had been realized, or if an attempt had been made to realize 
them, by the many thousands of his readers)” and the “very great improbability that such 
effects will be produced by such writings” (54).  In other words, acts of violence and sedition 
                                                        
17 In his 1784 essay “What is Enlightenment?” Kant distinguishes between the private and public use of one’s 
reason.  The “public use of a man’s reason must be free at all times, and this alone can bring enlightenment 
among men” (137).  Kant equates the public use of reason with scholarship and the scholar’s relation to his 
reading public, in contrast to private reason, which he equates with “a civic post or office” (137).  In many 
instances, for the sake of the greater good, civic functionaries should not exercise their right to free speech 
through argument, but rather should remain “passive” (137).  However, argument and criticism should be 
permitted in a purely speculative context.  For instance, a military officer should never question the orders 
given to him by a superior; however, that same officer reserves the right to question publicly the actions of the 
military.  Similarly, one must pay one’s taxes regardless of whether one agrees with the practice; however, as a 
scholar, one is free to utter “publicly his thoughts against the undesirability or even the unjustice of such taxes” 
(137).  This forms the basis of Kant’s argument in his 1798 Conflict of the Faculties, in which Kant distinguishes 
between the “higher” faculties—law, theology, and medicine—and the “lower” faculty of philosophy.  The 
higher faculties “interest the government itself” (26), and as such correspond to the “private” use of reason 
because students in the higher faculties will be trained for government posts.  The lower faculty, however, 
“uses its own judgment about what it teaches” (27) and, in the best interests of promoting enlightenment, 
should be “independent of the government’s command . . . free to evaluate everything” (29).  Without this 
right to free thought, “the truth would not come to light” (29).  Kant’s ideas here result from his own 
experiences with censorship.  After the 1786 death of Frederick the Great, who permitted scholarly freedom of 
expression, his successor Frederick William II implemented strict state-controlled censorship measures that 
greatly hindered intellectual speculation, especially in the domain of religious inquiry.  Kant outlines this 
situation in his preface to the Conflict of the Faculties.      
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are deserving of punishment, but texts should not be repressed due to the false logic of a  
cause-and-effect relationship between act and text.  Using Godwin’s terminology, one could 
rephrase Coleridge’s argument as stating that a text cannot be prosecuted based solely on its 
moral. Coleridge’s essay, written after more than fifteen years of state repression, reflects on 
the pervasive atmosphere of fear that characterizes the print marketplace of the Romantic 
period.  Indeed, closely linked with the history of the Romantic period is the incessant 
intrusion of the state in the print marketplace, in the form of sustained political censorship, 
from the 1790s through the 1820s.  To emphasize the persistent role of direct and indirect, 
official and unofficial forces of textual repression that compel writers to take their prefaces 
seriously as a means of avoiding persecution, I will provide a brief historical sketch to 
foreground the hazardousness of the long Romantic period’s publishing climate. 
Among European nations, Britain stood alone as a bastion of the right to free speech 
from the late-seventeenth century to the late-eighteenth century, having repealed the press 
licensing act in 1695.  But this relative freedom gave way to increasingly restrictive measures 
enacted through a series of government proclamations calculated to quell the tide of a radical 
print network, whose rapid expansion in the early 1790s was generated by a nascent mass 
political public with access to new discursive forms and channels of communication.  For 
the first time in history, a mass reading-public became a serious political force.   All orders of 
society had access to books, newspapers, and pamphlets:  circulating libraries ensured that 
books were available to those who could not otherwise afford to buy them, and the political 
events of the day were discussed in reading clubs and in the nation’s coffee-houses and pubs.  
Even the illiterate could be informed through listening to texts read aloud in these informal 
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settings. 18  But it was precisely the ubiquity of this print culture that worried the state, 
especially the fact that the ‘dark masses’ could be influenced by what they read.  Thus, when 
Thomas Paine’s Rights Of Man was published in 1791, and again in a second edition in 1792, 
selling an unprecedented 200,000 copies in a cheap sixpenny edition (A. Booth 109), 
authorities took notice precisely because it targeted a lower-class readership.  Characterized 
by its clear, simple prose, the Rights of Man, a book that supported the French Revolution 
and denounced the idea of hereditary rule, proved itself capable of attracting a mass 
readership.  But its publication did not happen in a vacuum:  the 1790s saw the emergence 
of a significant radical print culture, with a proliferation of radical writers, publishers, 
booksellers, and periodicals.  In this “threshold of mass political literacy” (A. Booth 110), 
radical newspapers such as the Manchester Herald, Cambridge Intelligencer and Sheffield Register 
were founded, alongside inexpensive radical periodicals such as Politics for the People and Pig’s 
Meat.  In addition, the London Corresponding Society was formed in 1792 to campaign for 
working-class suffrage. 
 Alarmed by this rapidly coalescing radical press, the British government soon took 
action.  Jon Klancher argues that the periodical can be “a space for imagining social 
formations still inchoate, and a means to give them shape” (24), although one could expand 
this argument to incorporate other forms of writing that, in addition to the periodical, 
contribute to social formation.  Clearly, this is the position taken by the British government 
in their haste to repress the publication of all types of radical literature, as they recognized 
the discursive potential for envisioning radically new forms of social and political 
organization.  Thus, in May of 1792, the first royal proclamation against seditious literature 
was enacted.  According to its stricture, the proclamation targeted “divers wicked and 
                                                        
18 Michael Sanderson estimates that literacy rates were about 40 percent among the plebian class, and the figure 
was much higher for the class of artisans and tradesmen (9-16). 
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seditious writings . . . printed, published and industriously dispersed, tending to excite tumult 
and disorder, by endeavouring to raise groundless jealousies in the minds of our faithful and 
loving subjects” (qtd. in A. Booth 110).  With this proclamation, and the enactment of a 
second royal proclamation in December of 1792, emerged the loyalist movement, the 
beginning of an ad hoc anti-radical campaign mobilized by the propertied class.  The loyalists, 
although not officially sanctioned by the government, nonetheless took it upon themselves 
to censor all publications—pamphlets, books, newspapers, periodicals—for potentially 
seditious ideas.  
 As the British government grew increasingly anxious about a French invasion, strict 
measures continued and new legislation was introduced.  The Treasonable Practices Bill of 
1795 extended the definition of treason to those who “‘maliciously and advisedly by writing, 
printing, preaching, or other speaking, express, publish, utter or declare, any words or 
sentences to excite or stir up the people to hatred or contempt of the person of his Majesty, 
his heirs or successors, or the government and constitution of this realm’“ (qtd. in A. Booth 
114). And the decade ended with the “most draconian legislation in the eighteenth century” 
(Feather 62-3), the Corresponding Societies Act of 1799, which banned all corresponding 
societies and imposed an arduous registration scheme for all publishers and printers.  
Furthermore, in 1797, the government crafted another method to control print circulation:  
the increase of the Stamp Tax.  The purpose of this increase was to limit publications 
“printed in very great numbers and at a very small price” that would “excite hatred and 
contempt of the government” (Cranfield 107).  Beginning with an increase from twopence 
to threepence-halfpenny, the tax was frequently raised to increase the price of newspapers, 
keeping them out of reach of the lower classes.  By 1815, the tax had reached fourpence, 
which raised the price of newspapers by double what they would otherwise have cost 
  20
(Goldstein 131).  And in 1819, the tax was extended to widen the variety of publications 
covered by its definition.  Thus, not only were newspapers heavily taxed, but the price of 
pamphlets was inflated as well. 
 Later in the Romantic period, restrictive measures continued, especially in the years 
1817-1820 following the French Revolutionary wars.  During 1817-20, at least 175 
publications were charged with sedition and blasphemous libel (Wickwar 315).  Among 
those convicted of the charge was printer Richard Carlile, who was sentenced to three years 
in prison for publishing Paine’s Rights of Man.  In 1817, Habeas Corpus was suspended and 
parliament passed the Seditious Meetings Act to give magistrates greater control of 
censorship over the radical press (Goldstein 129).   And in 1819, political ferment peaked 
with the notorious Peterloo massacre, in which a rally for parliamentary reform was attacked 
by cavalry, who killed eleven protestors and injured hundreds more.  This massacre 
“precipitated the final political struggle between the government and the press . . . the mood 
of the radical press became one of boiling anger” (Thomas 161).   Thus, in 1819 the 
government went even further by passing the Blasphemous and Seditious Libels Act, which 
gave magistrates even greater powers to search for seditious literature and established 
transportation as a penalty for second offences.   Finally, after years of increasingly violent 
unrest, the Reform Act of 1832 was passed, doubling the number of enfranchised voters, 
and redistributing constituencies to allow greater representation for industrial towns (Pugh 
49), setting the stage for the gradual enfranchisement of the middle class.   
This brief sketch of the period’s hostile publishing climate demonstrates the 
precarious milieu into which Romantic writers entered.  Godwin, Hays, Wordsworth, and 
Shelley—all of whom sought to disseminate radical ideas—thus experienced a significant 
“anxiety of reception,” a term used by Lucy Newlyn to account for writers frustrated by their 
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failed attempts to connect with a mass audience, or their inability to find an audience for 
their work.   Genette claims that one of the primary functions of the preface is to identify 
the author’s choice of a public.  But in order to make this choice, the author must have some 
idea about who his audience is:  “guiding the reader also, and first of all, means situating him, 
and thus determining who he is” (212).  Jon Klancher’s claim that the Romantics were 
“radically uncertain of their readers” (3) underscores one of the primary motivating factors 
for the period’s prefatory writing.  Klancher claims that “no single, unified ‘reading public’ 
could be addressed” in the Romantic period (3).   In this “inchoate cultural moment,” 
Klancher identifies four “strategically critical audiences” formed during the period:  “a newly 
self-conscious middle-class public, a nascent mass audience, a polemical radical readership, 
and the special institutional audience—what Coleridge called the clerisy—that assumed its 
first shape in this contentious time” (4).  As the principal site of interface between sender 
and interlocutor, inside and outside, private and public sphere, the preface is an index of the 
problematic relation between author and audience.  The author’s attempt to situate himself 
in an inchoate public sphere during this time of dizzying flux results in what Herrington-
Perry identifies as a significant source of the Romantic preface-writer’s anxiety:  that he is 
not the ultimate determinant of the meaning or value of his text (18).  A number of factors 
contribute to the formation of this crisis of subjectivity, stemming, on the one hand, from 
the author’s bewilderment at having to confront a mass readership and, on the other, from 
the paranoia resulting from the constant threat of hostile reviewers.   
Andrew Bennett identifies a sense of “dislocation, alienation and disillusionment” 
(Romantic 44) that afflicted writers like Wordsworth and Coleridge, poets whose poems sold 
poorly, and whose inability to connect with a mass audience resulted in a reversal of their 
youthful desire to democratize reading.  Both writers, by the 1810s, had spurned the 
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readership they had unsuccessfully courted: Coleridge derided the “promiscuous” reading 
public and turned his attention instead to the quasi-professional “clerisy,” while Wordsworth 
devised his imaginary audience of the future, constructing himself out of the Romantic 
period for a proto-Victorian audience.  Although Godwin reached a mass audience in the 
early 1790s, he and Hays were forced to reach toward a more restricted radical readership, 
the democratic equivalent of the clerisy.  In his preface to Prometheus Unbound, Shelley vaguely 
and optimistically identifies his readership as “the more select classes of poetical readers” 
(SPP 209).  He also claims, in a January 1822 letter to John Gisborne, that “Prometheus was 
never intended for more than 5 or 6 persons” (PBSL 2: 388).  Moreover, in his 
advertisement to Epipsychidion, he distinguishes the “certain class of readers” for whom the 
poem will be “sufficiently intelligible” from the “certain other class” to whom “it must ever 
remain incomprehensible, from a defect of a common organ of perception for the ideas of 
which it treats” (SPP 392).  Even Godwin, who achieved popular success with the 1793 
publication of Political Justice and the 1794 publication of Caleb Williams, fretted over the 
audience who consumed that novel.  In the preface to the 1832 second edition of Fleetwood, 
Godwin retrospectively recalls the process of writing and publishing Caleb Williams, 
lamenting that he feared he had “written a book to amuse boys and girls in their vacant 
hours, a story to be hastily gobbled up by them, swallowed in a pusillanimous and 
unanimated mood, without chewing and digestion” (12).  In the late-eighteenth century 
Godwin achieved a degree of literary success Wordsworth and Coleridge could only dream 
about, yet his anxiety about the reception of Caleb Williams reveals not only an uncertainty 
about who his audience might be, but an actively hostile suspicion that the novel was being 
indiscriminately consumed by the same promiscuous reading-public condemned by 
Coleridge.   
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 Whoever the writers discussed in this study may have imagined as their ideal or real 
audience—contemporary or posthumous, passive consumers or active receptors—there is 
one segment of the period’s readership whose presence could not be ignored or 
underestimated:  the critics.  The rise of the professional literary critic engendered a 
significant and unprecedented change in the configuration of the early-nineteenth century 
literary field.  Equally as threatening as the mass, faceless audience, was the anonymous 
reviewer whose barbs could doom both work and author to oblivion or ridicule.  The 
importance of the periodical as arbiter of literary taste cannot be underestimated:  at the 
height of their success (circa 1814), the Edinburgh and the Quarterly magazines circulated in 
excess of 13,000 copies each; in addition, by Francis Jeffrey’s estimate, an average of at least 
three people read each copy, making the total number of readers several times the actual 
circulation (Erickson 7).   The periodicals, according to Lee Erickson, were “giant machines” 
(88) that “made everyone who wrote subject to them because of their financial and critical 
power” (91).  Clifford Siskin claims that “writing was professionalized only when it came to 
be accompanied by the alternative forms of institutional self-control which we know 
collectively as criticism” (160).  Reviewers like Jeffrey, Croker, Lockhart and Hazlitt became 
the period’s agents of consecration and legitimation, and every publishing author was forced 
to endure the critical gauntlet of evaluation and criticism played out in the pages of the 
periodicals.  Coleridge’s 1815 poem “Contemporary Critics” seethes with the bitterness of a 
writer disgusted by the hostile treatment of writers at the hands of these “cut-throat bandits 
in the paths of fame”:19 
                                                        
19 This view of criticism as a degraded form of abuse against original writers is in keeping with sentiments 
expressed a century earlier in Pope’s “Essay on Criticism,” in which he contrasts the critics of Ancient 
Greece—”The gen’rous Critick fann’d the Poet’s Fire, / And taught the World, with Reason to Admire” (100-
1)—with contemporary British critics, “Monsters” (554) who, with their “Darts engage / Here point your 
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  No private grudge they need, no personal spite; 
  The viva sectio is its own delight! 
  All enmity, all envy, they disclaim, 
  Disinterested thieves of our good name: 
  Cool, sober murderers of their neighbour’s fame.  (Biographia 109) 
Among the reactions to the anxiety of critical reception were, in Newlyn’s words, 
“intricate and occluded devices for pre-empting misinterpretation” (x).  The devices 
suggested by Newlyn are often paratextual—the preface, above all, is the paratextual form 
most commonly employed for the purpose of guiding interpretation and directly addressing 
(or confronting) readers.  My analysis of the “intricate and occluded” prefaces of the 
Romantic period begins with William Godwin’s 1793 Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, a text 
whose preface epitomizes the spirit of the elusive preface.  A substantial philosophical 
treatise that would likely evade censorship because of the complexity of its subject matter 
and a prohibitively expensive pricetag, Political Justice nonetheless subverts its own immunity 
because of a preface that directly engages and provokes the forces of state repression.  
Indeed, in the very act of emphasizing gradualism as a revolutionary principle, Godwin puts 
the concept of gradualism under erasure as the urgency and force of his prefatory rhetoric 
unsettle the precepts of slow, non-violent ideological change argued for throughout his 
treatise.  The spirit of dissimulation attributed to Political Justice’s preface by Godwin’s friend 
William Nicholson—one of the hallmarks of Cicero’s insinuatio—thus pervades the preface’s 
rhetoric, a strategy that Godwin will employ again in 1795 for the second edition of his 
novel Caleb Williams when he writes a preface that announces the suppression of the first 
edition’s preface.   The inclusion of the second edition’s preface adds an additional narrative 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Thunder, and exhaust your rage” (554-55).   See also Chapter Four, where I discuss Matthew Arnold’s concept 
of epochs of concentration and expansion in the context of Shelley’s opinion of contemporary criticism. 
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layer to the novel, positing the extradiegetic ‘Godwin’ as a real-life victim of the same 
institutional forces of repression that plague the novel’s title-character, while foregrounding 
issues of reception in a mass print marketplace that preoccupy the novel’s third volume.  But 
the 1795 preface will eventually be superseded by Mary Shelley’s preface for its 1831 reissue 
as part of Colburn and Bentley’s Standard Novels series.  Mary Shelley’s preface, in addition 
to Godwin’s 1832 preface to Fleetwood, in which he recalls the composition process of Caleb 
Williams, ostensibly seeks to downplay the novel’s radically political tendency for a proto-
Victorian audience.  But as instances of the elusive preface, Godwin’s and Mary Shelley’s 
prefaces perform a surreptitious rhetorical maneuver.  What appears as a tamed-down 
narrative of Godwin and his novel reveals itself as a cover for rehabilitating the reputation of 
a philosopher whose radical ideas had alienated him from the British public since the late-
1790s. 
 The reception anxiety experienced by Godwin in the 1790s results primarily from a 
clash between his radical attacks on governmental institutions and the reaction of a British 
government anxious about revolutionary potential in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution.  But Godwin, an educated male intellectual, did not need to worry about 
establishing his authorial credibility, unlike his contemporary Mary Hays.   For Hays, a 
woman writer seeking literary entry first into the Dissenting public sphere, and then into the 
middle-class public sphere, establishing her discursive authority becomes a precondition for 
disseminating the feminist message of her 1790s publications.  Thus, Chapter Two 
investigates how Hays’s 1790s prefaces become the site of a rhetorical subterfuge through 
which she crafts a protean series of self-figurations designed to mediate her work to the 
public, a pattern she establishes in her first publication, Cursory Remarks on an Enquiry into the 
Expediency and Propriety of Public or Social Worship:  Inscribed to Gilbert Wakefield (1792).  Writing 
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under the pseudonym Eusebia, Hays creates a prefatory figure whose genuflections to 
feminine decorum obscure what is otherwise a bold assertion of her “right to philosophy” 
(Derrida, Ethics 13) to a male-dominated Dissenting audience.  The preface to her next 
publication, 1793’s Letters and Essays, Moral and Miscellaneous, retains the basic structure of its 
predecessor but asserts Hays’s discursive authority much more strongly through repeated 
allusions to Mary Wollstonecraft, whose editing suggestions and professional mentorship 
provided a catalyst for Hays’s authorial self-presentation.  Thus, by the time she publishes 
her novel Memoirs of Emma Courtney in 1796, the source of Hays’s reception anxiety shifts 
from concerns about her authority to uneasiness about public reaction to her protagonist’s 
unrestrained passion.  Hays compensates for this anxiety by writing an elusive preface that 
depicts Emma as a negative example, a rhetorical pattern that paratextually pervades the 
novel, from the preface to the framing letters to the footnotes, through which the moralizing 
voice of the preface continually intervenes to disapprove of Emma’s conduct in an attempt 
to contain the novel’s radical tendency.  For her final two 1790s publications, the 
anonymous Appeal to the Men of Great Britain in Behalf of Woman (1798) and The Victim of 
Prejudice (1799), Hays reacts to a changed intellectual climate within which feminist ideals are 
treated with hostility and suspicion.  As such, she again deploys rhetorical subterfuge in her 
prefaces to mediate her texts:  in the Appeal’s preface she distances herself from the 
disgraced Wollstonecraft and reverts to the self-deprecating tone of the Cursory Remarks; and 
in the Victim’s elusive preface, she posits a ‘red herring’ moral intended to obscure the 
comprehensiveness of her attack on patriarchal society. 
Chapter Three turns to the prefaces of William Wordsworth, which are elusive in the 
same way as Godwin’s and Hays’s, but with an additional degree of historically-determined 
reception anxiety.  For the revolutionary energies associated with the novels and polemics of 
  27
the 1790s become, at the turn of the century, redirected and marginalized within a poetry 
that is becoming increasingly outmoded in the age of prose that will be later theorized by 
writers such as Thomas Love Peacock and Hegel.  Whereas the prefaces of Godwin and 
Hays submit to censorship by imposing a moral in their prefaces, a sort of ‘writing in code’ 
necessitated by the political environment of the 1790s that genuflects to authority while 
allowing the texts themselves to develop their tendencies, Wordsworth faces the additional 
challenge of asserting the social relevance of the Poet.  Thus, like Hays in her preface to 
Letters and Essays, Wordsworth negotiates mediation through professionalization, although in 
the preface to the Lyrical Ballads’ second edition his concern is with constructing the 
professional category of the Poet rather than consolidating a gendered form of discursive 
authority.  The 1798, 1800, and 1802 versions of the Lyrical Ballads’ preface thus chart the 
anxious development of a prefatory poet-figure whose increasingly elaborate depiction 
obscures the hard realities of his historical moment, especially his status as a commodity-
producer in an industrial age and the belatedness of his vocation.  As a result of the prefaces’ 
monological intensity, the poems, intended as dialogic instances of a variety of ‘rustic’ 
speakers, risk being subsumed by the prefatory voice.   Ultimately, however, Wordsworth 
will realize the dialogic potential of his poetry through a hybridization of linguistic 
consciousnesses achieved through the juxtaposition of his prefatory voice with the 
characters in the poems.  
 Percy Bysshe Shelley, whose publishing career began around the time of 
Wordsworth’s 1815 Poems, also finds himself plagued by reception anxieties.  But while 
Wordsworth’s attempts at professionalizing the poet reflect his desire to capitulate to the 
public sphere through mediation, Shelley instead stages this capitulation in his prefaces 
ironically, in ways both within and beyond his control.  Shelley’s prefaces, as I argue in 
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Chapter Four, absorb themselves in a particular type of Romantic irony characterized by a 
self-negating form of parabasis.  The shifting array of self-figurations deployed by Shelley in 
his prefaces, elusively defensive in their attempts to evade the hostility of a public sphere 
intolerant of his ideals, become increasingly symptomatic of Shelley’s disconnection from his 
given actuality.   As revealed through the prefaces to Alastor, Laon and Cythna, Epipsychidion, 
and Adonais, Shelley repeatedly pushes the boundaries of the insinuatio, through which 
parabasis ultimately becomes subject to intense linguistic skepticism.  But Shelley’s use of 
insinuatio also reflects his desire to assert his right to “literature” (Derrida, On the Name 28) as 
the right to say anything in public, in the sense that he puts his radical political ideals into 
play while simultaneously evading responsibility for them through the workings of romantic 
irony.  Finally, at the end of the chapter, I return full-circle to Mary Shelley, whose prefaces 
to Shelley’s Posthumous Poems and Poetical Works perform the same rehabilitative function as 
her 1831 preface to Godwin’s Caleb Williams:  she figures a kinder, gentler Shelley whose 
radical and polemical energies are subdued to create a proto-Victorian version of the poet, 
characterized more by his lyric sensitivity than his political and religious polemicism. 
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—ONE— 
 
WILLIAM GODWIN:  THE POLITICS OF THE PREFACE 
 
 
“The Spirit of the Age was never more fully shown than in its treatment of this writer—its 
love of paradox and change, its dastard submission to prejudice and to the fashion of the 
day.  Five and twenty years ago he was in the very zenith of a sultry and unwholesome 
popularity . . . now he has sunk below the horizon.” 
 
—William Hazlitt, The Spirit of the Age (1825) 
 
Throughout his long and varied literary career, Godwin was a prolific preface-writer:  
nearly all of his published works are prefaced with introductions ranging from the verbose 
(the preface to The Genius of Christianity Unveiled runs sixteen pages, followed by yet another 
preface, the “Preface to Essay I,” which fills an additional seven pages) to the pithy (the 
preface to Deloraine consists of a mere six terse sentences).  The sheer volume of Godwinian 
prefaces is substantial and complex enough to warrant a full-length study of its own, but 
rather than providing a comprehensive overview, this chapter will focus in-depth on the 
several prefaces engendered by the publication of his two most topical works:  the 
philosophical treatise Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and the novel Caleb Williams, texts that 
span not only the duration of Godwin’s mature authorial career, but which also roughly 
cover the historically-defined period of British Romanticism.  I have selected these two texts 
because their prefaces embody the spirit of the elusive preface, in the sense that the prefaces 
mediate texts whose radical subject matter requires the insinuatio of a prefatory intervention.   
Furthermore, both texts are ‘multiprefatory’ as they were published, and prefaced, in 
multiple editions within Godwin’s lifetime, thus providing a glimpse into how the prefaces 
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adapt to the changing conditions of different historical moments of publication.  An analysis 
of these texts in their historical and narratological contexts will reveal how prefaces function 
as the site in which extra-textual historico-political anxieties impinge upon the structure of 
the primary narrative, fundamentally altering (often unintentionally) the work’s textual gist. 
 First, I analyze the 1793 preface to the first edition of Political Justice, an elusive 
preface that cuts against the gradualist grain of the text it introduces by unconsciously 
depicting itself in the same terms as those ‘incendiary’ radical publications from which it 
seeks to distance itself.  This tension between violent upheaval and gradualism also informs 
the content of the 1796 second edition’s preface and the revisions made to the treatise.  I 
then turn to the preface to the 1796 second edition of Godwin’s novel Caleb Williams, the 
inclusion of which significantly affects the reader’s experience of the text through its 
insertion of a polemical prefatory epinarrative at the highest narrative level.   In the final 
section, I return to Caleb Williams, specifically its 1831 reissue as part of Colburn and 
Bentley’s Standard Novels series, to analyze how these new paratexts—Mary Shelley’s 1831 
“Introduction” to Caleb Williams and Godwin’s 1832 preface to Fleetwood, in which Godwin 
reflects on Caleb Williams’ composition process—ostensibly pacify the novel’s radical energy 
by reinscribing it within an institutionalized system of reified authorship, but whose 
elusiveness also reallocates these energies to a proto-Victorian readership.  
 
Political Justice’s Radical Gradualism 
 
In the context of the mid-1790s historical moment during which Political Justice was 
published, Godwin’s ideas about choice in reading assume an especially urgent significance.  
For in the midst of this repressive intellectual climate, the publication of such a subversive 
work would not go unnoticed by government agents and censors.  Godwin’s belief in the 
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value of free and uncensored reading was certainly not shared by government forces seeking 
to shut down any instances of radical discourse.  Realizing the precariousness of his 
situation, Godwin thus crafts a preface intended to mediate his work to the public sphere, a 
preface ostensibly espousing a ‘moral’ calculated to depict Political Justice as a purely 
speculative work that emphasizes gradualism, not violent revolution, as the means by which 
its ideals will be realized.  But Political Justice has always been more of a process than a 
product, constantly interrogating and revising its own claims, and its preface reveals itself as 
a simultaneously overdetermined and indeterminate part of this process.  Therefore, in the 
process of claiming what it disclaims, the preface mirrors the logic of the text it introduces, 
whose latent uncertainties about the efficacy of gradualism are manifested in the preface’s 
urgent rhetoric.  That the preface unsettles one of the treatise’s main philosophical principles 
points to the indeterminacy of Political Justice’s message, while highlighting the ambivalence of 
Godwin’s commitment to gradualism in a political climate where, to avoid sedition charges, 
he cannot advocate violent revolution.  Indeed, what makes Political Justice’s preface such an 
interesting case of the elusive preface is that Godwin’s insinuatio opens up a gap between the 
preface and the main text that exposes the aporias inherent in gradualism.  The subtext 
revealed through this tension between preface and treatise is more a manifestation of the 
period’s political unconscious than a conscious attempt on Godwin’s part to question the 
efficacy of gradualism.   
 The following excerpt from a 1793 Critical Review article observes how Godwin’s 
preface to the first edition of Political Justice embroils itself in contemporary debates 
concerning freedom of the press and the suppression of seditious literature: 
  In his Preface Mr. Godwin seems to express some degree of apprehension,  
  that the freedom of his sentiments may draw upon him the resentment of the 
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  executive government in this country.–For our own parts we cannot for a  
  moment admit  the supposition.  We cannot for a moment believe that a  
  British minister would  attempt to fix shackles on the freedom of   
  philosophical speculation, or that the nation would endure such an attempt.   
  The only fair reason that can be urged for the prosecution of any publication  
  is, that it is calculated to excite insurrection, and to render the mass of the  
  people bad subjects.  This reasoning can never apply to a speculative work  
  like the present; a work in which particular men and particular measures are  
  rarely animadverted on; a work which from its nature and bulk can never  
  circulate among the inferior classes of society; and a work which   
  expressly condemns violent alterations, violent measures, and the aim of  
  which is to change the system of opinion and sentiment, rather than to effect 
  any sudden change in government. (qtd. in Graham, Godwin Reviewed 63) 
These remarks encapsulate the complex political milieu within which Political Justice makes its 
first appearance, emphasizing the ambiguous boundary between “speculative” literature and 
radical literature intended to provoke violent upheaval.  I will situate my discussion of 
Godwin’s preface to Political Justice within the parameters of these observations, highlighting 
the extent to which it is enmeshed in the exigencies of the historical moment of its 
publication.  Characterized by its ambivalent bait-and-switch rhetorical technique, the 
preface is structured by a dialectical system of tensions that play themselves out not only 
within the prefatory space but also cross over the threshold of the main work to disrupt the 
(dis)continuity of the main text’s argument.  These tensions reflect Godwin’s attempt to 
position himself and his text in an inchoate forum of literary political discussion, and the 
text’s oscillations between claims of conservatism and radicalism, speculative treatise and 
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pragmatic pamphlet, aid to reflection and call to action, are themselves the product of deeper 
indeterminacies concerning the role of political writing and the political writer.  This preface 
binds Political Justice to its immediate circumstances, exposing the anxieties experienced by 
Godwin as he anticipated its reception and its function in the context of British reaction to 
the French Revolution, and how he sought to obviate the book’s interpellation by the agents 
of political repression.  But the preface situates itself in an actual political context that the 
main work theoretically resists. 
 In a diary entry recorded in October of 1793, Godwin writes that he discussed this 
preface with his friend, the chemist and radical William Nicholson, who praised the preface 
for its “dissimulation” (qtd. in Philp 103).  Nicholson’s comment accurately reveals how in 
the preface Godwin at some level intentionally conceals or at least mitigates his thoughts on 
the potential political impact of Political Justice, a strategy that is ostensibly a shrewd move to 
prevent prosecution.  But as a pre-emptive maneuver the preface is a failure, for reasons 
likely beyond Godwin’s conscious awareness of the moral he has constructed in its pages.  I 
would suggest an additional, deeper source for the dissimulation pinpointed by Nicholson:  
an indistinct conception of the function of political discourse coupled with an entrenched 
anxiety about the practicability and the means of political reformation.  Put differently, the 
conflict between political ideals of gradualism and sudden, violent upheaval generates the 
disjunction between preface and main text.  Political Justice’s preface metatextually works 
through the process of Godwin’s ongoing struggle to define and differentiate the elusive and 
self-contradictory terms of political debate that underlie the volume’s assumptions.  What 
Godwin identifies in a deleted prefatory manuscript passage as the “repetitions, redundancies 
and . . . contradictions” (PJV 5) that characterize Political Justice are the necessary materials of 
a text in flux, rooted in the shifting historical sands of a volatile epoch.  The obvious 
  34
manifestation of Political Justice’s always-evolving nature can be found in the frequent, often 
contradictory, revisions made by Godwin throughout his lifetime—even at the time of his 
death, some forty-three years after its initial publication, Godwin was still making revisions 
for a fourth edition. 20  Like Mary Hays, whose prefatory subject is continually in process as 
she struggles to negotiate her discursive authority, Godwin similarly engages in a perpetual 
revisionary process to achieve a fully developed political system.  
Godwin’s ceaseless quest to improve his political treatise mirrors his belief in the 
possibility of human perfectibility, 21 and his classification of Political Justice, in a deleted 
prefatory manuscript passage, as an “experiment” (PJV 4) invokes the discourse of science 
to highlight the work’s perpetual susceptibility to modification while simultaneously 
submitting science’s truth claims to radical speculation.  Indeed, Godwin begins his preface 
by classifying Political Justice as a “scientific” treatise; just as new scientific works must be 
continually published to account for new developments in the field, so too must a work of 
political or moral science be updated to adapt to social changes: 
Few works of literature are held in greater estimation, than those which treat 
in a methodical and elementary way the principles of science.  But the human 
mind in every enlightened age is progressive; and the best elementary treaties 
after a certain time are reduced in their value by the operation of subsequent 
                                                        
20 Political Justice was published in three substantially revised versions in Godwin’s lifetime, appearing in 1793, 
1795, and 1797. Godwin also wrote a Prospectus for a fourth edition in 1832, but it was not published until 
after his death in 1842. 
 
21 In Book I, Chapter VI of Political Justice’s first edition, Godwin states the principle of human perfectibility 
that so crucially informs his argument:  “There is no characteristic of man, which seems at present at least so 
eminently to distinguish him, or to be of so much importance in every branch of moral science, as his 
perfectibility” (PJ 27).  Elsewhere, he outlines the “three principal causes by which the human mind is advanced 
towards a state of perfection; literature, or the diffusion of knowledge through the medium of discussion, 
whether written or oral; education, or a scheme for the early impression of right principles upon the hitherto 
unprejudiced mind; and political justice, or the adoption of any principle of morality and truth into the practice 
of a community” (14). 
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discoveries.  Hence it has always been desired by candid enquirers that 
preceding works of this kind should from time to time be superseded, and 
that other productions including the larger views that have since offered 
themselves, should be substituted in their place.   
 It would be strange if something of this kind were not desirable in 
politics, after the great change that has been produced in men’s minds upon 
this subject, and the light that has been thrown upon it by the recent 
discussions of America and France.  (iii). 
The spirit of dissimulation detected by Nicholson informs the preface’s introductory 
paragraphs.  Characterizing the treatise’s contents as scientific, Godwin emphasizes the 
objective, clinical nature of his analysis, in the process deflecting attention away from himself 
as the source of the radical ideas contained within its pages.  The utter lack of a first-person 
pronoun throughout the entire preface reinforces this sense of detached objectivity, as the 
figure of Godwin remains obscured by the preface’s articulation of Political Justice’s necessary 
function to supersede previous works of political theory.  In the same way, Godwin also 
objectivizes his relation to the American and French revolutions; rather than subversively 
announcing, from the outset, his ideological affinity with recent revolutionary activities, he 
instead mentions the revolutions as catalysts necessitating a new scientific analysis of political 
organization.  But perhaps the most disingenuous aspect of the preface’s opening is 
Godwin’s understated, matter-of-fact admission that “principles will occasionally be found, 
which it will not be just to reject without examination, merely because they are new” (iii).  
Again, this nod to the treatise’s radical subject matter—among other bold claims, Godwin 
advocates the abolition of government and marriage, and postulates the possibility of earthly 
immortality—emphasizes once more the scientific spirit of Godwin’s approach, as Godwin 
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cautions the reader against rejecting such ideas because “a science which may be said to be 
yet in its infancy” might lead to conclusions that are “in some degree uncommon” (iii).  
Thus, Godwin’s elusive rhetoric initially shifts the focus from the prosecutable aspects of 
Political Justice—his own agency as author, and the treatise’s potential for inciting mass 
uprising—to a purely scientific account of its purpose.  
But in the preface, Godwin must also descend from the loftier heights of speculative 
philosophy that characterize the treatise to imagine its actual reception, its relative position in 
the contemporaneous network of political discourse.  The preface, directly engaged with the 
conflicting forces of radicalism and conservatism raging at the peak of revolutionary fervour, 
captures and encapsulates the ambiguities inherent in the radical enterprise of which Godwin 
is about to become a major figure.  It is a text that—in its original form, and in its revised 
and expanded second- and third- edition forms—is fraught with paradox and irony, 
replicating the anxieties intrinsic in Godwin’s own engagement with the public sphere and, 
more widely, the dilemma of the British reform writer in the mid-1790s.  Thus, in the 
original 1793 preface to Political Justice’s first edition, Godwin positions the work not only in 
its immediate revolutionary context, but within the wider historical scope of reform writing 
and “progressive” literature generally.  In this text, Godwin displays his faith in the rhetorical 
power of the preface, entrusting it to justify the necessity of this individual work while 
simultaneously making a case for the development of a discursive form of discourse capable 
of effecting political reform and contributing to the general amelioration of humanity.  
Writing during a unique period in British history, at the intersection of revolutionary fervour 
and a nascent print culture, a “watershed in the history of mass political literacy” (A. Booth 
109) when public opinion seemed precariously balanced between radical and conservative 
extremes, reform writers like Godwin had the unprecedented opportunity to disseminate 
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their ideas among a mass readership.  For a brief period in the 1790s, a space for the 
revolutionary political possibilities of literature was opened up, and writers reacted to the 
responsibilities of this potential in a variety of ways. 22  Indeed, the primary anxiety embodied 
in the preface to Political Justice concerns the work’s audience and the extent to which this 
treatise could possibly foment revolutionary upheaval.  The spectre of violence loomed 
ominously in the consciousness of the British people as the violent energy unleashed by 
revolutionary activity began to crescendo in France, reaching its climax with the beginning of 
the Terror in July of 1793.  Although Godwin’s political philosophy adheres to the tenets of 
gradualism and, as Godwin makes explicit in his preface, one of the express objects of 
Political Justice is “the dissuading from all tumult and violence” (v), the very appearance of a 
work so violently antithetical to dominant political and religious state apparatuses at this 
historical moment was potentially dangerous for the author and for the state. 23  Originally 
published on February 14, 1793, a mere twenty-four days after the execution of Louis XVI, 
Political Justice’s prefatory proclamation that “monarchy was a species of government 
unavoidably corrupt” (iv) was inflammatory enough to override the merely speculative 
                                                        
22 Specifically, it should be noted, the conditions of possibility for the composition and publication of Political 
Justice were a direct result of increased market demand for books on political topics in the wake of the Burke–
Paine debate which had polarized public opinion and whetted consumer appetites for new voices in the French 
Revolutionary controversy.  In 1791 Godwin’s offer to write a book on political principles was accepted by 
publisher George Robinson, who financially supported Godwin with £650 for the sixteen months it took for 
the book’s composition, taking a calculated gamble that the book would generate profits.  Godwin, at this time 
a struggling hack writer, was fortunate to receive patronage for the composition of the work, especially in light 
of a note written in his private papers lamenting his inability to write a treatise on “moral science” because “a 
poor man can only write the books which obtain a present sale” (qtd. in Philp 73).  Admitting that his choice of 
subject matter for Political Justice “was more or less determined by mercantile considerations” (73), Godwin 
highlights the extent to which the market, itself determined by popular interest in political affairs, creates the 
possiblity of a work of ‘pure’ political theory such as Political Justice.      
    
23 Godwin makes this claim in the midst of a passage that portrays the atmosphere of general paranoia during 
the time of Political Justice’s publication:  “Every man, if we may believe the voice of rumour, is to be prosecuted 
who shall appeal to the people by the publication of any unconstitutional paper or pamphlet; and it is added, 
that men are to be prosecuted for any unguarded words that may be dropped in the warmth of conversation 
and debate.  It is now to be tried whether, in addition to these alarming encroachments upon our liberty, a 
book is to fall under the arm of the civil power, which, beside the advantage of having for one of its express 
objects the dissuading from all tumult and violence, is by its very nature an appeal to men of study and 
reflexion” (PJ v).  
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nature of the work.  It is a curious Godwinian irony that the author would publish a work so 
fervently advocating the dismantling of institutional structures at a time when the threat of 
mob violence and radical uprising was terrifyingly real, all the while distancing himself from 
any actual involvement with the front lines of revolutionary action.   
 To suggest that Godwin secretly or even consciously might have hoped that the 
masses would coalesce to impose political reform through the use of force would be very 
difficult to prove.  Certainly, there is very little in Political Justice to support any position that 
even hints at the desirability of violence.  A series of chapters in the “Miscellaneous 
Principles” section of Book IV (“Of Resistance,” “Of Revolutions,” “Of Political 
Associations,” “Of the Species of Reform to be Desired,” and “Of Tyrannicide”) considers 
at length the various modes of revolutionary action.  Throughout, Godwin is conscious of 
the always-lurking threat of violence, a hazard he seeks to avoid at every turn.  Cautioning 
against the “frenzy of enthusiasm,” he instead recommends the “calm, sagacious and 
deliberate effort of reason” (PJ 111) to seek the truth.  Resistance to the forces of 
institutional repression is essential, but force through discourse, not violence, is desirable:  
“the resistance I am bound to employ is that of uttering the truth” (112).  To achieve the 
sort of non-violent, intellectual revolution wished for by Godwin, the best method for 
changing the populace’s opinions is “argument and persuasion . . . free and unrestricted 
discussion . . . we must write, we must argue, we must converse” (115).  But this 
dissemination of ideas must maintain a calm and reflective tone:  Godwin highlights the 
importance of distinguishing between “informing the people and inflaming them,” as 
“indignation, resentment and fury are to be deprecated” (115).  According to Godwin’s 
interpretation of the history of revolutions, more recent insurgencies such as those in 
America and France have, because of the evolution of “great principles of truth” (116) 
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propagated by political philosophers like Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, been achieved 
with the use of significantly less force than, for instance, the resistance against Charles I (this 
was of course written before the commencement of the French Terror).   Such is the power 
of a fully realized philosophical truth that, had these revolutions occurred in the future, they 
would likely have been successful without “one drop of the blood of one citizen” or even 
“one solitary instance of violence and confiscation” (116).  Even political associations, with 
which Godwin was marginally associated but to which he was not committed, are 
condemned for their tendency to inculcate in their members a mob mentality likely to result 
in violent mutiny:   “there is nothing more barbarous, blood-thirsty and unfeeling than the 
triumph of the mob” (118).24 
 One is, however, left to wonder whether Godwin really believes that the gradual 
amelioration of humanity is wholly possible through the dissemination of ideas engendered 
by philosophical treatises such as his Political Justice, or whether he represses all mention of 
the necessity of mass uprising out of fear of arrest for sedition.  He was certainly aware of 
the seemingly ineluctable historical connection between revolution and violence, a 
connection articulated by Marx one century later in his aphorism that “force is the midwife 
of every old society pregnant with a new one” (Capital 751).  Godwin briefly alludes to this 
                                                        
24 Another, later publication goes further to condemn political associations, specifically John Thelwall and the 
London Corresponding Society.  In Godwin’s 1795 pamphlet Considerations on Lord Grenville’s and Mr. Pitt’s Bills, 
Concerning Treasonable and Seditious Practices, and Unlawful Assemblies, he likens Thelwall to a “common wrestler” 
who has “been loudest in increasing the broil” by having “called for blood” (81-82).  See also a 4 March 1812 
letter to Shelley, in which he advises the young would-be reformer that “discussion, reading, enquiry, perpetual 
communication:  these are my favourite methods for the improvement of mankind, but associations, organized 
societies, I firmly condemn.  You may as well tell the adder not to sting . . . as to tell organized societies of men 
. . . to be innocent, to employ no violence, and calmly to await the progress of truth.  I never was at a public 
political dinner, a scene that I have now not witnessed for many years, that I did not see how the enthusiasm 
was lighted up, how the flame caught from man to man, how fast the dictates of sober reason were obliterated 
by the gusts of passion, and how near the assembly was, like Alexander’s compotatores at Persepolis, to go 
forth and fire the city, or, like the auditors of Anthony’s oration over the body of Caesar, to apply a flaming 
brand to the mansion of each several conspirator” (qtd. in Paul 2:  204-5). 
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spectre of radical violence in the final chapter of the final book of Political Justice’s first 
edition, a provocative and somewhat ominous ending that denounces revolutionary violence 
even as it hints at its necessity.  Admitting that massacre often accompanies revolution, 
Godwin suggests that despite its horrors, the short-term “moment of horror and distress” 
inflicted by mass upheaval is a mere pittance for the “ages of felicity” to follow (PJ 467). 25  
Employing, like Marx, a bodily metaphor to rationalize the necessity of revolutionary force, 
Godwin compares the use of force to the amputation of a limb, which, despite momentary 
pain, leads to improved functioning of the organism (468).  In this final chapter, Godwin 
admits, despite his repeated insistence that Political Justice is intended for the intellectual elite, 
the possibility that its precepts will “ferment in the minds of the vulgar” (466) and lead to 
the type of wanton aggression historically attributed to the Goths and the Vandals.  Another 
subtle loophole appears in Godwin’s explanation of the “doctrine of force in general,” which 
states that force should only be resorted to in cases where any other means is ineffectual 
(111).          
 This is not to suggest that Godwin in any way consciously advocated the necessary 
evils of revolutionary violence or massacre nor that he intended Political Justice to incite such 
behaviour, but the urgency and force of the volume’s prefatory rhetoric does contrast with 
its pacifist and gradualist precepts.  The preface seems to have been written to inflame rather 
than to inform its readers, despite Godwin’s opposite intent.  In this instance the preface 
works against the grain of the text it is supposed to supplement, creating a friction generated 
by the tension between the work’s gradual and radical impulses.  As Mark Philp observes, 
                                                        
25 As French revolutionary bloodshed escalated, many British radicals found themselves in the increasingly 
awkward position of justifying the use of force.  Even Wordsworth, during his early radical phase, stressed its 
necessity in his unpublished 1793 Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff:  “Alas!  The obstinacy & perversion of men is 
such that [Liberty] is too often obliged to borrow the very arms of despotism to overthrow him and in order to 
reign in peace must establish herself by violence” (PW 48). 
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Political Justice “neither was, nor was intended to be, intimately connected to the political 
events of the time.  Godwin was writing philosophy; he was not, as so many of his 
contemporaries were, practising politics” (76).  But its preface, despite itself, de-idealizes the 
speculative treatise, dragging it into a political arena wherein it is forced to confront the 
contradictions inherent within its own speculation, forced to confront its own political 
unconscious.  To return to Godwin’s own distinction between the moral and tendency of a 
work, the individual reader’s actual interpretation of a work can rarely if ever be equated with 
the moral of the author’s semantic intention.  Political Justice’s preface problematizes the 
moral of the text it introduces through the very act of so explicitly contextualizing itself:  
Godwin was well aware of the potential multiplicity of interpretations, and targeting the 
intellectual elite as the book’s primary audience certainly did not preclude the possibility of 
radical incitement on a mass scale. 
 
“A Public That is Panic Struck” 
 Although in theory freedom of the press allowed all citizens to publish their views, 
the 1792 King’s Proclamation against seditious writings led to the policing of all works 
published in the succeeding years.  A variety of factors determined whether a publication 
would be deemed seditious and therefore subject to authorial prosecution.  A hazy set of 
criteria determined whether or not a book was seditious:  books deemed to be speculative or 
to participate in the exchange of ideas were exempt from prosecution, but those “designed 
to inflame the minds of disgruntled sectors of society” (Keen 55) were punished with the full 
force of the law.  Moreover, potentially seditious books were acceptable if they were either 
written in a style inaccessible to the lower class reader, if they showed evidence of having 
been composed over a long period of time, or if their price was expensive enough to prevent 
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purchase by the lower orders.  According to the apocryphal tale of Political Justice being 
discussed in parliament on May 25, 1793, Pitt cited the book’s prohibitive expense as 
grounds for not prosecuting it.  Mary Shelley recalled hearing her father tell the story of the 
parliamentary debate, at the conclusion of which Pitt observed that “a three guinea book 
could never do much harm among those who had not three shillings to spare” (qtd. in Paul 
1: 80). 26  The book’s price, according to Mary, was “in strict conformity to his principles.  
He was an advocate for improvements brought in by the enlightened and sober-minded, but 
he deprecated abrupt innovations, and appeals to the passions of the multitude” (80).   
Responding to Pitt’s classism and elitism, Mary in turn evokes a series of paradoxes and 
tensions that highlight Godwin’s own anxious response to a mass reading public, concerns 
that Godwin will thematize in the latter part of Caleb Williams, as discussed later in this 
chapter.  
  On the other hand, those works that had obviously been written and published 
quickly, priced cheaply, and designed to inflame the emotions of the public were considered 
dangerous and subject to prosecution.  Hence the anti-Jacobin British Critic is able to shrug 
off the possibility of Political Justice’s potential revolutionary impact by gloatingly depicting 
the work as a non-seller:   
  Secure in these great pledges of obscurity, full many a copy have we seen  
  with its title page exposed in a window with its leaves uncut, till flies and dust 
  had defaced its open front, and many an one, perhaps, shall we see   
  descending from the flies above to those of subterranean London, guiltless  
  of having seduced one wavering mind, or excited even a wish to prosecute,  
  much less to persecute, the author. (qtd. in Keen 56) 
                                                        
26 However, as Don Locke notes, the actual price of Political Justice was not three guineas but £1 16s. 0d (60).  
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This description, however, is inaccurate:  Political Justice did not sell nearly as well as Paine’s 
Rights of Man, but it did achieve a high degree of popularity uncharacteristic of a book of 
such bulk.  In addition to its 4,000 copies sold, the book was “everywhere the theme of 
popular conversation and praise”; was pirated in Ireland and Scotland; was very well received 
even by lower class readers; and hundreds of the purchased copies were distributed through 
subscriptions, lending libraries, and read aloud in public gatherings (Locke 61-62). 
 Godwin’s preface to Political Justice confronts issues of censorship and readership, as 
it attempts to position the work in relation to its intended audience.  If the philosophical 
principles contained within the volume are timeless and universal, the preface by contrast 
obeys Derrida’s “occasional necessity,” directly implicating itself in the tumult of its time: 
  The period in which the work makes its appearance is singular.  The   
  people of England have assiduously been excited to declare their loyalty,  
  and to mark every man as obnoxious who is not ready to sign the   
  Shibboleth of the constitution.  Money is raised by voluntary subscription  
  to defray the expence [sic] of prosecuting men who shall dare to promulgate  
  heretical opinions, and thus to express them at once with the enmity of  
  government and of individuals.  This was an accident wholly unforeseen  
  when the work was undertaken; and it will scarcely be supposed that such  
  an accident could produce any alteration in the writer’s designs.  Every  
  man, if we may believe the voice of rumour, is to be prosecuted who shall  
  appeal to the people by the publication of any unconstitutional paper or  
  pamphlet; and it is added, that men are to be prosecuted for any unguarded  
  words that may be dropped in the warmth of conversation and debate. (v) 
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Godwin here captures the mood of the radical moment of January 1793, pulling no punches 
in his attempt to convey the general paranoia experienced by a “public that is panic struck” 
(v) as an anxious English government reacted with increasingly restrictive measures to the 
concurrent revolutionary events unfolding in France.  In this preface, Godwin straddles a 
dangerously fine line between sedition and speculation:  the preface is strikingly provocative, 
expressing Godwin’s anger at governmental intrusions on subjects’ liberty through 
censorship not only in the public sphere of printed works, but also through the panoptic 
surveillance of private conversation and debate.  Its tone is significantly more agitated and 
confrontational than the reasoned and reflective cadences of the treatise itself.  Overall, 
however, Godwin makes the case that Political Justice should be classified as speculative 
philosophy, which is perhaps why he feels sufficiently empowered to pepper his preface with 
such bold rhetoric.  Describing Political Justice as “an appeal to men of study and reflexion” 
(v), an elite prototype of Coleridge’s clerisy, Godwin highlights his intention to target a more 
refined class of reader who would ideally contemplate and consider its philosophical 
principles, and participate in a more gradual large-scale ideological evolution to be realized in 
futurity.  He implies that to censor such a work would be akin to “suppressing the activity of 
mind” or “putting an end to the disquisitions of science” (v).   
 The preface to Political Justice is an anarchist’s challenge to authority, a refusal to 
accede to the spies and censors determined to suppress seditious publications.  Its inclusion 
is a gamble on Godwin’s part because it unnecessarily implicates the text in the fray that it 
could have transcended by dint of its status as speculative philosophy.  Even as it makes the 
case for its own speculative status, however, the preface does align itself with the very 
incendiary literature from which it attempts to distance itself, emphasizing that the treatise 
was hastily published before its completion because “it seemed as if no contemptible part of 
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the utility of the work depended upon its early appearance” (iv).  As a result, the 
composition and the printing of the work was rushed out of a desire to “reconcile a certain 
degree of dispatch with the necessary deliberation” and the printing was therefore 
commenced “long before the composition was finished” (iv).  Because of the hasty 
publication of the first edition, Godwin lacked the opportunity to fully incubate his ideas, 
which is why the second and third editions contain numerous revisions.  But the paradox is 
clear:  there is no reason why the composition of a purely speculative work of philosophy 
would need to be rushed, unless it was intended to make an immediate impact.  Political 
pamphlets, newspapers, and journals are characterized by their urgency and hasty publication 
because their purpose is the immediate engagement of topical issues; philosophical treatises, 
on the other hand, are generally not subject to the same occasional exigencies.  
 Yet even as the preface involves itself in the discourse of contemporary 
revolutionary debate, it does simultaneously evince a paradoxical desire to dissociate itself 
from local referentiality.  In an earlier manuscript draft of the preface, Godwin had originally 
acknowledged known radicals Thomas Holcroft and William Nicholson (PJV 4).  Their 
exclusion from the published version suggests that Godwin, whether out of fear of 
prosecution-via-association or out of a decision to universalize rather than localize the 
preface, chose to omit references to fellow radicals. 27  Unlike the prefaces to, for example, 
Burke’s 1790 Reflections on the Revolution in France and Paine’s 1791 Rights of Man, Godwin 
prefatorally wades into the revolution debate while maintaining a degree of ironic 
detachment, achieved especially through his disarming use of a third-person prefatory voice.  
                                                        
27 However, in the second edition’s preface, Godwin does add a sentence referring to the recent prosecution of 
Daniel Crichton, a tallow-chandler tried in January 1793 for treason:  “The first conviction of this kind, which 
the author was far from imagining to be so near, was of a journeyman tallow-chandler, January 8, 1793, who, 
being shown the regalia at the Tower, was proved to have vented a coarse expression against royalty to the 
person that exhibited them” (PJV 6).  
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Referring to himself as “the author,” Godwin constructs a shadowy prefatory persona in 
keeping with the preface’s tendency to circumvent fixed systems of value or meaning.  And 
unlike Burke and Paine, whose prefaces address actual persons—Burke’s is written as an 
epistle to the “gentleman in Paris” (1) who erroneously assumes Burke supports the French 
revolution, while Paine’s is dedicated to George Washington and makes constant reference 
to Burke and the “flagrant misrepresentations” (3) of the Reflections—Godwin eschews such 
local references, instead positioning his book in the broader scheme of political writers like 
Swift, Holbach, Rousseau, and Helvétius.28    
 For the 1796 publication of the revised Political Justice, Godwin added a second 
preface, a text which so frustrated Wordsworth that he apparently lost all interest in reading 
the second edition despite his initial excitement about it.  As Wordsworth indicates in a 
March 1796 letter to William Matthews, “I expect to find the work much improved.  I 
cannot say that I have been encouraged in this hope by the perusal of the second preface, 
which is all I have yet looked into.  Such a piece of barbarous writing I have not often seen.  
It contains scarce one sentence decently written” (EY 170).  This critique of the preface’s 
style is more likely a displaced ideological critique, as by 1796 Wordsworth had become 
disenchanted with Godwin and with political radicalism generally, and there is nothing in the 
style of the preface to warrant such a vitriolic attack.  Wordsworth’s reaction is symptomatic 
of Philp’s point that the second edition preface is a “a piece of pure obfuscation” and 
“prevarication” (121) based on its tendency to avoid clear statements about the motives for 
                                                        
28 Godwin’s account of Political Justice’s evolution, briefly delineated in the preface, emphasizes his allegiance 
to British and European political philosophy, rather than to local radical activists and journalists:  “The 
sentiments it contains are by no means the suggestions of a sudden effervescence of fancy.  Political enquiry 
had long held a foremost place in the writer’s attention. .  . He owed this conviction [that monarchy is 
unavoidably corrupt] to the political writings of Swift and to a perusal of the Latin historians.  Nearly at the 
same time he derived great additional instruction from reading the most considerable French writers upon the 
nature of man in the following order, Système de la Nature, Rousseau, and Helvétius” (iv). 
 
  47
Godwin’s extensive revisions—specifically, its waffling on the issue of whether Godwin felt 
compelled to revise out of response to “external pressures” or out of a desire to assuage self-
doubt about the validity of his theories.  Ironically, Wordsworth misses in Godwin’s second 
edition preface an attempt to offset revolutionary fervor with a sense of gradualism that in 
fact speaks precisely to Wordsworth’s own dissatisfaction with Godwin’s early radicalism, 
even if Wordsworth’s own gradualism is—as I will demonstrate in Chapter Three—less 
overtly political than Godwin’s.  Most of the second edition’s preface is devoted to a rather 
long-winded apology for the sheer quantity of revisions; it even goes so far as to apologize to 
the “purchasers of the former edition” (PJV 7) who might feel put upon to purchase the 
second edition.  However, at this phase in the publication history of Political Justice, two years 
after its original publication, the political and the personal have for Godwin become 
intertwined to the point that it becomes impossible to unravel their separate threads.  The 
“external pressures” to which Godwin may have been responding—for instance, the 
increasing resistance of conservatives or the still-looming threat of prosecution—have 
always already been absorbed into Godwin’s philosophical system and constitute an integral 
part of his theoretical process.  In other words, the “obfuscation” identified by Philp is the 
result of Godwin’s struggle to work through his own entanglement with the public sphere, 
and the second edition preface manifests the strains of the text’s involvement with the forces 
of historicity with which it must contend.   
 The final paragraph of the second edition’s preface revisits questions of prosecution 
and the political function of Political Justice, which have now taken on a different role in the 
aftermath of revolutionary Terror, and in the context of Godwin’s revised attention to the 
issue of violence and revolution: 
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  The Enquiry concerning Political Justice has been treated by some persons as 
  of a seditious and inflammatory nature.  This is probably an aspersion.  If the 
  political principles in favour of which it is written have no solid foundation,  
  they will probably be attended with no more than a temporary fashion; and  
  the present work is little calculated to answer a temporary purpose.  If on the 
  contrary they be founded in immutable truth . . . they will one day gain the  
  ascendancy.  In that case the tendency of such a disquisition, will be to  
  smooth the gradation, and to prepare the enlightened to sympathise with the  
  just claims of the oppressed and the humble.   No man can more fervently  
  deprecate scenes of commotion and tumult than the author of this book; no  
  man would more anxiously avoid the lending his assistance in the most  
  distant manner to animosity and bloodshed; but he persuades himself  
  that, whatever may be the events with which the present crisis of human  
  history shall be distinguished, the effect of his writings . . . will be found  
  favourable to the increase and preservation of a general kindness and  
  benevolence.  (PJV 7-8)  
Godwin again reiterates, this time in less ambiguous terms, his opposition to violent 
revolution and his belief in a gradualist scheme of reform.  The revisions for the second 
edition include more forceful indictments of revolutionary violence:  for instance, the 
amputated limb analogy is deleted, and the radical who resorts to violence is characterized as 
“the enemy, and not the benefactor of his contemporaries” (PJ 126).  As Political Justice has 
evolved, Godwin appears to have more clearly defined his stance on the issue of force.  But 
this is not to suggest, as does Brailsford, that the treatise has been “toned down” by 
“growing caution” (68) or, as Woodcock claims, that Godwin “tended to bend before the 
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blast” (121) of conservative backlash.  In Godwin’s prefatory words, “the spirit and great 
outlines of the work . . . remain untouched” (PJV 7), and many of the text’s fundamental 
and most incendiary principles—especially its condemnation of monarchy and systems of 
government generally—remain intact.  Rather, the revisions are the necessary result of the 
work’s progressive nature and reflect Godwin’s continuous involvement with and sensitivity 
to historical events.  But both the second and first edition prefaces conclude with perhaps 
the most important Godwinian notion:  the importance of a work’s tendency and Godwin’s 
sincere hope that Political Justice will contribute to the gradual evolution towards human 
perfection.  In the first edition’s preface, Godwin entreats the reader to “look with 
indifference upon the false fire of the moment, and to foresee the calm period of reason 
which will succeed” (PJ v), making the ultimate case for the speculative nature of Political 
Justice by highlighting the ephemerality of the historical moment and situating the text in the 
distant horizon of a more enlightened future age.  Godwin’s appeal to the future reader 
keeps the text open for continued speculation, in much the same way that the figure of 
Augustus Harley, Jr. symbolizes the future reader in Hays’s Memoirs, as I will discuss in 
Chapter Two.  For the modern reader, the preface no longer poses a threat to order; rather, 
it portrays, in concise and evocative terms, the perilousness of the political atmosphere in 
which Political Justice first made its appearance. 
 
Caleb Williams:  The Return of the Repressed Preface  
Like Political Justice, Caleb Williams is a perpetual work-in-process, having been 
published in five separate editions during Godwin’s lifetime, between its initial 1794 
publication and its 1831 publication as the second in the series of Colburn and Bentley’s 
Standard Novels.  Godwin made over 1,200 changes to the text, ranging from the minutiae 
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of grammatical and stylistic corrections to major structural and episodic modifications.  Caleb 
Williams is also, like Political Justice, a multi-prefaced work:  the 1796 second edition contains 
two prefaces (the original, suppressed 1794 preface along with an additional, new preface), 
the 1831 reissue contains Mary Shelley’s prefatory “Memoirs of William Godwin,” and the 
1832 reissue of Godwin’s third novel Fleetwood includes a preface in which Godwin 
retrospectively chronicles the composition of Caleb Williams.  This last preface, although not 
originally a part of Caleb Williams, has become so intertwined with the text about which it 
speaks that it is commonly included in modern editions of the novel and has, I would argue, 
become one of the novel’s several prefaces, albeit at a slight narrative remove.  These four 
prefaces are the result of a process of accretion through which the novel has acquired 
additional paratexts, resulting in fundamental changes in how the text is transmitted to 
successive generations of readers.  Like stamps on a passport, each paratext documents the 
novel’s progression through time, each instance bearing the imprint of its historical moment.   
The processive nature of Caleb Williams’ prefaces plays out in a different register the ongoing 
restlessness of Political Justice’s prefaces in their attempt to deal with political and social 
context.  Whereas Political Justice mediates between realpolitik and the idealism of a 
philosophy whose speculation works against this idealism, the prefaces to Caleb Williams 
perform the additional work of mediating between fiction and reality.  This section will 
consider the narratological function of the preface, exploring how the original preface to 
Caleb Williams augments the reader’s experience of the novel through its ability to 
incorporate extradiegetically the ‘real life’ political anxieties of its historical moment into the 
fictional realm of the novel.  In addition to presenting a reading of Caleb Williams that 
considers the preface as a distinct narrative level, I will also demonstrate precisely how 
prefaces, because of their liminiality, straddle the interior and exterior boundaries of a text.  
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 The 1794 preface to the first edition of Caleb Williams did not appear in the prefatory 
pages of the novel, as it was allegedly suppressed by the publisher for fear of sedition 
charges.  Originally published in May of 1794, at a time when the threat of prosecution for 
treasonable activities was peaking, Caleb Williams, like its philosophical predecessor, was a 
risky publication.29  According to this preface, because of the “alarms of booksellers” it was 
“withdrawn” (1) from the volume.  This claim is not unreasonable, nor are the fears of the 
booksellers unwarranted:  not only were authors culpable for the products of their pens, but 
publishers and booksellers were also commonly implicated in the sedition charges.30  Like 
the preface to Political Justice, the original preface to Caleb Williams grounds the text in the 
historical moment of its publication and contextualizes its theoretical project within an 
explicitly delineated account of contemporary political debate.  The ongoing struggle 
between radicals and conservatives is concisely depicted: “while one party pleads for 
reformation and change, the other extols in the warmest terms the existing constitution of 
society” (1).  Captured in this terse statement are the over one hundred books published 
between 1790 and 1794 on the subject of British political reformation in response to the 
French revolution; but Burke’s Reflections figures most prominently in this allusion, being the 
most famous contemporary text of praise for the English constitution.  Also alluded to in 
this sentence, via its association with Burke and its significance to the novel in the form of 
another paratext (the novel’s original title), is the text to which Burke’s Reflections is a 
                                                        
29 Although the Treasonable Practices Act would not be passed until half a year later (in 1795), Habeas Corpus 
had been suspended, resulting in a repressive intellectual climate. 
  
30 A disturbing precedent had already been set for the persecution of printers and booksellers in the wake of 
Paine’s 1792 in absentia sedition conviction for The Rights of Man.  For example, Matthew Falkner and Samuel 
Birch, proprietors of the radical newspaper Manchester Herald, were accused of selling Paine’s pamphlet along 
with other seditious literature in 1793; rather than face prosecution they fled to America.  Radical newspaper 
proprietor Richard Phillips was also accused and found guilty in April 1793:  he served an eighteen-month 
sentence.  Similarly, Paternoster Row bookseller H.D. Symonds was convicted and sentenced to four years’ 
imprisonment; James Ridgeway, pamphlet-shop proprietor, was given a similar sentence (Goodwin 271-73; 
Smith 62).      
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response:  Richard Price’s Old Jewry Sermon of November 4th, 1789, implores each man to 
“think of all things as they are, and not suffer any partial affections to blind his 
understanding” (8) in his quest for political freedom.  Things as They Are, the title under 
which Godwin originally published the novel, aligns the text with the revolutionary import 
of Price’s ideas, and, by extension, opposes it to a conservative Burkean response.  
  In the context of its relation to Political Justice’s preface, however, two important 
observations can be made.  The first concerns Godwin’s return to the question of 
‘speculative’ literature, which as previously stated was one condition for a text’s exemption 
from sedition charges.  In Caleb Williams’ preface, Godwin bluntly states that the novel is “no 
refined and abstract speculation; it is a study and delineation of things passing in the moral 
world” (1).  Booksellers would no doubt have been alarmed by this confrontational claim 
that the novel has gone beyond the merely speculative nature of Political Justice.  This 
transition from the theoretical to the actual contains the perceived possibility that a text 
dealing with ‘things’ rather than ‘ideas’ is more likely to incite mass uprising, at least 
according to the logic of the period’s agents of censorship.  But this claim does shed light on 
Godwin’s perception of novels:  in the preface he refers to the novel as a “vehicle” (1), 
suggesting that the primary function of this literary form is to convey political ideas in a 
practical way, a point that I will take up later in this section.  Second, Godwin in the preface 
subverts another of the conditions of sedition charges, that of audience.  Whereas in the 
preface to Political Justice Godwin claims that he writes for “men of study and reflection” (v), 
in his preface to Caleb Williams he addresses the novel-reading bulk of the British population, 
those whom “books of philosophy and science are never likely to reach” (1).  This 
substantial broadening of Godwin’s reading public would inevitably result in a more wide-
scale dissemination of his subversive political ideas, posing a significant threat to the stability 
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of public order.  Therefore, based on Godwin’s bold defiance of the Treasonable Practices 
Act, explicitly declared in the first edition’s preface, one can understand why his publisher 
and booksellers would demand that this hazardous preface be suppressed.              
 The withholding of the preface raises an important question:  why is the preface 
suppressed, and the novel itself allowed to be published?  The original preface to Caleb 
Williams is quite brief, and, when compared to the subject matter of the novel, seems 
relatively innocuous.  A mere ten sentences of introductory discourse prefacing a three-
volume novel hardly seems threatening, yet the fact that it was singled out as dangerous 
speaks volumes about the perceived rhetorical force of the preface.  The preface is capable 
of creating the conditions of its reception; or, in Philippe Lejeune’s words, the preface is that 
“fringe of the printed text which in reality controls one’s whole reading of the text” (qtd. in 
Genette 2).  Lejeune’s remark emphasizes the curious rhetorical power of the preface, a 
power that Godwin’s publisher and booksellers knew all too well.  The set of assumptions 
underlying this conception of the preface can be understood through an exploration of the 
preface’s textual status in the context of its relation to the main text.  Any prefaced work is a 
framed narrative, and in the case of a novel like Caleb Williams, which already consists of 
embedded narratives within the main work proper, the inclusion of the prefaces creates an 
additional narrative layer, problematizing the novel’s narrative scheme.  John Matthews 
observes that the frame is a “function which enables a relation between differentiated realms 
(the reader and author, the world and the artwork, reality and imagination)” (26).  The 
contrast between preface and narrative gives the preface the illusion of reality, as though the 
frame is that which mediates between real world and fictional world.  Godwin’s preface to 
Caleb Williams functions as a buffer zone, within which the author speaks candidly about the 
work, and the preface seems to exist more in the ‘real’ world than in the fictional world of 
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the novel.  Within the space of the preface, the illusion exists that the author himself is 
stepping forth to speak ‘in the flesh’ as it were: a fraudulent assumption, of course, as the 
preface-writing author is also the writer of the narrative.  In this case, the figure of ‘Godwin,’ 
radical author of Political Justice—and any of his signature’s Jacobin, anarchist, or atheistic 
associations—has been excised from the novel; the only remaining trace is his name on the 
title-page.  The suppression of the preface therefore symbolically enacts the erasure of 
Godwin the public figure.  Paradoxically, having been deemed an extraneous narrative 
layer—an “empty husk” (Dissemination 9), as Derrida would have it—the preface is effaced. 
 But this attempt by publishers to repress the preface to the first edition merely 
results in its eventual return, for it resurfaces from the depths of the political unconscious to 
appear in the prefatory space of the 1796 second edition.  Moreover, affixed to the original 
preface is an additional preface, informing the reader of the original preface’s omission.  The 
second edition of Caleb Williams, then, is framed by an epinarrative, through which Godwin 
contextualizes and—by dint of making present the original preface’s enforced absence—
gives additional weight to the novel’s revolutionary potential.  At this phase in its paratextual 
accretion, the novel has, sixteen months after its initial publication, been considerably altered 
by the addition of the two prefaces.  Where no preface previously existed, readers of the 
second edition are confronted with a terse account of Godwin’s ultimately successful 
struggle to print the original preface.  Not only does the inclusion of the new preface(s) 
make explicit the novel’s potentially seditious nature—creating an aura of danger at the 
novel’s outset—but, more importantly, the prefatory resurrection of Godwin reinforces his 
authority as a Jacobin writer who, having taken the risk of publishing the novel under his 
own name, has emerged to take control of the narrative.  Godwin, who, like Caleb, has been 
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pursued and prevented from relating the truth, triumphantly returns to his rightful position 
in the outermost narrative layer.   
 In his editor’s introduction to Caleb Williams, David McCracken interrogates the 
authenticity of the second edition preface, posing some important questions about the 
relation between the preface and the novel, and about its extra-textual engagement with 
historical events.  The crux of McCracken’s enquiry concerns the rationale for the preface’s 
eventual publication.  “Why print the preface at all,” McCracken asks, “when its contents 
were still inflammatory and it had by no means an obvious connection with the novel itself?” 
(xii).  McCracken suggests a number of possibilities for Godwin’s decision to include the 
preface:  Godwin might have intended to exaggerate the novel’s importance by suggesting 
that it was subject to persecution; or, a “deluded” Godwin, adhering to his own authorial 
intention rather than the novel’s finished product, might have believed that the preface is a 
true description of the novel, “against all evidence to the contrary in the novel itself” (xii).  
Eventually settling on the probability that Godwin’s remarks in the preface were sincere, and 
that it does accurately describe what the novel achieves on one level at least, McCracken 
points out the preface has “misled many readers into thinking that Godwin was conscious of 
no essential difference between the rhetorical effect of a treatise and that of a novel” (xii).  I 
would suggest, contrary to McCracken, that what is important is not what the preface rightly 
or wrongly says about the novel, but how it becomes absorbed into the structure of the 
narrative and participates in the novel’s thematization of political issues, a point I will take 
up shortly in my analysis of the preface as a framing device.  I would also modify 
McCracken’s claim that the contents of the preface were still inflammatory by the time of 
their 1796 publication.  The space that had opened up for the actual revolutionary power of 
literature had already closed by the time of the publication of Caleb Williams’ second edition.  
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Even as the preface embodies Godwin’s daring defiance of the forces of textual repression, 
its inclusion in the second edition also reflects a shift in the historical conditions for radical 
literature.  The sentiments expressed in the preface’s second part hint that the heyday of 
revolutionary possibility may have subsided:  Godwin writes, in the past tense, that “terror 
was the order of the day” (2; italics mine), suggesting that things have, to some extent at least, 
calmed down by October of 1795, the date of the second preface’s composition.  Godwin 
pinpoints the end of the “terror” as coterminous with the acquittal of members of the 
Corresponding and Constitutional Societies, including Godwin’s friends Thomas Holcroft, 
John Horne Tooke, and John Thelwall, who were accused of high treason and whose release 
was partly believed to have been aided by Godwin’s anonymous October 21, 1794 Morning 
Chronicle article, “Cursory Strictures on the Charge Delivered by Lord Chief Justice Eyre.”  In 
the preface to Caleb Williams, Godwin broadly alludes to these events, claiming that the 
publication of the novel’s first edition occurred “in the same month in which the sanguinary 
plot broke out against the liberties of Englishmen, which was happily terminated by the 
acquittal of its first intended victims, in the close of that year” (2).  The acquittal of the 
Jacobin writers coincides with the return of the prefatory Godwin, and the tide of public 
opinion upon which radical writers rode had subsided in the aftermath of the French terror 
as many English radicals reconsidered the efficacy of revolution. 
 One perceives a tension, however, generated by the contrast between the historical 
specificity of the preface and the ahistorical vagueness of the novel, which is reminiscent of a 
similar contrast between the localized preface to Political Justice and the treatise’s attempt to 
posit universal ‘truths’ also intended to be transhistorically disseminated.  The action of the 
novel seems to exist somewhere outside of the sphere of any recognizable historical period.  
Rudolf Storch claims that the novel has “no place in the society of 18th century England, 
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but belongs to the shadowy world of dreams” (198) while A.D. Harvey notes that it is 
“curiously detached from recognizable time and place” and “contains no hint of the precise 
period at which the action is supposed to have occurred” (237).  Early in the novel, the year 
of the action is signified by a gap in the text, as when Caleb recalls that “in the summer of 
the year      Mr. Falkland visited his estate in our country after an absence of several months” 
(5).  The temporal placing of the novel is made intentionally vague by Godwin, evincing his 
desire to construct the narrative as an ahistorical political allegory.  A rare clue to the text’s 
historical situation is discerned by Karl Simms, who takes the novel’s reference to the Black 
Act as indicating that the action must take place sometime between 1723, when the act was 
passed, and 1827, when it was repealed.  Nonetheless, Simms reads the lacuna-in-lieu-of-an-
actual-date as a reminder that in order for the text’s original title, “Things as They Are,” to 
hold true, the text must exist in a “time continuum which is always already the present” 
(360).  But with the addition of the prefaces, the novel’s action is localized, the events 
presumably taking place sometime around the date of “May 12, 1794,” the date of the first 
preface, or “October 29, 1795,” the date of the second.  Moreover, the date of the first 
preface is the same date on which Pitt’s government suspended habeas corpus and had twelve 
of the most prominent British radicals arrested for treason.  Whether or not the preface was 
written on the date claimed or whether Godwin fabricated the date for rhetorical purposes is 
beside the point:  as the novel stands, it is permanently affixed to a specific day in history, a 
day of especial importance to those connected with the English Jacobin movement.   
  
The Preface as Narrative Frame 
Apart from its function of anchoring the text to its historical moment of publication, 
it remains to be determined how the 1796 prefaces participate in the narrative of the main 
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text they introduce.  To return to Derrida’s seminal question—”Does a Preface exist?”—a 
preface that merely situates itself outside of the narrative’s limits while having very little to 
do with the text itself could not, in the final analysis, make a very convincing case for its own 
relevance.  But because of their ability to exploit the dialogic nature of novelistic discourse, 
prefaces can perform a number of textual maneuvers.  The 1795 preface to Caleb Williams 
does, despite its brevity, participate in the narrative that it introduces.  I would go so far as to 
suggest that, once published, this preface becomes an integral part of the novel, comprising 
one of its narrative layers and significantly contributing to its overall effect on the reader.  In 
his narratological analysis of Caleb Williams, Kenneth Graham identifies four “narrative 
moments” that structure the novel (Politics 84-96).  I would modify Graham’s claim by 
adding the preface as a narrative moment—the first narrative moment, no less—because of 
its spatial positioning at the head of the text and its ability to straddle both extratextual and 
intratextual boundaries.  What characterizes this preface intratextually is its thematic relation 
to the main text.  The preface is a thematic microcosm of the novel, representing in 
miniature many of the major themes that will be developed more fully in the novel itself.  
Godwin’s 1795 preface functions like Friedrich Schlegel’s ideal preface, that which “must be 
at once the square root and the square of its book” (144).  Specifically, the preface dovetails 
with the novel via its thematization of issues related to justice, especially through its concern 
with trials, judgment, imprisonment, and tyranny.  And given the narrative’s formal tendency 
to present incidents that mirror or replicate other incidents within the novel, it is not 
surprising that the preface too should participate in these scenes of narrative reduplication.   
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 One such mise-en-abyme31 narrative moment concerns the incident in which 
Falkland, intensely scrutinized by Caleb, serves as justice of the peace for a murder trial.  As 
Caleb observes, murder is the “master key that wakes distemper in the mind of Mr. 
Falkland” (126) and he watches Falkland for signs of his guilt.  The nature of the murder 
trial exactly parallels Falkland’s own entanglement with Tyrrel:  the accused was, like 
Falkland, an “ingenuous and benevolent” (127) man who had been hounded by a Tyrrel-like 
tyrant.  The accused peasant, unable to bear the animosity of his enemy, murdered him in a 
fit of passion in an incident that Godwin explicitly notes “suggested a sufficient 
resemblance” to Falkland’s suspected murder of Tyrrel, an analogous confrontation played 
out by “a human brute persisting in a course of hostility to a man of benevolent character, 
and suddenly and terribly cut off in the midst of his career” (129).  Falkland finds himself 
unable to bear the ordeal of a testimony that too closely mirrors his own guilty secret, so he 
discharges the accused peasant.  Caleb, having witnessed Falkland’s extreme agitation, 
determines that Falkland must have been the murderer of Tyrrel.  Taking a page from 
Hamlet’s play-within-a-play, Godwin recasts the scene as a trial-within-a-trial in which a guilty 
character is forced to observe the representation of his own crimes under the surveillance of 
a suspicious character.  
                                                        
31 My use of this slippery term appropriates and overlaps two of the experimental definitions offered by Lucien 
Dällenbach.  One is Dällenbach’s rejected possibility that, like a painting which contains a mirror reflecting 
images from ‘outside’ of the painting (ie. Velasquez’s Las Meniñas or Van Eyck’s Arnolfini Marriage), the preface 
brings into the novel “items that (fictively) are outside it,” fulfilling the role of “making the external intrude 
upon the internal” (12).  Although technically inaccurate, this definition does provide an apt analogy for 
prefatory function generally.  But more to the point is the narrative-specific definition of mise-en-abyme as 
containing a secondary narrative which reflects the primary one insofar as “the process of retroaction requires 
an analogy between the situation of the character and that of the narrator, in other words between the thematic 
content of the main story and that of the story contained within it . . . a twinning of activities related to a 
similar object” (18).  Generally, the preface tells the primary narrative of Godwin’s struggle to relate the truth 
of his narrative, just as Caleb in the secondary narrative seeks to do the same.  But within Caleb’s narrative are 
other instances of variations on the concept, such as the peasant murder trial discussed above.        
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 As a narrative level, prefaces can capitalize upon their ability to participate in—or at 
least to create the illusion of participating in—both the inside and the outside of the 
prefaced text.  Godwin’s prefatory statement that the “spirit and character of the 
government intrudes itself into every rank of society” (1) is the crux of the preface’s 
thematic explication.  Having made this assertion in the preface, Godwin simultaneously 
enacts it.  Occupying a peculiar and privileged spatio-temporal position within the text, the 
preface is what Genette calls an “undefined zone” (2) on the nebulous border between the 
text’s inside and outside.  What characterizes this undefined zone in a fictional work is the 
lack of clear definition between the perceived reality of the preface and what can only be at 
best the verisimilitude of the narrative.  This metaphysical “spirit” of governmental intrusion 
materializes itself in the preface in a more tangible and realistic way than it possibly could in 
the body of the narrative because of the perception that the preface exists on a higher 
narrative level, closer to ‘real life.’  The preface, whether true or not, is capable of a higher 
level of realism than the narrative, and the prefatory addendum’s claim that the original 
preface has been suppressed augments the idea of government’s panoptic ability to intervene 
in its subjects’ affairs.  The governmental intrusion about which the preface speaks makes 
itself present as an actual event:  as performed in the preface, ‘government’ has actually 
encroached on the space of the novel itself.  Of course, Godwin’s critique of institutional 
intrusion is central both to his argument in Political Justice and to the action of the plot of 
Caleb Williams.  In Political Justice, he makes the very similar claim that government “insinuates 
itself into our personal dispositions, and insensibly communicates its own spirit to our 
private transactions” (PJ 8).  Just as the “spirit” of government infiltrates the private sphere 
of interpersonal relations, so too does it violate the fictional space of the novel through its 
seepage into the space of the preface.  And the formal reduplication of narrative instances of 
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such repression, which work their way down the hierarchy of narrative levels from the 
preface to Caleb’s own story to his narration of other similarly themed stories—such as the 
Emily Melville and the Hawkins sub-plots—reflects a parallel hierarchical replication of 
power imbalances mimetically refracted in the narrative’s structure.  Thus, after having 
endured the sham trial in which he is wrongfully convicted of robbing Falkland, Caleb, 
identifying himself with the also wrongly convicted Hawkinses, alleges that Falkland 
“exhibited, upon a contracted scale indeed, but in which the truth of delineation was 
faithfully sustained, a copy of what monarchs are, who reckon among the instruments of 
their power prisons of state” (177).  The same power imbalance that, on a grand scale, 
characterizes the absolute power of the monarch in relation to his subjects perpetuates itself 
in miniature in the daily lives of landlords and tenants, masters and servants, men and 
women.     
 The plot of Caleb Williams is propelled by a series of incidents that substantiate the 
effects of this pervasive spirit of government on individual subjects.  The primary target of 
Godwin’s ideological critique is the British legal system, the force through which 
government exhibits its control over its subjects.  The novel’s second and third volumes 
chronicle Caleb’s increasingly desperate attempts to evade the law, but no matter where he 
runs he is unable to escape its pervasive gaze.  Thwarted in his efforts to relate the truth of 
his tale to his contemporaries, Caleb has no other choice but to pen his memoirs guided by a 
“faint idea that posterity may by their means be induced to render me a justice which my 
contemporaries refuse” (3).  P.N. Furbank’s oft-cited reading of the novel as a political 
allegory, a “symbolic picture of Godwin himself in the act of writing Political Justice” (215) in 
which Caleb represents Godwin, Falkland symbolizes the ancien regime, and the opening of 
the trunk is the writing of Political Justice, hints at the possibility of a reading of Caleb Williams 
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that takes seriously the narrative function of the preface.  Because of the preface’s emphasis 
on government control and the suppression of writing, and because its narrative casts the 
figure of Godwin as a seeker of truth fighting against the forces of reactionary paranoia, one 
can easily make the connection between the persecuted Caleb and the persecuted Godwin.  
Caleb’s plea to posterity becomes even more poignant when considered in the context of 
what happened to Godwin’s reputation by the end of the eighteenth century:  as British 
society became increasingly intolerant to revolutionary ideas, Godwin, in his own words, 
“was attacked from every side, and in a style which defied all moderation and decency.”  As 
the “chief (or shall I say its most voluminous?) English adherent” of the “new philosophy” 
(Thoughts 310-11), Godwin became the prime target of anti-Jacobin backlash, and his name 
fell into such obscurity that the young Percy Bysshe Shelley was shocked in 1812 to learn 
that Godwin was in fact still alive.32  So Caleb’s appeal to posterity also suggests Godwin’s, 
who might have suspected that his notoriety would escalate to the point that successive 
generations of readers would need to be called upon to vindicate him.  But if not for the 
preface, a reading that highlights the similarities between Caleb’s and Godwin’s respective 
plights would need to rely exclusively on extra-textual evidence to support its claims.  The 
preface inserts the figure of Godwin into the structure of the narrative and emplots the 
historical facts surrounding the composition and publication of the novel into its frame.  Sir 
Leslie Stephen’s remark that “the reader, unassisted by the preface, would scarcely perceive 
this doctrine [of government intrusion] between the lines” (140) suggests the likelihood of an 
unperceptive reader, but it does underscore the importance of the preface in making explicit 
                                                        
32 See Shelley’s first letter to Godwin, from Jan. 13, 1812:  “I have been accustomed to consider him [Godwin] 
as a luminary too dazzling for the darkness which surrounds him . . . you will not be surprised at the 
inconceivable emotion with which I learned your existence and your dwelling.  I had enrolled your name on the 
list of the honourable dead.  I had felt regret that the glory of your being had passed from this earth of ours.  It 
is not so.  You still live, and I firmly believe are still planning the welfare of human kind” (PBSL 1: 220).  
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within the text itself the realities of Godwin’s situation in the context of a reading of Caleb 
Williams as political allegory. 
 In this sense, the preface to Caleb Williams can be read as one of the various trials 
that punctuate the action of the novel.  It could be called a meta-trial, speaking implicitly 
about the mid-1790s sedition trials and Godwin’s own fringe involvement with them, while 
also putting both Godwin himself and his novel on trial in the court of posterity.  Almost all 
prefaces, to some extent, are trials, especially those ‘bad cases’ whose exordium requires the 
author’s insinuatio.  The most common prefatory function is for the ‘author’ (or whoever 
‘speaks’ the preface) to plead on his own behalf for the value and relevance of his work.  The 
judge and jury are the work’s readers; any prefacing author finds himself in a position rather 
like that of an accused felon, always on the defensive in his attempt to persuade the judges of 
the validity of his case.  Thus, judgment is integral to the very nature of prefatory writing.  
One rhetorical technique available to the prefacing author is the appeal to logos;  like a 
defendant speaking in the court of law, the prefacing author seeks to create the illusion of 
objectivity, of the facts speaking for themselves as it were.  Hence the extradiegetic prefacer, 
‘Godwin,’ in the preface assumes, as he does in the prefaces to Political Justice, a detached 
third-person persona whose identity is somewhat vague.   Referring abstractly to “the 
author” (1) or the “humble novelist” (2), the preface posits a figure who is undeniably 
Godwinesque, yet there is no textual indication to suggest that it really is ‘Godwin’ speaking.  
Because of prefatory convention, however, the reader assumes the speaker to be Godwin.  
But Caleb also performs this type of equivocation; despite his avowed intent to obtain 
justice, he does tend to slip into confusion about the purpose of telling his tale.  When 
detailing the particulars of his preparations for escaping from jail, Caleb becomes self-
conscious of the “vice and duplicity” (194) involved in his accumulation of various gimlets, 
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piercers and chissels to be used for purposes of escape.  He remarks that “I am writing my 
adventures and not my apology” (194).  Self-aware of his own elusiveness, Caleb’s rhetorical 
strategy parallels that of Godwin’s prefatory strategy, through which his “duplicity” 
characterizes the spirit of his elusive preface.  Indeed, this sense of duplicity will become 
even more pronounced in the prefaces of Mary Hays, as her rhetorical subterfuge is likewise 
characterized by its double-voiced structure.  Although on one level Caleb’s statement is 
meant to exhibit Godwin’s belief that external circumstances can force an otherwise virtuous 
individual to engage in nefarious practices—Caleb has been reduced to committing deceitful 
and criminal acts in his state of desperation—it also reveals a fundamental paradox about 
Caleb’s perception of the means through which he seeks exoneration.  To be vindicated 
requires the narration of an apology that, as the reader learns more than halfway through the 
novel, is not really an apology (which, in its etymological sense of apologia is a legal term 
denoting a speech in one’s own defense) but merely an objective chronicle of an 
“adventure.”33  These types of metanarrational statements uttered by Caleb periodically 
throughout the novel tend to puncture the fictionality of the text by evincing a degree of 
self-consciousness about its own narrative process.  But should Caleb’s memoirs be 
classified as an “apology” or an “adventure”?  The same question could be asked of 
Godwin’s preface. 
 
Provoking the “Mob-Monster” 
 A final significant intratextual connection between the preface and the narrative 
proper concerns the reading public and the dissemination of ideas through various literary 
                                                        
33 The term ‘adventure,’ derived from its Latin root adventurus: about to happen, makes for an interesting 
parallel with the preface.  To call a narrative an ‘adventure’ is a lie, because it relates events that have already 
happened while claiming they are about to happen; similarly, the preface speaks of a work which has already 
been written as though it is about to happen, while in reality it has been written after the fact.  
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forms.  The preface’s claim that the novel’s critique of government is a “truth highly worthy 
to be communicated to persons whom books of philosophy and science are never likely to 
reach” (1) does, as previously stated, target a readership not addressed in Political Justice.  But 
not only does Godwin here announce his intended audience:  he also foreshadows the third 
volume’s thematization of the production and reception of texts, which emphasizes how 
quickly certain texts (even fraudulent ‘true’ stories) can influence public opinion on a mass 
scale.  At stake is the holy Godwinian grail of the discovery or dissemination of “truth.” 
Kelvin Everest stresses the novel’s negative depiction of the futility of trying to tell the truth 
in his observation that Caleb Williams is characterized by a “profound pessimism over the 
possibility of communicating truth in the present conditions of society” (136).  The 
characters who inhabit the novel’s fictional universe are plagued by their inability to 
convince others of the truth of their tales, especially in situations where their status as social 
inferiors pits them against superiors whose abuse of power allows them to distort, suppress, 
or ignore the truth.  Caleb, frustrated in his repeated attempts to reveal the truth about 
Falkland, is himself reduced to a falsehood, stripped of all sense of self as he is forced to 
assume disguise after disguise to conceal his true identity:  “My life was all a lie.  I had a 
counterfeit character to support.  I had counterfeit manners to assume.  My gait, my 
gestures, my accents were all of them to be studied” (256).  The primary means by which 
Caleb’s character has been publicly ruined is through the diffusion of printed texts—
pamphlets, newspaper articles, and penny dreadful novels.  What emerges from the novel’s 
third volume is a tension between Godwin’s optimism about the potential of the novel to 
lead its readers towards the truth and his pessimism about the actuality of achieving this goal 
in the context of contemporary late-eighteenth-century print culture.  In the preface Godwin 
refers to himself as a “humble novelist” (2), a self-description whose ostensible adherence to 
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the prefatory convention of false modesty belies a more deep-seated anxiety of reception.  
The third volume of Caleb Williams tentatively investigates how the productions of the 
“humble novelist” can compete in a print culture where the boundary between truth and 
falsehood is blurred. 
 The novel Caleb Williams is, as Godwin describes it in the preface, a “vehicle” (1) for 
the propagation of truth.  David McCracken’s seminal article, “Godwin’s Literary Theory,” 
highlights Godwin’s belief in the power of the novel as a political medium, noting that it was 
common for late eighteenth-century writers to describe novels as vehicles, especially those 
with a radical aim.  Despite the form’s disreputable status, Godwin argues that the novelist’s 
knowledge of human nature and ability to imaginatively depict things as they are makes the 
novel superior to history writing (although still inferior to philosophical writing).34 As 
discussed above, the novel complements the philosophical treatise because of its ability to 
reach a much wider audience.  Godwin’s optimism about the novel’s potential, however, is 
tempered by his skepticism about the public’s ability to discern the truth.  The portrayal of 
the reading public in the novel’s third volume reflects Godwin’s ongoing struggle to define a 
hierarchy of readers.  In addition to the “men of study and reflexion” (v) targeted in Political 
Justice, and the “persons whom books of philosophy and science are never likely to reach” (1) 
addressed in Caleb Williams, Godwin, in a letter to Coleridge, also suggests another readerly 
echelon:  that of the “mob-monster” (qtd. in McCracken 118) utterly incapable of 
recognizing the truth.  But these latter two categories are slippery, and Godwin’s worst fear 
                                                        
34 See Godwin’s 1797 essay in narrative genre theory, “Of History and Romance.”   In this essay, Godwin 
argues for the “romance” writer’s superiority over the history writer:  “The historian is confined to individual 
incident and individual man, and must hang upon that his invention or conjecture as he can.  The writer of 
romance collects his materials from all sources, experience, report, and the records of human affairs; then 
generalizes them; and finally selects, from their elements and the various combinations they afford, those 
instances which he is best qualified to portray, and which he judges most calculated to impress the heart and 
improve the faculties of his reader.  In this point of view we should be apt to pronounce that romance was a 
nobler species of composition than history” (Caleb Williams 464).   
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that the category of “mob-monster”—an incipient version of Klancher’s mass audience—
might in fact characterize all readers but the philosophical few manifests itself in the third 
volume.  The third volume could be classified as an imaginative experiment in which 
Godwin attempts to map the cultural terrain of the reading public he hopes to influence.  
But during this time of flux, Godwin’s task is problematized by his gradual realization that 
his envisaged ideal audience might not actually exist.  Garrett Sullivan has shown how 
cultural shifts in the period’s production, dissemination, and reception of printed texts 
played a role in Godwin’s portrayal of the reading public, contradicting Godwin’s stated 
belief in the truth-value of the novel.  Observing that Godwin’s ideal scenario for the 
evolution of ideas begins with the discussion of ideas among the philosophical ‘gentleman’ 
readers before spreading to the lower orders, Sullivan characterizes Caleb Williams as 
illustrating Godwin’s coming to terms with “forms of textuality that do not contribute to a 
conversation between gentlemen, forms that Godwin sees as a threat not only to literary and 
intellectual discourse, but also to social relations” (332).  However, Godwin’s adherence to 
an eighteenth-century model of literary reception predicated on the importance of the 
printed text’s ability to generate such conversation, necessary for the testing and rational 
teasing out of ideas, has been destabilized by the fragmentation of reading audiences.  
Godwin’s own experience of attachment to a like-minded literary community is threatened 
by the emergence of various reading publics characterized by new and disparate textual 
desires.  Confronted with a “world of anonymous tracts and working class journals” 
(Sullivan 336), in addition to the many other competing forms of discourse among which 
Caleb Williams will circulate, Godwin ultimately expresses his ambivalence about the efficacy 
of the novel as arbiter of political reformation.  The novel’s tendencies thus become a source 
of concern for Godwin, especially during what Jon Klancher calls the “inchoate cultural 
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moment” (3) of the early Romantic period, when multiple reading audiences will inevitably 
produce multiple tendencies.  
  Although the intended effect of Godwin’s novel is to portray ‘things as they are’ and 
to awaken in the reader a sense of the injustice and power inequity inherent in England’s 
political system, there is no guarantee that the novel’s readers will discern this moral.  Hence 
Godwin’s worry, expressed in his preface to the 1832 edition of Fleetwood, that Caleb Williams 
had been published merely to “amuse boys and girls in their vacant hours . . . a story to be 
hastily gobbled up by them, swallowed in a pusillanimous and unanimated mood, without 
chewing and digestion” (7).  Godwin’s worst-case reception scenario describes his readers as 
passive consumers who, oblivious to the novel’s moral, enjoy the novel merely for its 
entertainment value.  But the depiction of the reading public in Caleb Williams’ third volume 
presents an even more serious problem for a writer whose goal is to disseminate the truth.  
In a world in which the common reader craves sensational literary accounts like the 
“histories of celebrated robbers” (259) penned by Caleb after his escape from prison—the 
type of reader that Wordsworth will single out in his preface to Lyrical Ballads as addicted to 
outrageous forms of stimulation—it is not the fact that readers seek out literature for its 
entertainment value but the reader’s susceptibility to deception that is especially problematic 
for Godwin.  As a form of “propaganda” (McCracken 131), the novel is but one of many 
literary forms intended to influence public opinion, and what is disturbing about the third 
volume’s portrayal of these various forms is their propagation of lies.  In an ominous 
foreshadowing of present-day corporate media manipulation, Godwin presents a scenario in 
which the production and dissemination of ‘information’ is controlled by the powerful.  The 
source of the several publications calling attention to Caleb’s guilt is Falkland:  he is the 
“absolute author” (296) who, although not necessarily directly responsible for writing the 
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pamphlets and handbills alerting the public about the fugitive Caleb, fabricated the story of 
having been robbed by his servant in the first place.  Falkland’s aristocratic status gives him 
the power, influence, and financial resources necessary to circulate texts intended to defame 
Caleb, but Falkand’s persecution of Caleb takes on a life of its own once it becomes 
enmeshed in the legal system.  Indeed, as Godwin claims in the preface, “it was proposed, in 
the invention of the following work, to comprehend, as far as the progressive nature of a 
single story would allow, a general review of the modes of domestic and unrecorded 
despotism, by which man becomes the destroyer of man” (2).  As depicted in the novel, the 
circulation of printed texts and the dialectical exchange of ideas through conversation—the 
ideal methods of social reformation for Godwin—are also paradoxically incipient modes of 
despotism as well.  To this end, Joel Faflak points out that the “public sphere of Godwinian 
conversation, rather than producing autonomous Romantic individuals, instead interpellates 
subjects (in the Althusserian sense) into the social identities they cannot resist inhabiting” 
(104).  
 The first, and most suggestive, instance of the extent to which printed texts serve as 
proxy-agents of power occurs during Caleb’s encounter with the thieves.  Shortly after his 
escape from prison, Caleb, while hiding with the gang of robbers, is ‘discovered’ as a fugitive 
after a gang member reads a newspaper article informing the public of his escape.  This 
scene enacts a contrast between two types of reader:  the “mob-monster,” represented by 
the two thieves who intend to turn in Caleb; and Mr. Raymond, the gang leader, who 
exhibits his critical acumen by refusing to believe the newspaper’s account.  The two thieves 
immediately believe what they read.  As Caleb relates it, “having read for a considerable time, 
they looked at me, and then at the paper, and then at me again.  They then went out of the 
room together, as if to consult without interruption upon something which that paper 
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suggested to them” (222) before returning to announce their intention to reap the reward 
money by apprehending Caleb.  But Mr. Raymond weighs the accuracy of the newspaper 
reports against his own estimation of Caleb’s character, concluding that Caleb is “guiltless of 
what they lay to his charge as that I am so myself” (224).  The newspaper report is especially 
disquieting not only because it falsely accuses Caleb of a crime he did not commit, but 
because it suggests that Caleb’s escape from prison is “tantamount to a confession of his 
guilt” (223).  What emerges from this scene is a nervous delineation of the power of printed 
texts:  the sheer rapidity of the spread of information is shocking, as is the ability of texts to 
so quickly penetrate even an outlaw milieu such as that inhabited by the thieves.  What began 
as a private dispute between two men, Caleb and Falkland, has proliferated to such an extent 
that even the most obscure substratum of society cannot help but know about it.  The 
printed text is shown to be a valuable weapon in the arsenal of power.  Moreover, once a 
narrative enters the public sphere, it can take on a life of its own.  Caleb wonders how 
Falkland can continue to pursue him in spite of everything he has already endured:   
  Surely he might now believe that he had sufficiently disarmed me, and  
  might at length suffer me to be at peace.  At least ought he not to be   
  contented to leave me to my fate, the perilous and uncertain condition of  
  an escaped felon, instead of thus whetting the animosity and vigilance  
  of my countrymen against me?  (227) 
But by this point Caleb’s ruminations are ineffectual, because the damage has already been 
done.  Caleb’s defamation becomes a self-perpetuating myth, a topical story of interest that 
has gone beyond the control of Falkland as it becomes public property, a text to be 
consumed and abused by an ingenuous reading public.  Caleb himself becomes a spectator 
of strangers discussing the ‘Kit Williams’ legend, and finds himself filled with mixed feelings 
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of shock and amusement at the “variety of the falsehoods” (237) contained within the 
public’s version of his story.  That Caleb’s story—itself predicated on a falsehood—has 
spread to such remote places as the rural public-house, and is discussed by the patrons as 
though they know the characters involved, borders on the absurd.  If there is hope for the 
readerly discernment of truth, it is embodied in the character of Raymond, whose judgment 
is not so easily swayed by what he has read. Raymond, a type of the ‘noble bandit,’ has also 
been spurned on account of his past transgressions.  As such, he is unable to return to 
legitimate society:  hence his identification with Caleb’s plight.  But most importantly 
Raymond is the paradigm of an ideal reader, one who examines critically the facts before 
forming a judgment.   
 Mr. Raymond is, however, a sole example of this ideal reader, a lone glimpse of 
optimism in a public otherwise prone to believe what it reads without reflection.  Other 
incidents in the third volume suggest that even intelligent and sensitive readers such as 
Caleb’s beloved Laura are culpable of falling prey to the designs of textual 
(mis)representations of Caleb’s story.  The halfpenny pamphlet, the Most Wonderful and 
Surprising History, And Miraculous Adventures of Caleb Williams, supplants the handbill as Caleb’s 
primary print persecutor.  Written by the criminal Gines, this text goes even farther than the 
handbill to exaggerate the severity of Caleb’s crimes.  Caleb quotes the Hawker who details 
the scandalous contents of the pamphlet: 
  Here you have the most wonderful and surprising history, and miraculous  
  adventures of Caleb Williams; you are informed how he first robbed, and  
  then brought false accusations against his master; as also of his attempting  
  divers times to break out of prison, till at last he effected his escape in the  
  most wonderful and uncredible manner; as also of his travelling the kingdom  
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  in various disguises, and the robberies he committed with a most desperate  
  and daring gang of thieves; and of his coming up to London, where it is  
  supposed he now lies concealed; with a  true and faithful copy of the hue and 
  cry printed and published by one of his majesty’s most principal secretaries  
  of state, offering a reward for one hundred guineas for apprehending him.   
  All for the price of one halfpenny. (268-69) 
Again, the embellishment of Caleb’s crimes creates an almost comic effect derived from its 
dramatic irony, as the novel’s reader, unlike the pamphlet’s reader, knows how far-fetched 
these allegations are.  What is not comical, however, is how easily the public believes the 
details of this narrative.  When Caleb appears finally to have found solace in the obscure 
market-town in Wales to which he absconds, it does appear for a brief time that he has 
finally eluded Falkland’s pursuit and can live out the rest of his life in peace.  But after he has 
established himself in the town, he finds himself spurned by the townspeople, and repulsed 
by Laura.  Laura, figured as a paragon of virtue whose relationship with Caleb has been 
founded on their mutual fondness for discussion of “subjects of literature and taste” (292), 
would appear to be the non-criminal counterpart of Mr. Raymond, one who knows Caleb 
well enough not to believe the pamphlet’s accusations.  But Laura, like her fellow credulous 
townsfolk, does believe what she reads and participates in the general rebuffing of Caleb.  
Notwithstanding the highly implausible coincidence that Falkland turns out to be a family 
friend of Laura’s (which could, possibly, explain her inclination to believe his word over 
Caleb’s), her readiness to turn against Caleb is disturbing given the presumed substance of 
her character.  After receiving the letter informing him that she wishes to see him no more, 
Caleb asks, “can you think of condemning a man, when you have heard only one side of his 
story?” (299).  But Laura has already made up her mind, and refuses to let Caleb plead his 
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case.  This incident highlights the pessimistic nature of Godwin’s imagining of the reading 
public, as the character most likely to be sympathetic to Caleb turns out to be no more 
discerning than any other ‘mob-monster.’  If the novel’s third volume is in part an 
imaginative experiment on the possibility of communicating truth via the printed word, its 
results suggest the difficulties of depending on the critical reading skills of an anonymous 
reading public.  
  
The Afterlife of Caleb Williams     
 It was not, however, until the 1831 reissue of Caleb Williams that Godwin’s novel 
could finally be afforded by the mass reading public he wished to influence.35  Published as 
the second in Colburn and Bentley’s Standard Novels series, the novel was issued as a single 
volume reissue at 6s.  By 1832, the novel has been bulked up by two lengthy prefaces—Mary 
Shelley’s 1831 “Memoirs of William Godwin,” published in the reissue of Caleb Williams, and 
Godwin’s own 1832 preface to Fleetwood, which deals exclusively with the composition and 
reception of Caleb Williams.  One of the attractions of the Standard Novels was their 
authoritative claim as “texts finally approved by their authors,” or at least they were 
published with new prefaces in which the author’s “mature judgment” was passed upon his 
or her early work (Sadleir, XIX 95).  As Colburn and Bentley boast in an 1831 advertisement 
for the newly launched series, the Standard Novels series present “the only genuine edition 
extant of the works in question (qtd. in Sadleir, “Bentley’s” 51).  But such a textual approach 
inevitably leads to problems, especially in the case of a novel like Caleb Williams, republished 
                                                        
35 Most of the novel’s original readers would have borrowed the book from a circulating library as only a very 
affluent minority could afford to purchase it.  Only with the single-volume Standard Novels edition was the 
price within reach of the average reader (Erickson 142-43).  
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almost forty years after its original publication.36  The recontextualizing of the novel results 
in a schizophrenic text, split between its original, revolutionary, 1794 context, and its proto-
Victorian context.  The contextual shifts, however, are not to be found in the body of the 
novel itself, but rather in the paratexts that mediate between the text and its public reception.   
One might expect that in 1832, the year of the Reform Act, Godwin would seize on the 
opportunity to reflect on the changes that had occurred in the three decades since he 
published Political Justice and Caleb Williams; however, no mention is made of this topic in the 
prefaces to Caleb Williams, St. Leon, or Fleetwood, the three Godwin novels serialized in the 
Standard Novels series.37  
 In addition to the numerous minor alterations to the text for the 1831 reissue, 
Godwin changed the title from Things as they Are to Caleb Williams, a move that downplayed 
the novel’s original politically polemical intent in favour of presenting the novel as a 
                                                        
36 Caleb Williams was not the only novel whose “Revised, Corrected, and Illustrated with Notes by the Author” 
version was problematic.  For example, Bentley omitted the dedication to the Prince Regent from Austen’s 
Emma.  Whether he did so because of the Prince Regent’s having fallen into disrepute or because it contrasted 
with the “pious” prefatory biographical sketch of Austen written by her brother for the ‘Standard Novels’ 
edition is unknown.  But Bentley’s omission has been followed by many Victorian and modern editors of the 
novel, thus eliminating a very important contextualizing paratext (Gettman 48-49). 
 
37 Although Godwin makes no mention of current political events in his 1832 paratexts, in 1832 he did pen a 
Prospectus for a new edition of Political Justice.  In this prospectus, dated Oct. 9, 1832, he does allude obliquely 
to the Reform Act, crediting his treatise for contributing to a gradual realization of greater equality for all 
citizens that has led to unprecedented social reform:  “The Enquiry concerning Political Justice had its day, and 
is by many supposed to be consigned to oblivion.  In all memorable crises of human affairs there is apt to be a 
reaction.  Men began to fear that they had gone too far; they suspected that when they sought liberty merely, 
they were in danger of anarchy, that war and bloodshed (modes of obtaining even a laudable end that were 
specially protested against in Political Justice) threatened to become general and that out of this confusion a 
tyranny might arise more remorseless than that under which mankind had groaned for ages . . . But the seeds 
had been sown too deeply; the soil of the human mind had been too effectually stirred up; and, after many 
memorable vicissitudes it became apparent that the cause of improvement and equality would finally triumph.  
Of late years in particular great strides have been taken in this respect, and it seems evident that, at least in 
these islands, sentiments favourable to human liberty and happiness will go forward with a tide that no power 
can resist.  In the mean time it is certain that the Enquiry concerning Political Justice led the way in this 
suspicious career.  The author struck the blow which shook the fabric of abuse and corruption to its basis.  
Other men have done well, and have manfully followed up what he began; but the claims of priority cannot 
reasonably be denied him” (PJV 422). 
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psychological character study.38  This change of titles shows how a simple paratext—the 
title—can, like a preface, strongly influence one’s reading of the novel.39  What is achieved in 
this change of titles is a shift from one pole to the other of what Ian Watt identifies as the 
“subjective and the objective poles of dualism” (296) that characterize a novel’s orientation.  
But this shift in emphasis from the outer world of things as they are to the inner world of 
the protagonist’s consciousness is a necessary one, overdetermined by a variety of factors, 
culminating in the revisioning of Caleb Williams’ original function.  The changing paratexts 
tell the story of two very different historical contexts:  just as the 1790s prefaces to Political 
Justice and Caleb Williams embody the tensions and the possibilities of their historical 
moments, so do the prefaces of the 1830s.  The primary narrative strand of this paratextual 
(de-)evolution portrays, at the outset, a societal shift in which the possibility of collective 
action spurred by the ‘political novel’ has diminished.40  Subtle indicators point to the social 
conditions impinging on the space of the preface, evincing an acute paratextual sensitivity to 
extra-textual factors.  For instance, the anonymous, third-person author-figure of the 
prefaces to Political Justice and Things as they Are becomes the venerable ‘William Godwin,’ 
memorialized by his daughter Mary in the 1831 Caleb Williams and given free reign to talk 
about himself in the 1832 preface to Fleetwood.  Moving away from the ‘immaturity’ of his 
                                                        
38 Gary Kelly makes this claim, arguing that the change of title represents a changed status from “tract of the 
times” to “prototype of the English novel’s renewed interest in individual psychology” (English 180). 
 
39 So much so that the two titles and the two sets of prefaces correspond with a trend in the history of the 
novel’s criticism to interpret the novel in binary terms as either ‘political’ or ‘psychological.’  For more on this 
tendency and representative works see Leaver 589-90, and Myers 591-2.   
   
40 One could, however, argue that this difference already exists in the novel’s two endings.  The original, 
unpublished ending depicts, through the judge’s silencing of Caleb and his subsequent descent into madness, a 
failure of collective action and a radicalism defeated by the institutions it seeks to overthrow.  The published 
ending shifts the locus of action away from the collective, focusing on the private encounter between Caleb and 
Falkland, yet does not renounce the possibility of revolution.  For a detailed discussion of the hermeneutic 
implications of the novel’s two endings, see Rajan, “Reading,” 240-43. 
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youthful radicalism to the ‘maturity’ of sober reflection reflects the well-told life, a 
developmental inevitability that fits with Victorian modes of social and cultural progress.  By 
contrast, the “humble novelist” of the 1790s has no prefatory identity apart from his 
functional role as purveyor of political truths and instigator of reform.  The figure posited in 
the 1790s prefaces is no individuated or solitary Romantic author, but rather a collaborator 
participating in the collective enterprise of political reform.    
 The 1831 and 1832 prefaces have generally been interpreted by critics as indicative of 
Godwin’s and Mary Shelley’s desire to dissociate the now-elderly writer from his Jacobin 
past by glossing over Caleb Williams’ political dimension.41  The curious absence of any 
reference to the novel’s original revolutionary context is highly problematic, and whatever 
Shelley’s and Godwin’s motives may have been for these prefatory tactics, there is no 
denying their attempts to recast the novel in “aesthetic and private terms” (Clemit 211).  A 
close analysis of these two paratexts, however, reveals two very different rhetorical strategies 
at work.  Whereas Mary’s “Memoirs” do consciously participate in a revisionary refiguration 
of Godwin as a political moderate for the sake of posterity, Godwin’s preface to Fleetwood 
can be read as an ironic engagement with the discourse of the contemporary cult of 
                                                        
41 Gary Kelly, for example, notes that the political dimension of the novel was “quickly forgoten as the 
controversies of the 1790s faded into the past”—Godwin “acquiesced” in this forgetting in his 1832 preface 
because he “ignored the political and philosphical aspects of the novel altogether” (English 182).  Marilyn Butler 
observes how Godwin emphasizes “romantic aspects” (58) of his book in 1832, the result of an increasing 
skepticism about the likelihood of real change in society through individual rationality.  Hence Godwin has 
reinterpreted the novel in terms of the irrational, emphasizing a state of mind characterized by “abnormality, its 
heightened and creative fervour,” stressing the “strangeness of the story he has to tell—as though it were an 
inexplicable product of the subconscious, rather than an intelligible description of a reality which the reader 
might recognize in the common world of every day” (58).  Pamela Clemit argues that the later prefaces reflect 
Godwin’s and Mary Shelley’s conservatism as they collaborate to disavow Godwin’s radical past:  “the re-
presentation of the Godwinian novel involves more than a response to Bentley’s marketing strategy.  At issue is 
the whole question of its original political content and purpose.  The later Prefaces show a shift to the 
subjective and private concerns already seen in Mary Shelley’s revisions to the text of the 1831 Frankenstein.  
This dampening-down of earlier radical aims is equally evident in redescriptions of Caleb Williams, in which it 
is difficult to separate Mary Shelley’s contribution from Godwin’s.  In her memoir of Godwin, issued with the 
1831 Caleb Williams, Mary Shelley emphasized the moderation of Godwin’s early political view and glossed over 
the subversive qualities of his best-known novel” (212-3).  
 
  77
authorship.  Unlike the original preface(s) to Caleb Williams, which functioned as the site in 
which political forces impinged on the fictional space of the novel through the enactment of 
textual repression, the later prefaces mark the intrusion of the economic through the 
insertion of a newly formulated reification of the ‘author.’42  The implications of this 
intrusion are numerous, and the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an analysis not 
only of how these new prefaces complicate—or clarify43—a reading of Caleb Williams, but, 
more broadly, of what they reveal about the institutionalization of the novel as a literary 
form and what they tell us about Godwin’s ‘author-function’ as formulated, and self-
deconstructed, in the early 1830s.     
It is important to observe how the 1796 prefaces are ‘pushed aside’ spatially in 
favour of Mary Shelley’s 1831 “Memoirs,” thus relegating them to a lower position in the 
narrative hierarchy, the highest level of which has been usurped by Mary’s text.44  No longer 
does the novel begin with Godwin’s heroic account of his successful efforts to overcome the 
agents of political censorship.  Instead, the text is prefaced by a loving tribute to Godwin 
                                                        
42 The 1830s paratexts manifest a changed cultural perspective on literature, the emergence of which Paul Keen 
locates at the end of the eighteenth century:  a shift in focus from literature to authors, and a redefinition of 
politics as “a struggle for professional distinction (status of the author) rather than for national agency 
(revolution, government reform, the rights of man)” (8).   
 
43 Mitzi Myers, for example, suggests that the prefaces complement one another by collectively constituting a 
more holistic explanation of the novel’s aims.  Whereas the author of the 1794 preface is the “rational 
philosopher” concerned with the didactic function of portraying things as they are, the Fleetwood preface is the 
product of the “conscious literary artist” realizing his imaginative vision.  “The two Prefaces reveal clearly the 
importance Godwin ascribes to both the understanding and the imagination in the creation of Caleb Williams” 
(598). 
 
44 Subsequent to 1831, few modern editions of Caleb Williams contain Mary’s memoir.  An 1856 American 
edition of the text, published by New York’s Harper & Brothers prints the 1831 text complete with Mary’s 
memoirs and the anonymous essay “Criticism on the Novels of Godwin.”  But other versions omit the 
memoirs altogether:  the 1988 Penguin Classics edition is based on the 1831 text, yet it does not print the 
memoirs; nor does the 2000 Broadview edition, which is also based on the 1831 text print the memoirs, nor 
does it include them in its extensive appendeces.  Both the 1988 and 2000 editions, however, do contain 
Godwin’s 1832 preface to Fleetwood as an appendix, as does the 1970 World’s Classics edition.  The 1970, 1988, 
and 2000 editions retain the 1794 and 1795 prefaces.  The 1926 edition published by Greenberg contains no 
original prefaces at all.     
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written by his daughter, casting Godwin in terms that differ significantly from the hostile 
‘Godwin’ self-depicted in the prefaces of the 1796 edition.  In Mary’s account, Godwin is 
praised for his “docility” (iii).  He “was not one of those youths who . . . rebel against 
authority” and possessed “equanimity and imperturbableness of temper” (iv).  He was 
characterized by “an air of mildness and contemplation yet fervour” (viii), and was “mild and 
benevolent of aspect, gentle and courteous of manner” (vi).  This last description is 
particularly telling, as Shelley immediately notes that “the author himself presented a singular 
contrast in appearance, to the boldness of his speculations” (vi).  Here we have the crux of 
Shelley’s memoir, which seeks to depict a very different Godwin from the one who had 
fallen into such public disfavour on account of his perceived earlier radicalism.  In a reversal 
of the ad hominem argument, Shelley emphasizes the positive attributes of Godwin’s character 
to outweigh the regrettable “boldness” of his earlier political ideas.  Perhaps the boldest 
move of Shelley’s memoir is a shrewd (mis)reading of Caleb Williams itself:  “all that might 
have offended, as hard and republican in his larger work, was obliterated by the splendour 
and noble beauty of the character of Falkland” (vi).  This is the only reference to the novel 
to which the memoir is affixed, and it disingenuously suggests that Godwin somehow 
mollifies the radical tenets of Political Justice through the figuration of the character of 
Falkland.  The irony here of course rests in the fact that Falkland’s character is supposed to 
embody many of the critiques outlined in Political Justice, as his aristocratic status gives him 
the power to so relentlessly pursue the inferior Caleb. 
 Moreover, Mary’s “Memoirs” explicitly seek to exonerate Godwin from his 
association with other notable British radicals of the 1790s.  Rightly pointing out that 
Godwin was “attached to moderate measures” and that he “believed that amelioration was 
more facile than reconstruction, and loved reformation better than destruction” (vii), Shelley 
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contrasts Godwin’s gradualism with the more aggressive tendencies of some of his radical 
contemporaries.  Holcroft, for instance, is condemned as “unrefined and self-educated,” 
plagued by a “violence of temper” (vii), which hindered the advancement of the radical 
cause.  Shelley also reminds the reader that although Godwin was neither affiliated with the 
Constitutional nor the London Corresponding Societies, his association with radicals like 
Horne Tooke, Thelwall, and Hardy meant that he would likely have been implicated if Pitt’s 
attempts to convict them had been successful.  But the societies are depicted as participating 
in the bastardization of Godwin’s ideas by “disseminating his opinions, and holding up the 
equalizing principles of the French Revolution” (vii).   There is nothing erroneous about 
Mary’s depiction of the events of the 1790s, and her “Memoirs” are, to be sure, an eloquent 
and respectful tribute to her father.  But their appearance in the prefatory pages of Caleb 
Williams serves to some extent to defeat the purpose of the novel’s original political intent.  
Part of the novel’s strategy for disseminating the ‘truths’ Godwin seeks to convey consists of 
its appeal to a future reader, in much the same way that Caleb’s own plea for exculpation is 
left to posterity.  Godwin’s political project, however, is fossilized with the inclusion of this 
memoir.  The novel Caleb Williams, along with Godwin’s political goals, is presented as an 
event already having taken place in the past, its very pastness suggesting that its purposes 
have already been fulfilled (or abandoned):  things as they were.  The sense of urgency and 
alarm setting the tone for the 1796 edition no longer exists; rather, it has been mitigated by 
the prefatory insertion of the institutionalized author-figure, who appears as more of a 
museum-piece than a political threat.  So by the time the 1831 reader reaches the original 
preface, its power to rouse has been diminished.  No longer contextualized by a preface 
evoking the danger and struggle of the radical cause, the novel becomes detached from its 
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engagement with political issues and presents itself as a harmless work of imaginative fiction 
produced by a (reformed) former radical who has by 1831 become an institution.  
 But contrary to readings that emphasize Mary Shelley’s role in sabotaging the 
political aims of Caleb Williams, one could also classify her preface as elusive, in the sense that 
it presents a version of Godwin as a proto-Victorian sage.  To this end, Mary exploits the 
possibilities of the Standard Editions preface, whose critical methodology is predicated on 
the ‘well-told life’ as a framework for contextualizing the author’s productions.  In this sense, 
the figure of the mature Godwin who subsumes the novel in 1831 makes him palatable for a 
proto-Victorian audience.  The novel’s contents, of course, remain intact; thus, the preface 
functions as a sort of smokescreen, concealing the novel’s radical energy.  The aftermaths of 
Godwin’s politics—the return of a repressed politics that can never be effectively 
repressed—cannot be erased from the novel despite any prefatory attempts to do so.  One 
could argue that the de-politicization of Godwin is in effect a re-politicization of him to 
different effect, a re-politicization that Godwin might very well resist by maintaining his 
cathexis with Political Justice and thus with 1790s’ radicalism.  Therefore, the very 
domestication of Godwin, who has been turned into an “author” or “character” in Mary’s 
and his own prefaces, is a strongly ideological ploy.  Mary Hays also deploys this prefatory 
strategy in her 1799 preface to The Victim of Prejudice, and Mary Shelley presents a similarly 
toned-down portrayal of Percy Bysshe Shelley in her 1824 preface to his Posthumous Poems 
and will continue the work in her 1839 preface to Poetical Works of P. B. Shelley, as I 
demonstrate in Chapters Two and Four.  
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Fleetwood and the Author-Function  
Mary’s intention is to resuscitate her father’s reputation for the sake of posterity, but 
what is revealed by the inclusion of her memoir in the 1831 edition of Caleb Williams, and the 
inclusion of Godwin’s new preface to the 1832 edition of Fleetwood, is a particular 
formulation of what Foucault has called the ‘author-function.’  Foucault conceives the 
author-function as a socially constructed, historically variable convention of attributing 
written texts to an originating author.  Not merely a simple case of automatically ascribing a 
given text to its creator, the author-function is “tied to the legal and institutional systems that 
circumscribe, determine and articulate the realm of discourses” (124).  Moreover, Foucault 
locates the emergence of the modern conception of the ‘author’ at the end of the eighteenth 
and the beginning of the nineteenth century, a time when strict laws about copyright and 
ownership developed.45  The coming into being of the modern notion of the ‘author’ marks, 
according to Foucault, a “privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas” (125).  
The extent to which the prefaces of the 1830s contribute to an individualization of Godwin-
the-author cannot be overlooked:  collectively, they constitute an instance of the ‘man-and-
his-work’ criticism characterized by the modern concept of authorship.  
 But what the specific case of the Standard Novels’ editorial practice of including 
authorial memoirs, biographies, etc. makes especially clear is the economic manifestation of 
the newly evolved author-function.  The function of these author-centric paratexts is, first 
and foremost, a marketing tactic, the intention of which is to replicate the success of Walter 
Scott’s own paratextual strategy of prefacing his “Author’s Edition” of the Waverley Novels 
with a General Preface containing a sketch of his biography and literary development.  
                                                        
45 “It was at the moment when a system of ownership and strict copyright rules (toward the end of the 
eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century) that the transgressive properties always intrinsic to the act 
of writing became the forceful imperative of literature” (Foucault 125). 
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Colburn and Bentley’s Standard Novels series was originally influenced by Cadell’s highly 
successful reissue series of Scott’s Waverley novels, which began in June of 1829.  This series, 
the genesis of the cheap fiction reprint, reissued Scott’s novels in a small, two-volume format 
for 5s each; therefore, the novels, which originally cost a prohibitive 31s 6d, were within the 
reach of the average reader (Erickson 146-50).  The mass production of cheap fiction and 
the lengthy paratextual intrusion of the ‘author’ speaking about himself (in professional 
terms) emerge simultaneously at a historical moment in which the commodification of the 
novel attains new levels of profitablity for publishers.  Godwin himself, in the preface to the 
1831 Standard Novels reissue of St. Leon, comments on the changed public perception of 
authorship.  Observing a shift in focus from the work itself to the author’s character and 
method of composition, Godwin states that 
  One of my most valued friends (Mr. Northcote) has often told me, that the  
  public may sometimes be interested in the perusal of a book, but that they  
  never give themselves any trouble about the author.  He therefore kindly  
  advised me on no occasion to say any thing in print about myself.  The  
  present race of readers seem scarcely disposed to verify this maxim.  They  
  are understood to be desirous to learn something of the peculiarities, the  
  “life, character, and behaviour” of an author, before they consign him to  
  the gulph of oblivion, and are willing to learn from his own testimony  
  what train of thoughts induced him to adopt the particular subject and plan  
  of the work, upon the perusal of which they are engaged. (xxix) 
This preface, the first composed by Godwin for the Standard Novels series, finds itself 
perplexed by the demands made on it by a publisher who understands the contemporary 
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importance of what Derrida calls the “gossipy chit-chat” (Dissemination 10) of the preface. 46  
Explicitly alluding to Scott, whom he credits for the discovery that an author can write 
“twenty or thirty” (xxix) novels without losing hold of the public’s interest, Godwin thus 
implicates his own text in the same system of literary production now dominated by the 
influence of Scott’s larger-than-life author-figure.47  Godwin also alludes to the 
institutionalization of the novel as a legitimate literary form and the novelist as a respected 
literary figure:  in his preface, Godwin recalls that “in those days it was deemed a most 
daring thought to attempt to write a novel, with the hope that it might hereafter rank among 
the classics of a language” (xxix).  Initially, Godwin appears bemused by this new author-
centric approach to novel reading.  He admits to being “at a loss” (xxix) about how to oblige 
the publisher’s request for information about the genesis of St. Leon.  For Godwin, the new 
preface can only be superfluous: “in the original Preface I frankly stated the sources upon 
which I had drawn for the idea and conduct of the work” (xxix).  The absurdity of prefacing 
an already prefaced work is hinted at in this comment; Godwin has acquiesced merely by 
writing the preface, although it is quite terse and contributes very little to a deeper 
understanding of St. Leon.       
 If Godwin’s 1831 preface to the reissued St. Leon resists Bentley’s request for a 
glimpse into the “life, character, and behaviour” of the author, his preface to the 1832 
Fleetwood reissue makes a more potentially serious attempt to comply with the publisher’s 
                                                        
46 St. Leon, reissued in 1831, was the fifth installment of the Standard Novels series.  Caleb Williams, the second 
installment, contained Mary Shelley’s memoirs but no contribution from Godwin.   
 
47 The reissued St. Leon preface, however, is not the only preface in which Godwin alludes to Scott’s prolific 
literary output:  in his 1832 preface to Deloraine, Godwin makes a similar remark that “the Great Unknown, as 
he had for years been denominated, had suficiently shown that it was not absolutely necessary for the mind of 
an author to lie fallow for years, between the conclusion of one work of fiction and the commencement of 
another.  And, old as I was, and little as it might become me in other respects to put forward a comparison 
between myself and the writer now recently deceased, I felt an ambition to show that I upon occasion could be 
no less intermitted in the invention of a narrative” (5).  
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demands.  Godwin’s preface to Fleetwood is considerably more loquacious than the St. Leon 
advertisement, and concerns itself exclusively with the inspiration for and composition of 
Caleb Williams.  As noted, critics have observed the extent to which Godwin ignores the 
novel’s original political intention in favour of presenting a romanticized account of the 
novel.  I would suggest, however, that there are two contrasting ways of approaching the 
Fleetwood preface that would result in radically different readings.  The first method (that 
which has, generally speaking, been used by the critics quoted above) would assume that 
Godwin’s preface is sincere, and that his preface is predicated on a not-so-subtly hidden 
agenda to impose his later, more conservative point-of-view on the novel.  A second 
method, which I will pursue in my analysis, would involve reading the 1832 preface in an 
ironic mode, paying close attention to how Godwin constructs a narrative that self-
consciously parodies the type of authorial preface he would have been expected to have 
written, achieved through his deconstruction of the author-figure.  His first prefatory 
contribution to the Standard Novels series, the preface to St. Leon, is tinged with irony, 
revealing a self-conscious awareness of his author-figure’s figural dimension.  
 Regardless of Godwin’s intent, however, it is worth noting how Fleetwood’s preface 
engages with what might be called the ‘ur-preface’ of the paratextual genre that the Standard 
Novels’ publishers sought to emulate:  Scott’s General Preface to the Waverley Novels series.  
Ostensibly, the purpose of this type of preface is to provide a deeper insight into the 
workings of the novel as described in Scott’s misleading watch analogy:  “it remains to be 
tried whether the public (like a child to whom a watch is shown) will, after having been 
saturated with looking at the outside, acquire some new interest in the object when it is 
opened and the internal machinery displayed to them” (101).  What characterizes Scott’s 
General Preface is an emphasis on matters pertaining to authorship, literary fame, and the 
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field of literary production generally.  It is a text absorbed in the system of literary 
professionalization so effectively exploited by Scott, saturated with the worldly functions of 
the working writer’s relationship to this structure.  As the first novelist to achieve mass 
literary celebrity, Scott represents an authorial figure whose rise to fame could only have 
occurred under the exact historical conditions of the first decades of the nineteenth century.  
The figure of Scott in many respects symbolizes the emerging capitalist model of the author, 
a writer whose signature becomes an industry in itself, producing “a commodity to be sold 
by bulk” (Saunders 179).  Saunders’ depiction of  Scott’s “essentially commercial connexion 
with his audience” (180) is especially valid in the context of of the publication of the Waverley 
Novels reissues, as their publication was motivated purely by financial reasons necessitated by 
Scott’s recent bankruptcy.48  Cadell and Scott realized the potential for unprecedented 
profits, and Scott, desperate to recuperate his losses and continue to live his lavish lifestyle, 
seized the opportunity.  Written in 1829, at the height of Scott’s literary fame, the General 
Preface is a paradigmatic formulation of a new, economically constituted, professionalized 
concept of authorship whose primary interest concerns the history of the author’s ‘rise’ to 
fame.  The ‘author’ is individuated, privileged, and the Waverley novels themselves become 
by-products of their creator, subordinate to the prefatorally narrated process of their 
conception.  A significant bulk of the preface concerns Scott’s reflections on the concealing 
of his authorial identity for the publication of the Waverley novels and the subsequent flood 
                                                        
48 In his last years, Godwin too desired a commerical relationship with Scott:  In a February 17, 1831 letter to 
Scott, Godwin, desperate for money and unable to find a publisher for Lives of the Necromancers, seeks Scott’s 
help in persuading Cadell or any other publisher to accept the work.  Despite the poignancy of Godwin’s plea 
(“I am . .. the prodigal who so often serves to point the moral of a tale.  I have spent what I had, and have 
nothing left . . . I have a wife:  I need the little house I live in to hold my books and my literary 
accommodations” (qtd. in Paul 2:  310-12), Scott cannot oblige his request.  Unfortunately, Scott too has 
suffered the same fate as Godwin:  as he explains in his Feb. 24, 1831 reply to Godwin, he is bankrupt, and as 
such unable to engage in any “literary speculations” which would require his financial backing should the 
volume fail to show an immediate profit (312-13).   
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of public curiosity.   A reading of Godwin’s preface to Fleetwood in conjunction with Scott’s 
General Preface reveals how closely Godwin followed the model originated by Scott.49  
 In addition to the similarities noted below, the general spirit of Godwin’s preface is, 
despite its lack of humour and Scottian glibness, very much akin to Scott’s preface.  But 
what is especially noteworthy about its relation to Caleb Williams’ original preface is its 
tendency to transpose certain thematic elements from the earlier text to harmonize with this 
new emphasis on matters pertaining to authorship.  For instance, the earlier preface’s 
concern with judgment in the political and judicial sense, as it implicates itself in topical 
issues of censorship and government persecution of radical writers, along with its 
participation in the novel’s critique of the legal and penal systems, is transformed into a 
preoccupation with literary judgment as seen in Godwin’s tale of Marshal’s negative response 
to the novel’s early draft:  “I doubtless felt no implicit deference for the judgment of my 
                                                        
49 First, Scott playfully begins his preface by speaking in the third person, before claiming, at the end of the first 
paragraph, that “having introduced himself in the third person singular, he proceeds in the second paragraph to 
make use of the first” (86), sacrificing “modesty” to avoid the effects of “stiffness and affectation” associated 
with the former mode.  Godwin also relates a tale of a shift from the third to the first person mode, pertaining 
to his composition of Caleb Williams.  Although the novel was begun in the third person mode, Godwin soon 
became “dissatisfied” before assuming the first person for the purpose of “making the hero of my tale his own 
historian,” a mode he continued to employ for the remainder of his novelistic career on account of its capacity 
to allow for more detailed psychological delineation of character carved out by the author’s “metaphysical 
dissecting knife” (339).  Second, Scott tells the story of having shown an early draft of Waverley “as far, I think, 
as the seventh chapter” (90; italics mine)  to a friend whose opinion of it was “unfavourable” (90). Therefore, not 
wishing to sacrifice his poetic reputation, Scott put aside the work; but at any rate the novel was eventually 
published and the friend’s judgment was “afterwards reversed on an appeal to the public” (90).  But Scott had 
only shown the friend a portion of the first volume, before the hero had departed for Scotland, so it is no 
wonder that it did not receive a rave review.  Godwin too recounts an early bad review of Caleb Williams: after 
giving a draft of “about seven-tenths” of the first volume to his secretary James Marshal, Godwin received a 
note two days letter warning that “if I had obeyed the impulse of my own mind, I should have thrust it in the 
fire.  If you persist, the book will infallibly prove the grave of your literary fame” (339; italics mine).  Like Scott, 
Godwin put aside the novel, suffering “at least two days of deep anxiety.”  But “by dint of resolution I became 
invulnerable” and he proceeded to finish the novel.  Third, Scott gives an account of the composition of 
Waverley, admitting that “the mode in which I conducted the story scarcely deserved the success which the 
romance afterwards attained.  The tale of Waverley was put together with so little care that I cannot boast of 
having sketched any distinct plan of the work.”  On the whole, the adventures are “managed without much 
skill” (93).  Godwin by contrast emphasizes the careful design of his novel, providing a very influential account 
of his technique.  He presents a step-by-step description of how, working backwards from the originally 
conceived third volume (the method which so appealed to Poe), he constructed the novel.  The intended 
overall effect was no less than “an entire unity of plot” combined with a “unity of spirit of interest” that would 
exert a “powerful hold on the reader” (337). 
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friendly critic” (339).  Similarly, the idea of pursuit that informs not only the prefatorally-
narrated pursuit of Godwin and his fellow radicals by government agents, but also drives the 
action of the narrative as it follows Caleb as he is relentlessly pursued by Falkland’s 
henchmen, is also reordered into literary terms as Godwin employs the verb to depict the 
aforementioned process by which he structured the novel:  “Pursuing this idea, I invented 
first the third volume of my tale, then the second, and last of all the first” (337).  And 
Godwin’s recollection of his original motive for writing the novel strongly contrasts with his 
avowed intent in the 1795 preface.  Whereas, according to the novel’s original preface, 
Godwin sought to transmit a “truth highly worthy to be communicated” (1), in the 1832 
preface his motive for writing both Caleb Williams and Political Justice is depicted in terms of 
his desire for literary fame:  quoting Cowley, he asks, “‘what shall I do to be for ever known, 
/ And make the age to come my own?’” (336).   What is chronicled is not Godwin’s struggle 
as a radical political figure, but rather his attempt to establish his authority, to situate himself 
within the field of literary production.  When conceiving Caleb Williams, he admits he was 
concerned with “building to myself a name” (336) by producing a work of fiction containing 
the “stamp of originality” (338).  And although having appropriated the ideas of other 
authors, he was confident of having a “vein of thinking that was properly my own.” 
 Curiously, however, in the very midst of establishing a particular authorial figure, 
Godwin also deconstructs the figure of the author as someone who can be totalized and 
grasped, by suggesting the novel we read forwards was actually constructed backwards in 
such a way as to disclose the structurality of its structure.  Thus, the preface becomes doubly 
elusive:  not only in the sense that Godwin, like Mary, contributes a preface that distracts the 
reader from remembering Godwin’s radical past, but also in the sense that the author-
figure’s elusiveness is heightened through its association with this structurality.  Thus the 
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“entire unity of plot” and the “unity of spirit of interest” (337) identified by Godwin in the 
preface as characterizing the effect of Caleb Williams’ plot discloses itself as a sort of figural 
illusiveness.  Emerging from Godwin’s ruminations on his reverse compositional method is 
a recognition of the prefatory figure as figure, as a tropological structure distinct from the 
empirical author whose authority he seeks to consolidate in the preface.  Whereas the early 
prefaces to Political Justice and Caleb Williams eschewed an elaborated authorial figure in 
favour of an objective statement of facts, the later prefaces depict a Godwin whose self-
figurations become an ‘experiment’ in themselves.  This figural dimension of the prefatory 
speaker will prove to be crucial to Mary Hays, as she exploits its possibilities to craft 
prefatory figures designed to mediate her texts to multiple reading audiences. 
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—TWO— 
 
MARY HAYS’S PREFACES OF THE 1790s:  RHETORICAL 
SUBTERFUGE AND THE RISE OF RADICAL FEMINISM 
 
“The result of her hazardous experiment is calculated to operate as a warning, rather 
than as an example” (36).  
— Mary Hays, Memoirs of Emma Courtney 
 
 
During the turbulent decade of the 1790s, another form of radical writing was 
developing while Godwin wrote and published Political Justice and Caleb Williams.  A number 
of women writers were also engaged in the process of theorizing the French Revolution’s 
impact on British society.  But unlike Godwin, these early feminist writers were especially 
concerned with the concept of gender and how the principles of equality that characterized 
the revolutionary spirit could be applied to liberate women from patriarchal constraints.  Of 
the late-eighteenth-century feminists, Mary Wollstonecraft is the best known; however, her 
contemporary, Mary Hays, published several important works throughout the 1790s that 
furthered the early feminist cause.  All of Hays’s major works of the 1790s are elusively 
prefaced,50 and in this chapter I seek to explore the connections between paratextuality, 
                                                        
50 The practice of women writers prefacing their work was reasonably common in the late-eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.  Among Hays’s most significant contemporaries, for instance, Mary Wollstonecraft’s 
 Vindication of the Rights of Men is prefaced with a brief advertisement that polemically derides the “devious,” 
“questionable” and “sophistical arguments” (33) of Burke’s Reflections, to which her treatise is a reply.  Her 
novel Mary:  A Fiction (1788) contains a brief Advertisement, which Mary Hays might have drawn on for her 
preface to Memoirs of Emma Courtney, as I mention in my analysis of the Memoirs. A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman (1792) is not prefaced, although it does include a polemical “Author’s Introduction” that provides a 
“rough sketch” (112) of the treatise’s methodology, and her Wrongs of Women contains a posthumous preface 
written by William Godwin, along with a fragment of the original “Author’s Preface,” introduced by Godwin as 
“not a preface regularly drawn out by author, but merely hints for a preface, which . . . appeared to be worth 
preserving” (72).  On the whole, Wollstonecraft’s prefaces are more straightforward, briefer, and less 
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discursive authority,51 and the development of the early feminist movement as manifested in 
the prefaces to Hays’s 1790s publications.  Just as Godwin’s preface to Political Justice was 
characterized by its spirit of “dissimulation,” so too are Mary Hays’s prefaces characterized 
by a rhetorical subterfuge that allows her to negotiate the complex demands of a woman 
writer seeking to disseminate potentially subversive ideas.  Always acutely aware of the 
demands of her particular reading audiences, Hays deploys a variety of related strategies to 
legitimize her entry into the Dissenting public sphere, and then into the general public 
sphere, strategies that respond to and subtly alter the terms of debate required of a woman 
writer seeking to disseminate a radical feminist message. 
 Overdetermined by many of the same factors as those absorbed into Godwin’s 
prefaces, Hays’s prefaces must perform the additional work of overcoming gender barriers 
to establish a modicum of discursive authority.  Thus in addition to eluding censors and 
mediating her work to a potentially hostile reading public, Hays finds herself compelled to 
use insinuatio to justify her public literary authority, a difficult feat for a marginalized writer 
                                                                                                                                                                     
rhetorically ambitious than those of Hays.  Fanny Burney’s 1779 second edition of the anonymously-published 
Evelina contains two prefaces:  the first, entitled “To the Authors of The Monthly and Critical Reviews,” pleads 
with the reviewers to treat her kindly:  “Without name, without recommendation, and unknown alike to success 
and disgrace, to whom can I so properly apply for patronage, as those who publicly profess themselves 
Inspectors of all literary performances?” (91).  The preface takes up the issue of original character 
development, which I will discuss in the context of the Memoirs’ preface.  Joanna Baillie’s anonymously-
published 1798 A Series of Plays is prefaced by a lengthy “Introductory Discourse” that explains the author’s 
method of depicting strong human passions.   Anna Barbauld, one of Hays’s Dissenting contemporaries, 
published in 1810 The British Novelists; With an Essay; and Prefaces, Biographical and Critical, a series of British novels 
with attached prefaces written to contextualize the authors and the works.  For a comprehensive overview of 
women’s preface-writing in the period, see Howells.  In her study of eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
women’s prefaces, she emphasizes throughout her study the most common rhetorical tactics of women’s 
prefaces, especially the conventionally feminine poses of humility, sympathy, and passivity used by women to 
establish their authority.  
 
51 I use the term “discursive authority” in the sense defined by Susan Lanser:  “the intellectual credibility, 
ideological validity, and aesthetic value claimed by or conferred upon a work, author, narrator, character, or 
textual practice” (6).  It is produced “interactively . . . characterized with respect to specific receiving 
communities” (6).  A woman writer like Hays must therefore establish her discursive authority in relation to the 
hegemonic norm of the dominant male social power.  But “narrative authority is also constituted through 
(historically changing) textual strategies that even socially unauthorized writers can appropriate” (7).  For Hays, 
especially early in her publishing career, developing her discursive authority proves to be one of the primary 
functions of her prefaces. 
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seeking to participate in a male-dominated literary sphere.  To this end, the spectrum of 
shifting prefatory self-figurations crafted by Hays reflects the development of a subject-in-
process, revealing itself as a perpetually indeterminate response to the fluctuating temper of 
an ideologically capricious 1790s reading public.  The self-figurations deployed by Hays in 
her prefaces thus directly engage the exigencies of her historical moment, coalescing a 
complex nexus of intersecting forces comprised of audience, gender politics, discursive 
authority, professionalization, and censorship.  In this sense, Hays’s prefaces and the figures 
in whose voice they are ‘spoken’ function synecdochally as indices of Hays’s always-tenuous 
relation to her reading audiences.  Inscribed within the historically-defined narrative of the 
early feminist movement’s brief rise and fall (roughly 1792-1797), Hays’s prefaces provide a 
glimpse into the front lines of how she mediates her work to her reading audiences.  
Throughout the 1790s, Hays develops an increasingly strong voice as a female Dissenter, yet 
her prefatory voice—always in process, always in dialogue with its tendencies—never settles 
into identity politics. 
The first section begins with an analysis of Hays’s 1792 debut publication Cursory 
Remarks on an Enquiry into the Expediency and Propriety of Public or Social Worship:  Inscribed to 
Gilbert Wakefield.  The prefatory remarks to this pseudonymously-published pamphlet, 
addressed to the Dissenting public sphere, establish a rhetorical pattern that Hays will exploit 
in all of her subsequent 1790s publications.  She constructs a prefatory figure whose 
genuflection to accepted feminine ideals and feigned modesty provides her with a cover 
under which she can clandestinely sow the seeds of what will germinate, in her 1793 book 
Letters and Essays, Moral and Miscellaneous, into radical feminist critiques of female education 
and patriarchal oppression.  Thus, in the Letters and Essays, as I argue in the second section, 
Hays shifts her rhetorical strategy to construct a figure of a Wollstonecraftian disciple who, 
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through excessive argumentum ad verecundiam allusions to Wollstonecraft, solidifies her 
discursive authority by attaching her authorial identity to that of her more famous mentor.  
The revisionary process of the Letters and Essays’ preface, strongly influenced by 
Wollstonecraft’s editing suggestions, marks the emergence of a ‘professionalized’ Hays, who 
becomes sufficiently emboldened to publish a subjective novelistic treatment of her 
philosophical ideas in the 1796 novel Memoirs of Emma Courtney.  In the third section I analyze 
the rhetorical pattern of Hays’s moralizing prefatory “warning” in the Memoirs as yet another 
manifestation of the Cursory Remarks’ duplicitous structure, through which Hays attempts to 
assuage the public sphere by staging the imposing of a moral on her narrative to suppress 
the powers of her novel’s passion-inciting tendencies.  This rhetorical pattern permeates all 
levels of the narrative, but proves to be especially prominent in the novel’s paratexts—
preface, footnotes, and epitextual letters to Godwin, as well as the framing letters to 
Augustus Harley, Jr.  Finally, the fourth and fifth sections—dealing with, respectively, 1798’s 
Appeal to the Men of Great Britain and 1799’s The Victim of Prejudice, analyze Hays’s final two 
1790s publications in the context of a restrictive political environment within which an 
increasingly conservative public sphere is no longer receptive to ideals of radical feminism.  
Thus Hays again deploys her rhetorical subterfuge to emphasize her own belatedness as a 
means of drawing attention away from her continued radicalism.  To this end, in the Appeal, 
she reverts to a prefatory strategy similar to that enacted in the Cursory Remarks as an 
anonymous amateur; and in The Victim of Prejudice, she posits a ‘red herring’ prefatory moral 
calculated to obscure the comprehensiveness of her radical feminist critique. 
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The Face of the Feminine:  Cursory Remarks 
Hays made her publishing debut in 1792 with the pamphlet Cursory Remarks on an 
Enquiry into the Expediency and Propriety of Public or Social Worship:  Inscribed to Gilbert Wakefield.  
Written as a response to former New College tutor and prominent Dissenting scholar 
Gilbert Wakefield, the Cursory Remarks presents Hays’s rebuttals to his recently published 
Enquiry into the Expediency and Propriety of Public or Social Worship.  Wakefield, a dissenting 
Dissenter, published his pamphlet as a rebuke against what he believed were the antiquated 
remnants of an Anglicanism still practiced by Dissenters whose religious practices should, he 
believes, have evolved more fully.  Chief among his complaints is the practice of social 
worship, which, as Wakefield argues in his Advertisement, is “unedifying, and intolerably 
irrational” (iii).  He deplores the “utter insignificancy of ceremonial observances” (10) as a 
barrier to a purer spiritual communion, which should be conducted in solitude.  The crux of 
Wakefield’s argument relies on passages from the New Testament that emphasize Jesus’s 
preference for private communion with God in times of crisis:  withdrawing himself to the 
wilderness, climbing a mountain, or praying alone among his disciples, Jesus functions as the 
introspective, meditative model of an unmediated relation with God.  This last example, 
excerpted from Luke ix. 18, of Jesus engaged in solitary prayer despite being surrounded by 
others, receives especial attention from Wakefield as a controlling image for his argument:  
“Our Lord chooses to pray ALONE, at some distance, it should seem, at the space of a 
stone’s throw perhaps, from friends and favourites!  This saviour of the world had no relish for 
public prayer!” (18; Wakefield’s emphasis).  Thus, Wakefield argues, all “ostentatious 
exhibitions of piety and devotion, appear not only irreconcilable to the true character of 
Christianity, but are immediately calculated to counteract it’s [sic] genuine effects” (46).    
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 In selecting Wakefield as the opponent for her publishing debut, Hays was boldly 
taking on a formidable opponent.  Wakefield was an esteemed theologian and classical 
scholar:  his pamphlet was targeted to an elite, classically educated, male Dissenting audience 
as evidenced by the numerous Greek and Latin references cited throughout the pamphlet.  
Seizing the chance to publish on a subject about which she was especially passionate and on 
which she could express herself with some authority,52 Hays likely predicated her decision to 
refute Wakefield on the basis of her own experiences with social worship.  Lacking access to 
formal education, intellectually curious women like Hays had few opportunities to further 
their learning.  Social worship—including formal church services and other less formal 
Dissenting gatherings—provided Hays with the opportunity to engage publicly with current 
theological issues and to participate in a Dissenting culture from which she would otherwise 
have been excluded.  For literary entry into the Dissenting public sphere53 was generally 
reserved for educated males—the very audience targeted in Wakefield’s Enquiry.  Hays, 
doubly disadvantaged as a woman writer and as an autodidact without classical training, was 
self-consciously aware of her own shortcomings relative to the authoritative public persona 
of a scholar like Wakefield.  Thus, to compensate for these shortcomings, Hays concocts 
two related strategies calculated to legitimize her entry into the Dissenting public sphere.  
                                                        
52 Barbara Taylor points out that in the early 1790s, religion was still the “main arena” of female public 
influence, especially considering most Jacobin women writers were rational Dissenters; even those who 
weren’t—such as Wollstonecraft and Mary Robinson—frequently mixed in Rational Dissenting circles (186). 
 
53 Daniel White identifies the Dissenting public sphere as a “discrete fragment of the bourgeois public sphere” 
comprised of the “extensive literary networks forged by nonconformist religious affiliations” (12).  Despite 
having been excluded from participation in the bourgeois public sphere via the Corporation and Test Acts, and 
despite being barred from national university, church, military and political initiatives, the Dissenters 
nonetheless “exerted critical pressure from within” (67).  That is to say the Dissenters nonetheless impacted the 
mainstream public sphere from their marginal position in society, actively engaging in public life; moreover, 
their legal status as nonconformists gave “added impetus to their engagement with public opinion, and their 
sphere of intervention was thus by necessity an intermediate space between the private realm and the state” 
(67).  
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She adopts the pseudonym Eusebia, and she disingenuously constructs a self-deprecating 
prefatory figure of herself.   
 Hays’s decision to publish under the pseudonym ‘Eusebia’ reflects her desire to 
conceal her gender54 and her lack of status in the Dissenting community.   Although several 
women writers actively published within the Dissenting public sphere, they were generally 
taken less seriously than their male counterparts.55  In this context, Hays’s choice of 
‘Eusebia’ is a riposte to Wakefield, its Greek origins a playful attempt to engage the very 
classicism deployed by Wakefield to limit his audience to the learned.  Rhetorically, however, 
Hays’s pseudonym reveals itself as an instance of prosopopeia, defined by Paul de Man as a 
“fiction of address” (“Autobiography” 78) performed through the “giving and taking away 
of faces” (76).  For through the pseudonym, Hays gives herself a ‘face’:  she constructs a 
figure of herself that simultaneously genuflects to the gendered expectation of a woman 
presenting herself with ‘feminine’ characteristics, while more subtly concealing the rhetorical 
force with which her pamphlet asserts her right to philosophy and theology.56  The various 
                                                        
54 Even though she selects a female pseudonym, Wakefield would still assume she was a man posing as a 
woman:  see discussion below.  During the time of the Cursory Remarks’ publication, it was, and had been for at 
least two decades previous, quite common for men to assume a female persona to seek softer treatment from 
critics.  For instance, a 1774 Critical Review article notes that “in anonymous publications, the words written by a 
lady are sometimes made use of to preclude the severity of criticism . . . but as Reviewers are generally churls 
and greybeards, this piece of finesse very seldom answers” (qtd. in Raven 155). 
 
55 Within the Dissenting public sphere, pseudonymous and anonymous publication was common, especially 
among women.  Thus, even an established and respected writer like Anna Barbauld still felt compelled to 
publish many of her political and theological critiques anonymously or pseudonymously.  Like Hays, Barbauld 
also responded to Wakefield’s Enquiry; her response, Remarks on Mr. Gilbert Wakefield’s Enquiry into the Expediency 
and Propreity of Public or Social Worship (1792) was published anonymously, as was her Civic Sermons to the People” 
(1792).  Furthermore, She published her Address to the Opposers of the Repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts (1790) 
under the name “A Dissenter”; Sins of Government, Sins of the Nation; or A Discourse for the Fast, Appointed on April 
19, 1793 (1793) was attributed to “Bob Short.”  See White 68-69.   See also Marlon Ross, who elaborates on 
the “status of double dissent” for women writers of the period:  not only were women writers dissenters in the 
sense that, as Dissenters, they were members of a disenfranchised minority, but as “political women,” they 
were dissenters within the Dissenting community by dint of their engagement in the male-dominated realm of 
political discourse (93).   For further remarks on the issue of anonymous publication, see note xx. 
 
56 I use the term “right to philosophy” as defined by Derrida in Ethics, Institutions, and the Right to Philosophy as the 
forces that “in every cultural, linguistic, national, and religious area, can limit the right to philosophy for social, 
  96
connotations associated with ‘Eusebia’ texture Hays’s self-figuration in ways that complicate 
the pamphlet’s rhetoric.  Clasically, Eusebia was the ancient Greek embodiment of piety, 
loyalty, duty and filial respect.  But the name also had more contemporary resonance for 
Dissenters:  the character of the “good Euesebia” had featured prominently in William Law’s 
well-known 1728 book The Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life.  Chapter XIX of Law’s book, 
“The spirit of a better education represented in the character of Eusebia” (246), presents a 
critique of contemporary female education.  Law criticizes the early-eighteenth century 
ideology of female education, which emphasizes “a fondness for our persons, a desire for 
beauty, a love of dress” (247).  As an educated widow embodying the ideals of piety, humility 
and rationality, Eusebia functions as an example of ideal female education.  Indeed, Law 
claims that if properly educated, women could “have as great a share in the rational nature as 
men have; that they have as much reason to pretend to, and as much necessity to aspire 
after, the highest accomplishments of a Christian and solid virtue, as the gravest and wisest 
among Christian philosophers” (348).  However, despite Law’s lip-service to women’s 
potential for rational thought, his Eusebia represents an education reflective “of morals 
rather than mind” (Philips and Tomkinson 181).  For even as he presents a Wollstonecraft-
esque critique of an educational ideology focusing on feminine beauty and submissiveness, 
Law instead shifts the educational emphasis into a moral, rather than an intellectual, register.  
Thus Law ends up consolidating a somewhat conservative view of femininity, emphasizing 
the practical effects of a woman’s education to further her abilities to perform typically 
women’s duties.  A woman should be, in the words of Law’s Eusebia, “a plain, unaffected, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
political, or religious reasons, for belonging to a class, age, or gender” (13).  In this sense, Hays finds herself 
denied access to this right based on gendered and linguistic barriers.  The necessity of apologizing for her lack 
of linguistic erudition, for instance, in the context of a debate with Wakefield, a philosopher who is 
ostentatiously fluent in Greek and Latin, underscores the linguistic impediments identified by Derrida as having 
traditionally denied access to philosophy:  “philosophy demands. . . that we liberate ourselves from the 
phenomena of dogmatism and authority that language can produce” (12).  
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modest, humble creature,” and her educational goal serves to “bring them up in all kinds of 
labour that are proper for women, as sewing, knitting, spinning, and all other parts of 
housewifery . . . not for their own amusement but that they may be serviceable to themselves 
and others” (359).  Thus, the pseudonym contains the conflicting elements of Hays’s debut 
publishing endeavour.  The ostensible ‘face’ put forth by Hays is that of the pious, good-
natured Eusebia, embodying the feminine ideals of humility, passivity, and obedience.  
Lurking beneath this benignly feminine persona, however, is the subversive feminist Hays, 
whose desire to improve female education will soon manifest itself in the Letters and Essays, 
Moral and Miscellaneous.  But this more contentious dimension of Hays remains inchoate at 
the time of the Cursory Remarks, implicit only through the pseudonym’s literary connotations.  
Indeed, the character of Eusebia, an idealized figure of feminine restraint, piety, and ascetic 
stoicism, will contrast even more radically with the character of Emma Courtney in Hays’s 
Memoirs.  
 The duality introduced by the Eusebia pseudonym is borne out and complicated 
even further through the oscillating rhetoric of the Cursory Remarks.  Although the Cursory 
Remarks is not officially prefaced—that is the ‘preface’ is not typographically distinct from 
the ‘main text’ and marked as a preface or advertisement—the pamphlet’s opening 
paragraphs are indeed ‘prefaced’ in a way typical of eighteenth-century women writers.  As 
Helen Elizabeth Howells observes, women writers of the late-eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries employed a variety of rhetorical prefatory strategies to carve out a space for 
themselves in the literary marketplace.  In a male-dominated literary world, women faced an 
especially difficult task in getting their works noticed and taken seriously.  Prefaces thus 
served the very important function of creating a public authorial voice for women writers.  
However, women writers needed to be especially careful about how they portrayed 
  98
themselves publicly.  Their primary prefatory strategy was a recurring, self-deprecating stance 
through which women “used characteristics of contemporary proper femininity (humility, 
sympathy, and passivity) in order to achieve public authority” (7).  Thus, having established a 
satisfactory feminine ethos, the writer could deflect criticism and avoid the provocation 
associated with an aggressive authorial voice.  Hays begins her Cursory Remarks by 
introducing herself in typically feminine terms as  
a writer with great presumption; a woman, young, unlearned, unacquainted 
with any language but her own; possessing no other merit than a love of 
truth and virtue, an ardent desire of knowledge, and a heart susceptible to the 
affecting and elevating emotions afforded by a pure and rational devotion. (2)   
This excessive humility—a commonplace in women’s prefaces of the period—apologizes for 
a woman’s venturing into the male-dominated domain of theology, emphasizing her lack of 
formal education and her feminine vulnerability to emotions.  But Hays ensures that this 
disarming figure represents the source of her unlearnedness, emphasizing the “great 
disadvantages” that she, as a woman, has endured in her quest for equal education:  she has 
encountered barriers “almost insuperable” (3) that, if not for her “active” and “earnest” (3-4) 
mind, would have caused her to abandon any intellectual ambitions.  Again, Hays’s rhetorical 
deftness manifests itself; for even as she crafts the figure of an obsequious amateur out of 
her element in the republic of letters, she simultaneously interposes an almost imperceptible 
critique of female education.  Hays therefore enters the Dissenting public sphere 
immediately calling attention to her gendered lack of educational opportunities.  
 But even more striking than the tensions contained within Hays’s prefatory remarks 
is the contrast between the prefatory figure and the essence of the Cursory Remarks’ 
argument.  Although the title Cursory Remarks—in keeping with Eusebia’s humble, self-
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deprecating feminine persona—characterizes the pamphlet as a hasty or superficial treatment 
of its subject, the substance of the argument is cogent and sophisticated.57   Employing a 
total of eighteen scriptural passages to support her position (astutely quoted from 
Wakefield’s own recent translation of the New Testament), Hays presents a solid argument 
that contradicts the modest self-image she presents at the tract’s outset.  She sustains her 
argument for twenty pages, furthering it with quotations from Rousseau, personal experience 
of her own positive experiences with public religious ritual, and an emphasis on the moral 
values inculcated in children through exposure to social worship.  The crux of Hays’s 
argument articulates the necessity of public worship rituals to ensure continued religious 
devotion among a population incapable of direct communion in the way described by 
Wakefield.  She observes: 
Far as the world has advanced to maturity, and enlightened as is the present 
age, compared with former obscurity; yet are the generality of mankind by no 
means sufficiently spiritualized, as to be capable of rising into first principles, 
and regulating their practice from the reason and moral fitness to things; and 
where through inattention or incapacity, this is not to be expected, even a 
mechanical devotion, a mere performance of external duties (and private 
prayer may frequently be no more) may have a restraining effect upon the 
conduct. . . the world is not yet ripe for a religion purely mental and 
contemplative. (10-11)       
                                                        
57 Responses to Eusebia’s pamphlet testify to the power of her argument.  According to the English Review, 
“Eusebia needs only claim the merit of a performance which, in the compass of a few pages, contains all the 
most striking authorities, as well as the most cogent arguments, for public worship, expressed in a lively and 
pleasing manner” (qtd. in Kelly, Women 83).   The Critical Review wrote that “Rational religion appears with 
particular beauty in a female mind, for it is generally animated with warmth of devotion, and rendered 
interesting by the feminine weakness, which requires support” (qtd. in Kelly, Women 83).  William Frend praised 
Hays, declaring “so much candour and sound reasoning cloathed in insinuating language excite in us the hopes 
that the aid of the fair sex may in future be often called in to soften the animosity and fervour of disputation” 
(qtd. in Kelly, Women 84).  
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At the end of the tract, however, after having very successfully refuted Wakefield, she again 
reverts to the self-deprecating female persona, apologizing to the reader because 
I feel as if I have ventured beyond my depth; I am unequal to the 
management of controversial weapons, and have, perhaps, though influenced 
by the purest motives, displayed in the proceeding remarks my weakness 
only, and incapacity for the discussion.  (21)       
The bathetic effect of this hasty conclusion calls attention to itself given its positioning 
directly after a lengthy and climactic concluding paragraph culminating with Hays looking 
ahead to a future where “we shall . . . penetrate to the source of things, and become true 
philosophers, without any danger of mistake or hazard” (20-21).  She thus frames the 
pamphlet with remarks designed to solidify her prefatory self-construction as an unworthy 
amateur out of her depth in intellectual debate.  The contrast here between the argument’s 
self-assured rhetoric and the concluding statement reveals Hays’s dilemma as an eighteenth- 
century woman writer negotiating her entry into the public sphere:  capable of sophisticated 
argumentation on the same level as a theological scholar such as Wakefield yet compelled to 
belittle herself as a way of apologizing for her femininity, the necessity of rhetorical duplicity 
as a means of fostering discursive authority proves crucial to Hays’s survival as a writer.    
 Wakefield’s response to ‘Eusebia’ tellingly reveals the nature of gender politics in the 
Dissenting public sphere.  Soon after the publication of Hays’s Cursory Remarks, Wakefield 
published a second edition of his Enquiry with an appendix responding to the several 
critiques leveled against his argument.  But he directs the bulk of his response to Eusebia, 
whom he believed to be a man masquerading as a woman.  Thus his sexist, ad feminem 
response employs sexual innuendo to belittle his opponent.  Quoting from the Proverbs, 
Wakefield jokes: 
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There be three things, which are too wonderful for me; yea four, which I 
know not.  The way of an eagle in the air, the way of a serpent upon a rock, 
the way of a ship in the midst of a sea, and THE WAY OF A MAN WITH 
A MAID.  (59; Wakefield’s capitals) 
Clearly, the intended rhetorical effect of Wakefield’s humour is a red herring:  refusing to 
engage Eusebia’s argument, he instead spotlights her gender to diminish her credibility and 
to shut down the argument altogether.  Wakefield implies that public literary debate with a 
woman is simply a joke, as revealed through the flippant manner of his remarks.  Eventually, 
however, Wakefield would learn that Eusebia actually was a woman and he assumes a 
conciliatory tone in his response to Cambridge reformer William Frend,58 who has informed 
Wakefield of his gaffe.  Frend knew, through mutual acquaintance with Hays’s associates 
Robert Robertson and Joseph Priestley, that Eusebia was really Mary Hays (MHI 127).   
Frend’s letter to Wakefield has not survived, but Wakefield’s reply suggests that Frend had 
written to chastise him for his insensitivity to a woman: 
You must lower your opinion of me, for you seem to suppose, that I have 
the gift of Prophecy:  otherwise how was it possible for me to know, without 
any Means of knowing, that the Author of that Pamphlet was a Lady?  There 
is no artifice more common [and] so often complained of by Reviewers, as 
that of assuming a female Name to escape the Lash of Criticism.  Had I 
known who it was, I certainly wd by no Means have thought of such a Piece 
of Levity. (MHI 127-128)         
                                                        
58 Cambridge reformer and Unitarian scholar William Frend would later serve as the real-life inspiration for the 
character of Augustus Harley in Hays’s Memoirs of Emma Courtney.  Their correspondence began with Frend’s 
positive response to Hays’s Cursory Remarks and led to an epistolary relationship that Hays misread as a 
romantic courtship.  See Luria, Growth 120-21. 
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However, despite expressing remorse for the glibness of his remarks, Wakefield makes no 
apologies for the tenor of his rebuttal.  His letter to Frend contains a postscript that 
elaborates his disdain for men writing under female pseudonyms.  Men could sidestep the 
rigorous expectations for a male author by doing so.  And because of women’s relative lack 
of education and public authority, they should avoid publishing in a public sphere in which 
they are not sufficiently qualified to participate.59       
 The fracas ends later in 1792, when Hays published a second edition of the Cursory 
Remarks, with an attached postscript.  The postscript responds to the sexist remarks directed 
at Eusebia in the second edition of Wakefield’s Enquiry, and her stance in this postscript is 
even more apologetic than in the first edition.  In this postscript she writes that although 
“Eusebia” is “highly gratified by the honourable mention Mr. Wakefield makes of her 
address to him,” she is ultimately troubled because he had “prefaced it by a ludicrous sally 
unworthy of the subject” (22).  The “ludicrous sally” referred to by Hays is the quotation 
from Proverbs cited above.  She details the hurt she has suffered from Wakefield’s dismissal, 
which “inflicts on a mind of delicate sensibility, a more painful and complicated emotion 
than was, perhaps, wished or intended.  Abashed and wounded, I withdraw from a polemic 
controversy to which I profess myself very unequal” (22).  She admits that she has “failed” 
in her attempt to refute Wakefield, and she apologizes for “venturing to address a gentleman 
of Mr. Wakefield’s literary character” (22).  Ultimately, “the timidity and gentleness generally 
attributed to my sex, may render me an incompetent judge” (26).  Thus, the paradoxical 
                                                        
 59 In keeping with the spirit of his remarks, Wakefield published A General Reply to the Arguments Against the 
Enquiry into Public Worship, published after 19 June, 1792.  This general reply reassumes the derogatory tone of 
the Enquiry’s appendix, and again female Dissenters are singled out for special ridicule.  Wakefield alludes to the 
“cohort of Amazonian auxillaries” who responded to the Enquiry, in particular Eusebia and Mrs. Barbauld.  
Again, he dismisses the women’s arguments in sexist terms, bringing in the Greek epigram in which an armed 
Pallas Athene challenges the unarmed Venus to a fight.  “‘What occasion have I,’ asks Venus, ‘for the shield or 
spear?  If I could vanquish you with my native unadorned beauty, how much more, if I put on armour?’” (MHI 
136).  Wakefield’s implication is that women’s sexual power is greater than their potential for intellectual 
debate.  
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nature of Hays’s literary debut returns full-circle.  Polarized extremes of self-effacement and 
self-assertion intermingle throughout both editions of the Cursory Remarks, mobilized and 
exacerbated by Hays’s insistent prodding of gender politics.  In a subtle display of rhetorical 
sleight-of-hand, Hays almost imperceptibly announces her right to philosophy and her right 
to theology in the midst of a pamphlet otherwise replete with feminine reticence.  Hays’s 
postscript to the Cursory Remarks’ is especially deceptive in this regard:  on the surface an 
admission of defeat and an apology for venturing out of her depth, the postscript really 
marks the beginning of Hays’s publishing career.  For having successfully established herself 
as a worthy force in the Dissenting public sphere with this first publication, Hays will build 
upon the discursive authority she has consolidated in her quest for an expanded readership.                       
 
The Professional Hays:  Letters and Essays 
Hays would briefly revisit the Wakefield controversy in 1793 with the publication of 
her first book, Letters and Essays, Moral and Miscellaneous.  In the first letter of the Letters and 
Essays (No. I, To Mr.--), Hays immediately returns to the issue of social worship, a tactic 
through which she not only partially sets up her argument for the book, but through which 
she cleverly builds upon the authority she has already established through the Cursory 
Remarks’ success.  One can perceive, however, a very different authorial voice in the letter 
compared to that of the Cursory Remarks.  The letter begins, not with an apology or a self-
deprecating remark, but with a brief note of thanks to her imaginary interlocutor for 
engaging with her ideas on social worship:  “Thank you, my friend, for the remarks with 
which you have forwarded me, on the Wakefieldian controversy” (1).  At first glance merely 
a platitude, the remark is noteworthy for its matter-of-factness and its lack of self-effacing 
apology, a pattern consistent with the Letters and Essays’ rhetorical scheme overall.  Moving 
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on to present a new dimension of her argument against Wakefield—the exhilarating and 
captivating “powers of oratory” (6), which have, throughout history, inspired people to 
virtue and right action—Hays exploits the momentum she has set in motion with her debut 
publication.  This first letter, despite being somewhat anomalous in terms of the book’s 
content, captures the essence of the newly reinvented ‘Hays’.  The letter’s cordial and 
reasoned introduction tellingly announces a writer who more confidently asserts her right to 
philosophy.  But the origins of this shift in Hays’s persona can be traced back to the revision 
process of the Letters and Essays’ preface, a process overdetermined by political and 
professional considerations through which Hays negotiates her entry into the Dissenting 
public sphere under her own name. 
  A radical conduct book for women, the Letters and Essays constructs, through its 
sixteen letters, two short narratives, and four poems, a theoretical template for women’s 
education largely modeled on principles Hays had absorbed during her time spent among the 
faculty and students of the all-male New College Dissenting academy.  Like the Cursory 
Remarks, the Letters and Essays primarily targets a Dissenting audience, although Hays’s desire 
to widen her reading audience is also evident.  Dedicated to the Unitarian minister Dr. John 
Disney, one of Hays’s intellectual and spiritual mentors, the Letters and Essays addresses the 
missing link in Dissenting ideals of equality and education:  gender equality.60  In the Letters 
and Essays’ preface, Hays establishes her allegiance to Mary Wollstonecraft, whose Vindication 
of the Rights of Woman she had read while composing Letters and Essays.   Due to 
Wollstonecraft’s influence, Hays has largely abandoned the false modesty and special 
pleading that characterized the voice of Eusebia in favour of a noticeably more assertive 
tone.  Wollstonecraft thus functions as the catalyst through which Hays sheds the cover of 
                                                        
60 Amy Weldon points out that Dissenters of the late eighteenth century “engaged visibly with nearly every 
major social issue . . . except one—the rights of women (16). 
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Eusebia to emerge as an author on her own terms, speaking in a much stronger voice that 
exhibits rather than begs for its discursive authority.  To this end, Hays makes explicit in the 
Letters and Essays preface what was implicit in the Cursory Remarks:  she forcefully critiques 
women’s subordination in a male-dominated society, focusing specific attention on the 
deficiencies of women’s education.  But one must be careful to distinguish the real-life 
connection between Hays and Wollstonecraft from its rhetorical enactment in the preface.  
For in a rhetorical sense, Hays’s paratextual deployment of Wollstonecraft marks yet another 
instance of her prefatory figure’s protean development.  Attaching her name to 
Wollstonecraft’s allows Hays to capitalize on the more famous writer’s authority; thus, as 
signifier, Wollstonecraft represents something in excess of her feminist ideals.  In essence, 
Hays’s preface relies heavily on this argumentum ad verecundiam or appeal to authority, at least 
in order to bolster her own fledgling discursive authority.  In this case, the prosopopeial face 
through which Hays voices her preface has shifted from Eusebia to devout Wollstonecraft 
disciple.  This figure of Hays as disciple, however, elides the differences between the two 
thinkers, even as it solidifies their common proto-feminist goals.61  
 Mary Wollstonecraft’s intellectual influence on Hays has been well documented, and 
her role as a mentor figure to Hays cannot be denied, especially given the emergence of 
Hays’s significantly more radical feminist argument after having absorbed Wollstonecraft’s 
                                                        
61 Scott Nowka points out that “Although Godwin and Wollstonecraft were undeniably powerful influences on 
Hays’s intellectual life, she cannot be reduced to them, for her thought is part of a genealogy of materialist 
thinkers that extends far beyond them” (524).  Nowka identifies a fundamental philosophical distinction 
between the two thinkers:  whereas Wollstonecraft argues for the importance of women achieving their own 
agency, Hays “relinquishes that very agency,” instead incorporating the “logic of necessitarianism” (524) to 
emphasize the causal necessity of ‘feminine’ behaviour.   See also Rajan, who points out the “significant 
differences” (Romantic 84) between the two thinkers, focusing especially on Hays’s advocacy of passion, 
romance and sensibility as compared to Wollstonecraft.   In addition, Hays was also much more publicly radical 
than Wollstonecraft, as her Memoirs would divulge intimate details of her pursuit of William Frend; 
Wollstonecraft, by contrast, never publicly revealed her affair with Gilbert Imlay, in keeping with her relative 
disdain for passion and sensibility.  Only with the publication of Godwin’s Memoirs of Wollstonecraft would 
that romance be publicized, after Wollstonecraft’s death.  
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feminist treatise.  But as Mary Waters argues, Wollstonecraft’s influence extended further 
than the intellectual; she also mentored Hays on the exigencies of professional authorship.62  
Thus, one of the crucial outcomes of the Wollstonecraft-Hays connection was the resulting 
self-awareness of Hays’s status as an emerging professional author, an awareness manifested 
through the book’s revised preface.  The nexus of discursive authority, gender politics, and 
professionalization characterizing this early phase of the proto-feminist movement reveals 
itself through the preface’s revisionary process.  Just as Wordsworth in 1800 will use his 
revised preface to Lyrical Ballads to justify the professional autonomy of the poet, as I will 
demonstrate in Chapter Three, Hays uses this preface to construct a professionalized image 
of herself.  But Hays proceeds much more subtly in her self-presentation, relying heavily on 
her prefatory figure to convey herself as a writer to be taken seriously in the mold of a Mary 
Wollstonecraft.  By the time she met Hays in late 1792 through their mutual acquaintance 
George Dyer, Wollstonecraft was a seasoned professional ‘hack’ writer in the employ of the 
publisher Joseph Johnson, to whose periodical Analytical Review she regularly contributed 
reviews and for whom she served as an editorial assistant.  Hays had requested a meeting 
with Wollstonecraft, whose Vindication she had recently read and so strongly admired.  After 
having read a draft of Hays’s Letters and Essays manuscript, which Hays had sent her for 
feedback and with hopes that Johnson would be interested in publishing it, Wollstonecraft 
replied with a critique primarily focusing on Hays’s textual depiction of herself as author.  
Wollstonecraft advises Hays to re-write the book’s preface to present a professionalized 
version of herself as author, rather than a Eusebia-like figure characterized by her deference 
to male authority and self-deprecating tone.   Wollstonecraft singles out two of the tactics 
                                                        
62 As Waters notes, the Hays-Wollstonecraft mentorship was significant in the history of literary production:  a 
“landmark” in the history of women writers’ professionalization, Wollstonecraft’s “role as a professional 
mentor, offering expert guidance to Hays, marks the first time in the history of British letters that such a 
relationship between two women writers can be traced” (88). 
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deployed by Hays in her draft preface—special pleading for reader indulgence and assurance 
that her work had already been warmly received in private—both common prefatory 
strategies for late-eighteenth century women writers.  For Wollstonecraft, the prefatory 
figure of Hays was abominable for its portrayal of such a meek authorial figure.  In her 
November 1792 letter to Hays, Wollstonecraft articulates her aversion to the draft preface: 
I do not approve of your preface—and I will tell you why.  If your work 
should deserve attention it is a blur on the very face of it.—Disadvantages of 
education &c ought, in my opinion never to be pleaded (with the public) in 
excuse for defects of any importance.  If the writer has not sufficient 
strength of mind to overcome the common difficulties which lie in his way, 
nature seems to command him, with a very audible voice, to leave the task of 
instructing others to those who can.  This kind of vain humility has ever 
disgusted me—and I should say to an author, who humbly sued for 
forbearance, ‘if you have not a tolerably good opinion of your own 
production, why intrude in on the public?  we have plenty of bad books 
already, that have just gasped for breath and died.’  (MHI 191)  
Wollstonecraft singles out the preface’s last paragraph, which she criticizes for 
“being so full of vanity” (191).  She admonishes Hays for her obsequiousness, disapproving 
of her tendency to solicit compliments from men in private, who would otherwise criticize 
her works publicly.  Wollstonecraft here passes on her hard-won understanding of how 
discursive authority functions in a text.  For as Susan Lanser observes, “even novelists who 
challenge this [discursive] authority are constrained to adopt the authorizing conventions of 
narrative voice in order, paradoxically, to mount an authoritative critique of the authority 
that the text therefore also perpetuates” (7).  The crucial element in Hays’s professional 
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development, in the evolving validation of her discursive authority, is the necessity of 
assuming the rhetorical stance of the “white, educated men of hegemonic ideology” (Lanser 
7) who set the terms of debate.  Even Wollstonecraft, despite her radical feminist ideology, 
recognizes this:  significantly, her advice to Hays reverts to the male pronoun when speaking 
of authority (“nature seems to command him”).63   And her choice of the phrase “vain 
humility” also signifies a gendered allusion to patriarchal hegemony, as “vanity” for 
Wollstonecraft serves as a derogatory catch-phrase throughout her Vindication, encapsulating 
the effects of societal emphasis on women’s beauty and grooming in place of a rationally-
grounded education. Wollstonecraft’s final criticism focuses on Hays’s overbearing prefatory 
persona.  An unknown author such as Hays should stay in the “back ground” because, until 
the public’s curiosity has been aroused through the publication of a worthy book, nobody 
cares about her.  “Indeed the preface, and even your pamphlet, is too full of yourself” (MHI 
192), writes Wollstonecraft.   
The exact extent to which Hays followed Wollstonecraft’s advice and revised the 
Letters and Essays’ preface is unknown as no extant copies of the draft exist.  But a 
comparison of Wollstonecraft’s letter with the published version of the Letters and Essays’ 
preface reveals that Hays must have heeded Wollstonecraft’s counsel.  Both of 
Wollstonecraft’s main criticisms—her objection to Hays’s special pleading and to Hays’s 
                                                        
63 Even use of the first-person pronoun carried “unspoken assumptions of default masculinity” (Hodson 282).  
Hays was acutely aware of the myriad connotations associated with the ‘I’ as revealed through comments she 
will make in her 1798 work An Appeal to the Men of Great Britain.  The following passage reveals Hays’s 
acknowledgment of the gendered ‘I’:  “Writing in the first person then, is a practice condemned by the canons of 
criticism, and the use of it forbidden, where it can be at all avoided. To confound the persons is likewise a deadly 
sin, in the eyes of orthodox critics – Yet against both these rules has the writer of this little sketch, transgressed, 
in no common degree.  In short, it must be confessed, that, ‘the monosyllable’ alleged to be ‘dear to authors’ – 
that the proscribed little personage – I – unfortunately occurs, remarkably often, in the foregoing pages. And 
that WE – and all its lawful accompaniments, which were introduced sometimes, from a desire to take off from 
the dictatorial tone of composition; and sometimes, as expressive of the sense of the whole sex, as well as that of 
the author – are fully as liable to the charge of presumption, as even that, for which they were only meant as 
humble substitutes” (298, Hays’s italics).  Hays’s rhetoric, with its echoes of Eve’s biblical fall (“deadly sin,” 
“transgressed,” “charge of presumption”) displays the woman writer’s predicament even when faced with 
something as seemingly innocuous as a pronoun.  
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vanity—are not present in the published version.  Indeed, the source of Wollstonecraft’s first 
tirade, Hays’s excessive apologizing for her lack of education, has been cleverly reversed.  In 
the published preface, Hays, instead of pleading her own educational deficiencies, quotes 
from Wollstonecraft’s Vindication to point out the more general problem of women’s 
education:  “‘that as society is at present constituted, the little knowledge, which even 
women of stronger minds attain, is of too desultory a nature, and pursued in too secondary a 
manner to give vigour to the faculties, or clearness to the judgment’” (v).  Hays extrapolates 
this general observation of Wollstonecraft’s to underscore her own predicament as a woman 
writer, acknowledging that “I feel the truth of this observation with a mixture of indignation 
and regret.”  However, in a remark clearly provoked by Wollstonecraft’s critique, Hays adds, 
“this is the only apology I shall make to the critical reader, who may be inclined to censure as 
unconnected, or inconclusive, any of the subsequent remarks” (v-vi).  Thus, rather than 
presenting a protracted, Eusebia-like apology for her lack of refinement and education, the 
prefatory Hays of the Letters and Essays brings in Wollstonecraft’s critique of gendered 
education to bolster her own brief apology.  Wollstonecraft thus becomes a mouthpiece for 
the very aspect of the preface that she had previously criticized.   
If this preface is “full” of anyone, it is full of Wollstonecraft, as Hays repeatedly 
praises her, quotes her, and aligns her own argument with the Vindication’s.  Wollstonecraft is 
referred to as the “Master,” the “admirable advocate for the rights of woman”  (vi) whose 
writings are “irradiated by truth and genius” (vi).  The preface’s first section is a self-
professed “tribute of public respect” (vi) to Wollstonecraft.  Moreover, within the Letters and 
Essays, Hays sets up her ‘argument’ with elaborated reference to Wollstonecraft.  Letter III 
of the Letters and Essays presents a protracted defense of Wollstonecraft’s Vindication, 
emphasizing its role in helping to alleviate the “mental bondage” (19) that has “enslaved the 
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female mind” (20).  Hays credits Wollstonecraft as one of the few “distinguished individuals 
. . . endeavouring to dispel the magical illusions of custom,” proclaiming that “the name of 
Woolstonecraft [sic] will go down to posterity with reverence, when the pointless sarcasms 
of witlings are forgotten” (20).   Buttressing her own argument against those objections 
commonly leveled against Wollstonecraft, Hays refutes those who fear that “by enlarging 
and ennobling our minds, we shall be undomesticated, and unfitted . . . for mere household 
drudges” (26), while castigating those who dismiss Wollstonecraft’s (and by extension, 
Hays’s own) theories as unsound because of her “never having entered the matrimonial lists” 
(27).   The ubiquitous Wollstonecraft thus permeates all levels of the book’s structure, from 
its preface to the third letter, forming the argument’s ideological foundation.   That Hays 
tends to conflate herself with Wollstonecraft, however, remains subtly concealed from the 
reader.  Hays’s pre-emptive counter-arguments ostensibly combat those determined to refute 
Wollstonecraft, when in reality she intends to disarm the reader from attacking her own 
argument.  The rhetorical subterfuge performed here therefore permits Hays to take cover 
under Wollstonecraft, deflecting criticism that would otherwise be directed at Hays herself. 
This strategy becomes especially clear in relief of the 1798 preface to An Appeal to the Men of 
Great Britain, when Wollstonecraft receives an entirely different portrayal, as discussed below.  
This preface depicts a more objective authorial persona than the figure presumably 
depicted in the draft.  Contrary to the “vanity” and obsessive self-handicapping that plagued 
the Cursory Remarks’ and the draft’s preface, the published version focuses on the issue of 
women’s education rather than the author’s neuroses.  As such, Hays’s revised preface lays 
down the book’s ideological premise without any distractions arising from excess self-
absorption.  The preface’s overall thrust is a rallying call for the “reformation of manners” 
(viii) necessary to incite the process of women’s empowerment.  Railing against a culture that 
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uncritically perpetuates prescribed gender roles based on unfounded biological distinctions, 
Hays argues for the necessity of an enlightened social consciousness.  To this end, her 
rhetoric is forceful, even occasionally militant:  men, because of their narrow-mindedness 
and their refusal to acknowledge women’s desire for self-improvement, have been the 
“enemies” (viii) not only of themselves and their women, but also of their children.  So 
deeply ingrained are these ideologies of gender that each successive generation is burdened 
with the naturalized, outworn assumptions of its ancestors.  The “degrading maxims” (vii) 
dictating our understanding of gender must be overcome; the fountain, which is “poisoned 
at its source” (viii) must be purified to ensure that all inquiring minds, regardless of gender, 
have the right to its waters.   
Hays’s prefatory allusions to Wollstonecraft contextualize the Letters and Essays as a 
radical critique of female education, not only in mainstream British society, but especially 
within the Dissenting public sphere.  Unbinding the tightly-knit connection between 
education and morality insinuated through the Eusebia of Law’s Serious Call and substituting 
the Wollstonecraft-inflected voice as the controlling prefatory figure, Hays brings to the 
forefront her predominating concern with education.  For in the late-eighteenth century, a 
significant gap separated theoretical support for women’s educational equality from its actual 
practice.  Prominent Dissenters like Joseph Priestley would proclaim that women “should be 
given the [highest] education of which they were capable,” consisting of the “learned and the 
modern languages . . . mathematics and philosophy” because “the minds of women are 
capable of the same improvement and the same furniture as those of men” (qtd. in Watts 
36).  But despite the Dissenters’ bold claims for women’s education, they did not extend 
educational equality for women in the sense of a formal education.  Dissenting academies 
were not co-educational, nor was a network of academies ever established for women.  Thus, 
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women’s education was largely relegated to the private sphere, left to the “tightly knit yet 
disparate intellectual and cultured Unitarian network” of relatives and friends, through which 
they would further their education (Watts 67).   The “contradictory position” (Weldon 13) of 
Dissenting women arose from the tension between a belief that everyone possessed the 
God-given right to rational communion with God, and the conflicting belief that the sensual 
and emotional nature of women’s bodies interfered with their rationality, thus hindering 
their spiritual potential.   In her attempt to overcome such misconceptions, Hays in her 
Letters and Essays and elsewhere, attempts to use Rational Dissent’s “own weapons against 
itself” (Weldon 16).  Dissenting principles such as an autonomous approach to individual 
faith, challenges to religious orthodoxy, and attempts to integrate private life with public 
action are deployed by Hays to argue for the extension of educational equality to women.   
As an example of Hays’s liberatory ideas on education—in the sense that improved 
education leads to freedom, and that an ideal education should permit freedom of 
intellectual curiosity—Letters IV and VII delineate educational precepts that are not only 
significant in themselves, but which set up concepts that will be crucial to unbinding the 
complex logic of Emma Courtney’s prefatory “warning.”  Both of these letters deal with the 
issue of girls’ reading, recognizing books as being essential, as she argues in Letter IV, for 
“moral as well as speculative improvement” (31).64  But as Hays makes clear, especially in 
Letter VII, a text’s tendency always has primacy over its moral, beginning a pattern of 
foregrounding the tendency’s interpretive value that she will redouble in the Memoirs.  
Assuring her interlocutor not to be “alarmed . . . at your daughter’s predilection for novels 
                                                        
64 The freedom granted by Hays to female readers, especially in regards to novels, is subversive in the context 
of strong late-eighteenth-century beliefs against the pernicious effects of novel-reading.  Katherine Binhammer 
summarizes the allegedly deleterious effects of novel-reading as perpetuating “mistaken expectations of life, 
subverted class barriers, increased vice simply by representing it, and caused inflamed female imaginations and 
neglect of domestic duties . . . by the 1790s the novel had become the culture’s latest intoxicating drug” (3).   
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and romances” (86), Hays develops an argument aligned with Godwin’s sentiments in “Of 
Choice in Reading”:  “let them read with you and let their choice of books be free” (90).  
Properly trained, young readers should be able to read works of their own choosing.  
Mothers are advised to instill their daughters with sound literary judgment from an early age:   
Converse with them on the merits of the various authors, and accustom 
them to critical, and literary discussions.  They will soon be emulous of 
gaining your approbation by entering into your ideas, and will be ashamed of 
being pleased with what you ridicule as absurd, and out of nature, or 
disapprove, of having an improper and immoral tendency. (91) 
Books cannot be blamed for compromising the virtue of young women; regardless of a 
book’s intention, ultimately the reader decides for herself whether to accept or reject its 
message.  This precept is fundamental to what Hays describes elsewhere in the letter as her 
attempt at “joining my feeble efforts to those of the admirable assertor of female rights 
[Wollstonecraft], in endeavouring to stimulate, and rouse my sex from the state of mental 
degradation, and bondage, in which they have long been held” (92).   Hays’s concept of 
choice in reading underpins a tension between the Memoirs’ didactic prefatory premise and 
the novel’s narrative tendency, the result of a subtle rhetorical sleight-of-hand through which 
she subverts the novel’s prefatory warning. 
 
Rhetorical Subterfuge:  Memoirs of Emma Courtney 
 
 Having reached the limits of the polemical essay for her purposes of delving into an 
authentic exploration of the emotions, Hays, seeking to depart from the rigid objectivism of 
Enlightenment philosophy, turned to the novel, as Godwin had recently done to fictionalize 
his philosophical precepts in Caleb Williams.  Louise Joy notes that Hays used fiction to 
“rehabilitate the subjective component that falls out of accounts of emotions offered by 
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non-fictional philosophy” (221), and in the highly subjective context of her Memoirs, Hays 
surely had discarded at least one bit of Wollstonecraft’s advice for the Letters and Essays’ 
preface.  To criticize the Memoirs for being “full of yourself” would be an understatement, at 
least according to a reading that conflates the novel’s protagonist with its author.  Of course, 
the ‘Hays’ who dominates the Memoirs is a figure far removed from the Cursory Remarks’ 
Eusebia in the sense that she has shed her idealized feminine attributes to reveal herself as 
the fleshly embodiment of a woman struggling to contain her desires.  Despite their 
ostensible differences, however, traces of the Eusebia figure re-emerge in the Memoirs.  The 
essence of Eusebia as prefatory figure in the Cursory Remarks—her fundamental duplicity, the 
prosopopoeial face through which she represents Hays—returns as a structuring principle in 
the Memoirs.  Yet the rhetorical subterfuge performed by Hays in her prefaces becomes even 
more elaborate in the Memoirs, diffusing itself throughout the multi-layered narrative 
structure, staging the persistent introjection of the Memoirs’ moral value.  Incessantly framing 
and re-framing itself, the novel’s strange composite of preface, epistolary framing device, 
first-person narration, and intrusive footnotes, along with its epitextual letters to Godwin 
and intratextual letters to Godwin’s fictional alter-ego, Mr. Francis, constitutes the formal 
peculiarities of the “experiment” referred to so frequently by Hays.  In a narrative scheme 
chacterized by Thorell Porter Tsomondo as “curiously schizothymic” on account of its 
“counterfeit dialogics” (58), the various strands of Hays’s composite portray a subject 
anxiously and perpetually in process, a subject that feigns capitulation to the moral 
expectations of the bourgeois public sphere, yet furtively holds to its conviction of the 
tendency as the true measure of a text’s reception. 
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First Frame:  The Preface 
Ostensibly, the Memoirs’ preface seeks to impose a moral on the text’s tendencies, to 
pre-emptively dissuade the reader from negative judgments of Emma’s conduct, in keeping 
with the moral expectations of the middle-class public sphere.   Her double-voiced discourse 
allows her to address and placate a middle-class audience through the cautionary warning, 
while engaging a Dissenting audience more likely to be receptive to a character whose 
conduct transgresses societal norms.  To this end, Hays in the preface famously announces 
that the “errors” of her heroine “were the offspring of sensibility; and that the result of her 
hazardous experiment is calculated to operate as a warning, rather than as an example” (36).65   
Her prefatory warning, however, is unconvincing as it epitomizes what Janet Todd identifies 
as the “contradictions between the novel and the preface” (242), contradictions generated by 
the fact that the novel’s heroine, from whose perspective the tale is told, will more likely 
“glory in” than “denigrate” her sensibility (242).66  Like Godwin’s prefaces to Political Justice 
and Caleb Williams, Hays’s preface to the Memoirs—along with the preface to her next novel, 
The Victim of Prejudice—provides a deep historical context for the novel:  in Hays’s case, the 
necessity of apologizing for her protagonist’s behaviour underscores the fact that the late-
                                                        
65 Reviewers from both the Monthly Review and Critical Review quote this warning in their reviews of the novel.  
Both reviews are favourable, yet the Critical Review’s anonymous reviewer appears somewhat troubled by the 
character of Emma, concluding his article by remarking that “we do not hold up Emma Courtney as a 
character for general imitation, any more than, we presume, the authoress herself would” (Memoirs 297).  He 
goes on to briefly catalogue Emma’s flaws, while informing the reader about the importance of reason and how 
“our conduct must, in a great measure, be regulated by the welfare and good order of society” (297).  Thus, 
despite the review’s positive thrust, the reviewer ultimately reveals an uneasiness with the heroine’s depiction.  
This uneasiness is symptomatic of an ambiguity in the novel’s tendency that stems from a tension between 
Hays’s prefatory “warning” and the sheer magnitude of Emma’s character. 
  
66 To this day, critics remain divided on the issue of whether readers are justified in condemning Emma’s 
‘immorality’ despite the preface’s warning.  See, for instance, Jane Spencer, who faults critics for “making the 
author and her protagonist bywords for immorality, despite Hays’s careful claim that her heroine’s story was 
meant ‘as a warning, rather than as an example” (130).  Conversely, Nicola Watson points out that the novel in 
fact upholds the beliefs it purportedly seeks to oppose:  “Claiming to be a warning against the over-indulgence 
of feeling, it actually celebrates and validates the heroine’s own infatuated, coercive effusions, with which the 
reader is virtually forced to identify as a result of the mixed epistolary and memoir format” (46). 
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eighteenth-century reading public would not likely be receptive to a character such as Emma, 
whose uncontrolled passion marks her as socially abject.  Unlike Hays’s previous two 
publications, the 1796 publication of Memoirs of Emma Courtney generated considerable 
controversy.  Marilyn Butler claims that the Memoirs “attracted more remonstrance than any 
other individual revolutionary novel” (Jane 117) on account of its radical portrayal of a 
woman who, refusing to subordinate her passions to reason, eschews traditional gender roles 
in the obsessive pursuit of her would-be lover, Augustus Harley.   
That the novel would likely attract the censure of her contemporaries was clear to 
Hays:  much of her preface attempts to justify the novel’s moral, and Hays takes pains, 
through the novel’s prefatory insinuatio, to ensure that readers do not consider Emma as a 
model for emulation.  But more importantly, the way Hays manages her novel’s entry into 
the bourgeois public sphere once again recalls the spirit of dissimulation attributed to 
Godwin’s Political Justice preface.  Godwin’s preface deftly sidestepped the question of its 
actual political enactment; emphasizing the book’s speculative nature, Godwin in his preface 
seeks to evade responsibility for the consequences of any revolutionary upheaval incited by 
his book.  In the Memoirs’ preface, Hays takes a similar approach.  Her preface likewise seeks 
to evade responsibility for ‘corrupting’ her readers through exposure to the impassioned 
Emma Courtney by acknowledging the book’s speculative nature.  That both writers classify 
their works as an “experiment”—Godwin does so in the deleted manuscript preface to 
Political Justice, and Hays uses the term several times throughout her novel not only in the 
preface but elsewhere in the novel as detailed below—suggests yet another attempt to 
placate censors and hostile reviewers by stressing the speculative, rather than the pragmatic, 
dimension of their texts.   
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Indeed, most of the Memoirs’ preface elaborates Hays’s defense of her protagonist’s 
conduct.67  To this end, Hays repeatedly calls attention to her novel’s philosophical basis and 
its utilitarian value.  The preface begins with Hays’s claim that the “most useful . . . fictions” 
are those which trace “one strong, indulged, passion . . . by which the philosopher may 
calculate the powers of the human mind” (35).  From the outset, Hays depicts the novel as a 
primarily philosophical foray into the psychological workings of the human mind.  There is, 
of course, nothing false about this claim:  throughout the novel, Hays continually indulges 
and cites her interest in psychology.  But as an instance of Hays’s rhetorical subterfuge, the 
preface’s opening adroitly stages the process of conditioning the reader to perceive the novel 
in a particular way. Similarly, Hays briefly alludes to the method through which she 
constructs the character of Emma, pointing out that 
It has commonly been the business of fiction to pourtray [sic] characters, not as they 
really exist, but, as we are told, they ought to be—a sort of ideal perfection, in which 
nature and passion are melted away, and jarring attributes wonderfully combined. 
In delineating the character of Emma Courtney, I had not in view those fantastic 
models:  I meant to represent her, as a human being, loving virtue while enslaved by 
passion, liable to the mistakes and weaknesses of our fragile nature.  (36; Hays’s 
italics)  
                                                        
67 Byron, in his original 1812 preface to Childe Harold and in his 1813 “Addition to the Preface” follows a 
similar pattern.  In the “Addition to the Preface,” he uses the same terminology as Hays does in her preface, 
assuring the reader that Harold “never was intended as an example, further than to show, that early perversion 
of mind and morals leads to satiety of past pleasures and disappointment in new ones” (viii).  In the original 
preface, Byron addresses the question of whether or not Harold is based on “some real personage,” such as 
Byron himself.  But Byron dismisses the speculation, arguing that “Harold is the child of imagination” (v).  
Thus, in his preface, Byron performs a similar maneuver, somewhat unconvincingly distancing himself from his 
main character, while ironically aligning himself with any reader who would be offended by Harold’s lewd 
conduct.  
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Hays’s remarks, which she elaborates one year later in her Monthly Magazine article “On 
Novel Writing,” embody her belief that characters should be depicted realistically with 
virtues and vices, contrary to Samuel Johnson’s influential notion that “the most perfect 
models of virtue ought only to be exhibited” (180).68   Referring to Richardson’s Clarissa as 
“a beautiful superstructure upon a false and airy foundation,” Hays argues that such a 
character can “never be regarded as a model for imitation” because she is “far removed from 
common life and human feelings” (180).  Hays’s prefatory emphasis on the necessity of 
portraying Emma’s faults, however, likely derives from the preface of the very novel against 
which she contrasts her own method:  the preface to Richardson’s Clarissa also contains a 
preface that apologizes for depicting ‘flawed’ characters.69  By positioning the novel as a 
“useful” character study from which philosophers can better understand the human mind, 
and by emphasizing the ‘realism’ of Emma’s depiction, Hays immediately seeks to contain 
her protagonist’s wild energies, much as Shelley will attempt in his preface to Alastor, as I 
argue in Chapter Four.   Yet just as Shelley’s preface will fail in its attempt to impose a 
moral, so too does Hays’s attempt fail to subdue Emma’s profound emotional excesses.   
                                                        
68 See also Frances Burney’s preface to Evelina, in which she announces her intent to “draw characters from 
nature . . . and to mark the manners of the times,” noting that “the heroine of these memoirs, young artless, 
and inexperienced, is ‘No faultless Monster, that the world ne’er saw’” (96).  Similarly, Mary Wollstonecraft’s 
1788 preface to her Mary:  A Fiction, points out that “this woman [the novel’s heroine] is neither a Clarissa, a 
Lady G—, nor a Sophie . . . artists wander from nature, when they copy the originals of great masters,” arguing 
that her depiction of Mary is “artless . . . drawn by the individual from the original source” (ii-iii). 
 
69 In his preface to Clarissa (1748), Richardson imposes a rather heavy-handed moral on his novel, a method 
that likely influenced Hays’s prefatory strategy.  Throughout Clarissa’s preface, Richardson repeatedly 
demonstrates how particular aspects of his narrative are intended to “warn and instruct” (xx).   For instance, 
apologizing for the “professed Libertines” Robert Lovelace and John Belford, Richardson assures the reader 
that, despite their vices, they are neither “Infidels or Scoffers” who “disbelieve not a Future State of Rewards 
and Punishments, and who one day propose to reform—One of them actually reforming” (xix).  And Clarissa, 
despite being an “Exemplar to her sex” is nonetheless “not in all respects a perfect character” (xx).  Overall, 
like Hays, Richardson foregrounds the “warnings” his novel intends to announce:  the work’s aim is to “warn 
the Inconsiderate and Thoughtless of the one sex, against the base arts and designs of specious Contrivers of 
the other – To caution Parents against the undue exercise of their natural authority over their Children in the 
great article of Marriage – To warn Children against preferring a Man of Pleasure to a Man of Probity” (xx).   
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The duality of Hays’s prefatory figure reveals itself subtly throughout the preface, 
especially in those instances when her moralizing tone becomes especially strong.  In 
particular, two instances in the preface expose the rift between the prosopopoeial face of the 
Memoirs’ prefatory ‘Hays’ as distinguished from the narrating protagonist Emma Courtney, 
whose behaviour requires the prefatory “warning.”  First, the preface’s second paragraph 
elaborates the moral that Hays sets up in the preface.  After having introduced the novel’s 
philosophical foundation—tracing the consequences of “one strong, indulged, passion”—
Hays proceeds to distinguish the nature of her chosen passion from those already 
novelistically delineated by Radcliffe (“the passion of terror”) and Godwin (“curiosity in the 
hero, and the love of reputation in the soul-moving character of Falkland”) (35).  As she sets 
up this distinction, however, Hays paraleptically stops short of actually naming the passion 
that her novel so obsessively analyzes.  Any one of a number of epithets could describe 
Emma’s “passion”—love, obsessive desire, infatuation, to name but a few—but the 
prefatory Hays alludes to it obliquely through innuendo.  Thus, the reader is informed, in the 
disinterested third-person passive voice, that “a more universal sentiment is chosen – a 
sentiment hackneyed in this species of composition, consequently more difficult to treat with 
any degree of originality” (36).  
 For the moralizing prefatory persona, the novel’s subject matter cannot be named 
and the voice refuses even to accept agency for its selection.   But the omission calls 
attention to itself, for if the novel really were simply about ‘love,’ the elaborate preface would 
be unnecessary given the “hackneyed” thematic prominence of love in so many other 
contemporary novels.  By circumventing the naming of Emma’s ruling passion, the prefatory 
figure reveals, on the one hand, a pious unwillingness to provide details about such 
potentially unseemly subject matter.  But on the other, Hays displays remarkable rhetorical 
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disingenuousness:  for even as she attempts to mitigate hostile receptions of Emma 
Courtney by presenting the novel as yet another love story, her refusal to name Emma’s 
passion simultaneously highlights the narrative’s originality and complexity in the very midst 
of questioning the likelihood of treating the subject originally.  For the Memoirs presents 
much more than a hackneyed love story:  indeed, most of the difficulty of naming Emma’s 
passion stems from its elusiveness.  As Rajan implies, Emma Courtney’s ruling passion 
cannot be straightforwardly reduced to that of ‘love.’   Rather, it is overdetermined by 
various configurations of desire:  not only is Emma’s desire “excessive” because it “exceeds 
the objective correlative it tries to find in Augustus,” but it is also generated by “a desire for 
access to knowledge” and a “desire for the enunciative position within the social order that a 
woman could have only in relation to a man” (Romantic 90).   Given the multivalent 
dimensions of her novel’s thematic nexus, Hays in the preface thus paradoxically gestures 
towards an absent theme that implicitly reveals, according to the logic of paralepsis, that 
which has been omitted.  Just as Hays’s subtle critique of female education lies concealed in 
the distant literary connotations associated with Law’s Eusebia in the Cursory Remarks, so too 
does her acknowledgment of the myriad social imperatives bound up within the “socially 
prescribed form of heterosexual love” (Rajan, Romantic 90) suspend within itself the critique 
of a marriage system that Hays will excoriate in her next novel, The Victim of Prejudice.   
The preface’s double voice also reveals itself through the Godwinian logic assumed 
in the preface’s third paragraph, through which Hays—in the midst of a preface outlining 
the novel’s moral—simultaneously acknowledges the primacy of the tendency70 using 
language very similar to Godwin’s distinction between moral and tendency: 
                                                        
70 In this regard, Hays’s preface shares affinities with Defoe’s preface to Moll Flanders, another of the Memoirs’ 
direct influences.  In his preface, Defoe is also concerned with assuaging the reader’s fears about the potential 
moral contagion associated with the book’s protagonist; thus, Defoe argues that “All possible care . . . has been 
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Every writer, who advances principles, whether true or false, that have a 
tendency to set the mind in motion, does good.  Innumerable mistakes have 
been made, both moral and philosophical:--while covered with a sacred and 
mysterious veil, how are they to be detected?  From various combinations 
and multiplied experiments, truth only, can result.  Free thinking, and free 
speaking, are the virtue and the characteristics of a rational being.  (36) 
Hays in the Letters and Essays had previously stated her position on the question of choice in 
reading.  In the Memoirs’ preface, she again revisits this subject:  her claim that only through 
“multiplied experiments” can one begin to discern the truth, combined with her emphasis on 
the necessity of “free thinking, and free speaking” aligns itself with the basis of Godwin’s 
argument in “Of Choice and Reading.”  As I pointed out in the Introduction, Godwin 
defines the tendency as the “actual effect” produced upon a reader by a text, an effect that 
“cannot be completely ascertained but by the experiment “ (109).  Hays thus slyly unravels 
the preface’s carefully crafted moral in the very moment of its creation.  As she makes the 
case for Emma’s and the Memoirs’ moral relevance, she undermines the moral altogether 
through her subtle deference to the text’s tendency.  For a text’s moral and tendency are 
antithetical:  the moral and the tendency can form a dialectical synthesis, but always at the 
expense of the moral’s sublation.  Thus even in situations like Hays’s Memoirs, where she 
prefaces her novel with an explicit moral, ultimately the reader will discern whether or not to 
retain it.   One year later, in her article “On Novel Writing,” Hays revisits this territory, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
given to give no lewd Ideas, no immodest Turns in the new dressing up this story” (3).  And emphasizing the 
primacy of his novel’s tendency, Defoe writes, “But as this Work is chiefly recommended to those who know 
how to Read it, and how to make the good Uses of it, which the Story all along recommends to them, so it is to 
be hop’d that such Readers will be much more pleas’d with the Moral than the Fable, with the Application than 
with the Relation, and with the End of the Writer than with the Life of the Person written of” (4).  In a 
Godwinian sense, Defoe’s argument distinguishes the text’s moral from its tendency; individual readers—those 
who “know how to Read it”—will be able to discern their own moral.  Despite having been exposed to a 
“wicked” character, readers are in no danger of being corrupted by such exposure.   
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finally making explicit what she has so subtly concealed in the Memoirs’ preface.  For in the 
article, she openly questions the validity of a novel’s moral altogether, suggesting that 
morality is less significant than the intellectual speculation engendered through the novel-
reading experience:  “It is not necessary that we should be able to deduce from a novel, a 
formal and didactic moral; it is sufficient if it has a tendency to raise the mind by elevated 
sentiments, to warm the heart with generous affections, to enlarge our views, or to increase 
our stock of useful knowledge” (286-87).   Hays’s use of the terms ‘moral’ and ‘tendency’ in 
such close proximity likely stems from her recent reading of Godwin’s Enquirer, also 
published in 1797, in which his essay “Of Choice in Reading” appeared.71   But even if 
Godwin’s article hadn’t yet been published at the time of the Memoirs, Hays was clearly 
familiar with the terminology through her frequent discussions with Godwin.  In light of 
Hays’s understanding of the fundamental distinctions between the moral and the tendency, 
then, her prefatory “warning” is displaced by her acknowledgment of the tendency’s 
precedence.  
 
Second Frame:  Letters to Augustus Harley, Jr. 
But the preface is not the novel’s only framing device:  as a secondary narrative layer, 
the letters to Augustus Harley, Jr. (Emma’s adopted son) also provide a frame (within a 
frame) for the narrative.  The letters to Augustus, Jr. continue the work of addressing the 
bifurcated middle-class and Dissenting audiences implicitly targeted in the preface, but the 
                                                        
71 In a 1797 Monthly Magazine article “Are Mental Talents Productive of Happiness?,” Hays alludes to the 
recently published Enquirer, paraphrasing Godwin’s idea that “every attempt, however impotent, to investigate 
or elucidate the nature and history of mind, is laudable, and has a claim to indulgence; the desire of simplifying 
its operations, tracing their principles, and reducing them to general laws, it has been justly observed by an 
eloquent philosophic writer [Godwin], in the preface to a late publication,  is one of the grandest efforts of 
human reason” (284).  
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figure of Augustus, Jr. also opens up a space for a future audience.   In many ways, the 
letters to Augustus Jr. transpose the prefatory voice of ‘Hays’ into the fictional voice of 
Emma Courtney, and even constitute what could be called an ‘internal’ preface, or an 
intradiegetic instance of what is normally an extradiegetic maneuver.  As I will argue in 
Chapter Four, part of what constitutes the irony of Shelley’s prefaces is their ‘literariness,’ a 
primary symptom of which is their thematization of prefacing; instances such as Hays’s 
framing letters pave the way for the development of this aspect of Shelley’s prefaces, a 
characteristic also shared by the ‘internal’ prefaces of Wordsworth’s that I analyze in Chapter 
Three.  But even if the letters introduce the reader to the character of Emma and her 
mysterious son, they also reiterate the preface’s rhetorical pattern.  The substitution of the 
prefatory Hays for Emma allows Hays to continue the duplicity enacted in the preface, 
allowing her simultaneously to reinforce and to negate the novel’s moral by emphasizing the 
power of its tendencies. There are a total of four letters to Augustus Jr.:  two preliminary 
letters between the preface and the first chapter, a one-letter interlude between the first and 
second volumes, and a closing letter that ends the novel.  The first letter reveals that 
Augustus’ life is beginning to mirror that of his surrogate mother, prompting her compulsion 
to pen her memoirs.  Linking preface with preliminary letters is the emphasis on warning, 
explicit in both narrative levels.  Just as the preface-writing Mary Hays reassures the public 
that her novel should serve as a warning rather than an example, the diegetic narrator Emma 
Courtney similarly justifies her memoir-penning motivation as directed to warning her son 
not to repeat the errors she has made, to prevent his “destruction” (41).  Young Augustus’s 
situation, a narrative mise-en-abyme of Emma’s story, is cryptically referred to in the first letter.  
We learn that Emma has sent Augustus away to cure him of an unrequited obsession with a 
girl named Joanna.  We also learn that Joanna has just been married to someone else.  
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Presumably this is the first young Augustus will have learned about the marriage.  But the 
parallels are obvious:  both mother and son have engaged in the futile pursuit of a lover who 
is already, in Emma’s words, “devoted to another object” (41).  This epistolary framing 
device charges the novel with a sense of urgency from the outset, while creating a sense of 
necessity:  Emma’s story is not simply frivolous, but written for the specific didactic purpose 
of educating young Augustus.  Thus, as an extension of the preface, the first letter continues 
the preface’s work of justifying the Memoirs’ moral relevance.  Furthermore, the Emma of the 
letters figures herself as a devastated and humiliated woman, recalling the “bitterness of [her] 
past life, that “loathed and bitter portion of existence” which “harrows up [her] soul with 
inconceivable misery” (41).  That the fictional Emma so deeply resents her past conduct 
crystallizes the preface’s warning:  haunted by her youthful indiscretions, the mature Emma 
must suffer for her wrongdoings.  Opening her novel with the portrait of a dejected and 
lachrymose Emma, Hays takes pains to ensure her prefatory warning cannot simply be 
written off as lip-service.   
This immediate juxtaposition of the mature Emma with the prefatory warning 
suggests that Hays really does intend to condemn her protagonist for so thoroughly 
indulging her passions.  But in keeping with her surreptitious rhetorical technique, Hays 
quickly unsettles the sincerity of her moral with a series of rhetorical questions posed to 
Augustus Jr., questions that cast suspicion on the reliability of Emma’s moralizing framing 
narrative: 
[S]hall I expose your ardent mind to the incessant conflict between truth and 
error – shall I practice the disingenousness, by which my peace has been 
blasted – shall I suffer you to run the wild career of passion – shall I keep 
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back the recital, written upon my own mind in characters of blood, which 
may preserve the child of my affections from destruction? (41) 
These rapid-fire questions, although voiced by Emma, expose the method of Hays’s 
rhetorical subterfuge in language that implicitly reveals its duplicitous nature.  The dialectical 
“conflict between truth and error” highlights the very structure through which Hays posits 
the Memoirs’ moral, distilling aphoristically the essence of finding truth (right conduct) 
through the errors of negative example (Emma’s unbridled passions).  Yet Emma announces 
her own “disingenuousness” at the very moment of reinforcing her moral; indeed, the 
proximity of “truth” and “disingenuousness” within the same series of questions only serves 
to widen the gap between the passion-constricting voice of the preface and the passion-
inciting portrayal of Emma enacted throughout the novel.  For although the questions are 
ostensibly directed to Augustus, they really address the novel’s actual reader for whom 
Augustus functions as a proxy.  Extracted from their context, these questions taunt more 
than they moralize, their utterance characterized by a provocative, teasing tone.  Tantalizing 
the reader with the imminent details of her “wild career of passion,” Emma playfully debates 
whether or not she should actually narrate her tale.  Even the form of her utterance—
rhetorical questions—manifests Emma’s disingenuousness.  The rhetorical question is a 
fundamentally duplicitious instance of the interrogative mode, disguising itself as a question 
but really functioning as a declarative statement.  Formally, then, the mode of utterance 
replicates its content, the false question conveying the feigned coyness of Emma’s attempt at 
toying with the reader.  Further adding to Hays’s rhetorical obliqueness is the stylistic shift 
distinguishing the prefatory Hays from the fictional Emma.  From the outset, Emma’s tone 
and diction contrasts with the prefatory Hays’s:  whereas the preface depicts the moralizing 
Hays speaking in measured and authoritative prose, Emma appears as stammering and 
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unfocused throughout the first letter.  Characterized by frequent dashes and continuously 
interrupted clauses, Emma’s writing reflects her agitated state of mind, a depiction in 
keeping with the intensity of her unrestrained passion.  Spoken by Emma, however, the 
prefatory warning becomes especially suspect, for her anxious rambling calls into question 
the narrative’s alleged depiction of its protagonist as a woman who, settling into maturity, 
has overcome her “wild career of passion.”  As evidenced by this first letter, recollecting the 
scenes of her youth arouses strong feelings in Emma, casting doubt on her claim that 
Augustus has “[torn] from [her] heart” the incidents from her life that she had hoped no 
“cruel necessity” would ever cause her to revisit.   
The moralizing Emma Courtney of the framing letters re-emerges in between the 
novel’s two volumes to repeat the moral.  Indeed, this intermediary framing letter almost 
directly replicates the same pattern of ideas already laid out in the preface and the first two 
letters.  Hays’s/Emma’s repetition compulsion manifests itself as yet another attempt to 
reinforce the novel’s moral, a tactic becoming increasingly desparate with each successive 
attempt.  In this letter, Emma reminds Augustus that “it is for your benefit, that I have 
reviewed the sentiments and the incidents, of my past life” (127).  The narrative’s didactic 
function is, she again emphasizes, “the reformation of our errors” (127).  To this end, “It is 
by tracing, by developing, the passions in the minds of others; tracing them, from the seeds 
by which they have been generated, through all their extended consequences, that we learn, 
the more effectually, to regulate and to subdue our own” (127).  But again, just as she does 
in the first set of framing letters, Emma subtly taunts the reader with hints of her 
dissimulation in the very moment of imposing the moral:  “I repeat, it will cost me some 
pain to be ingenuous in the recital which I have pledged myself to give you; even in the 
moment when I resume my pen, prejudice continues to struggle with principle and I feel an 
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inclination to retract” (127).  And once more repeating the preface’s keyword, Emma 
reminds Augustus that she intends her narrative as a “warning” to keep his “little bark” from 
destruction from the “quicksands” and “rocks” against which hers has crashed.  Inserting 
the moral into every possible interstice within the novel—before the first volume, in 
between volumes, and at the narrative’s end—Hays overcompensates for what she realizes 
constitutes the novel’s subversive subject matter.    
 
Footnotes 
The dubious “warning” of the preface and the letters to Augustus already constitute 
a somewhat aggressive attempt to dictate a moral.  But in keeping with her propensity to fill 
all of the novel’s interstices with the prefatory figure’s intervening voice, Hays uses 
footnotes72 as yet another opportunity to insert the moralizing voice into the text.  Most of 
the novel’s footnotes are simply citations, but two particular footnotes, appearing in the 
novel’s second volume, show how Hays’s prefatory voice encroaches into the margins of the 
text, appearing directly after two particularly incendiary statements.  Shari Benstock, in her 
analysis of fictional footnotes,73 observes that Fielding’s footnotes “counterpoint and 
undermine the narrative voice(s) of the text” (205), a description that perfectly encapsulates 
Hays’s method.  Hays thus extends and displaces the preface’s insinuatio into the footnotes, 
inserting the prefatory warning as a counterpoint to the narrator’s discourse.  The first such 
                                                        
72 Gentte points out the “affinity of function” between notes and prefaces, observing that “the discourse of the 
preface and that of the apparatus of notes are in a very close relation of continuity and homogeneity” (320).  
Using the example of Chateaubriand’s Martyrs and his Essai Sur les Revolutions, Genette points out that in both of 
these texts, “a single discourse . . . is divided between the preface and the notes, the preface dealing with 
general considerations and the notes taking responsibility for points of detail” (320).   One could assign a 
similar function to the preface-footnote relation in Hays’s Memoirs, as the preface provides the general moral 
“warning,” with the notes assigned to comment on particular instances that transgress the warning. 
 
73 As Benstock notes, “footnotes in a literary work highlight the interplay between author and subject, text and 
reader, that is always at work in fiction, giving us occasion to speculate on self-reflexive narration as an aspect 
of textual authority” (205).   
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footnote occurs after Emma has spent a fortnight fruitlessly waiting for a reply from 
Augustus Harley.  Exasperated, she comes to realize that “those who have courage to act 
upon advanced principles, must be content to suffer moral martyrdom” (163).  This remark 
anticipates the same sentiment revealed in the novel’s final letter.   But whereas the same 
idea in the final letter can be stated without annotation, Hays affixes a terse footnote to its 
utterance in the novel’s body:  “The sentiment may be just in some particular cases, but it is 
by no means a general application, and must be understood with great limitations” (163).  
Hays reveals a strong awareness of the perilousness of her situation.  Recognizing that she 
might have gone too far with her use of the term “martyr,” she feels immediately compelled 
to qualify—and, consequently, defuse—her rhetoric by acknowledging the limitations of 
such a bold claim.  Aligned with the novel’s rhetorical subterfuge, however, the footnote’s 
moralizing voice presents itself as yet another instance of Hays’s moral posturing, an attempt 
to deploy the prefatory figure’s extradiegetic voice to mollify a bold statement at the very 
moment of its utterance.   Indeed, the footnotes provide a vivid glimpse into Hays’s 
rhetorical method, as they expose an unmediated instance of the dialectic between the 
prefatory figure and the character of Emma.  An immediate juxtaposition of Emma’s voice 
with the extradiegetic narrator’s voice generates the tension between the two opposing 
points of view, providing the reader with a microcosmic instance of Hays’s rhetorical 
scheme.  Within this scheme, set up in the preface and carried out through the letters to 
Augustus Jr. and the footnotes, the moralizing, extradiegetic ‘Hays’ becomes a hovering 
presence, always at the ready to intervene during potentially contentious narrative moments.  
Although the identity of the footnote’s ‘speaker’ might be difficult to identify in this case, 
one assumes that the prefatory figure is also the extradiegetic narrator of the preface. 
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The second footnote provides a much clearer instance of the extradiegetic narrator’s 
intervention, for its tone and diction are closely aligned with that of the preface.  This 
footnote appears four pages later, after a particularly strong passage in which Emma 
questions the existence of God: 
And must I live – live for what? – God only knows!  Yet, how am I sure that 
there is a God – is he wise – is he powerful – is he benevolent?  If he be, can 
he sport himself in the miseries of poor, feeble, impotent beings, forced into 
existence, without their choice – impelled, by the iron hand of necessity, 
through mistake, into calamity? – Ah, my friend, who will condemn the poor 
solitary wanderer, whose feet are pierced with many a thorn, should he turn 
suddenly out of the rugged path, seek an obscure shade to shrowd his 
wounds, his sorrows, and his indignation, from the scorn of a pitiless world, 
and accelerate the hour of repose.  Who would be born if they could help it? 
(167) 
The audacity of this passage is provocative, with its undertones of atheism and existential 
angst.  It forcibly demonstrates the extreme suffering endured by Emma, and serves as a 
powerful index of Emma’s depression.  Yet Hays again feels the need to intervene, so 
attached to the end of this passage is another footnote which seeks to downplay or evade the 
passage’s sentiments:  “This is the reasoning of a mind distorted by passion.  Even in the 
moment of disappointment, our heroine judged better. See vol 2. chapter 7” (167).  This 
unexpected interruption of the author’s footnoted voice again reveals Hays’s acute awareness 
of her experiment’s hazardousness.  This footnote occurs during the novel’s emotional 
climax, immediately after Emma has received the letter from Mrs. Harley informing her that 
Augustus has been married for the past three years.  Presumably—given Emma’s progressive 
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melancholic descent—the reader would not be surprised that the news would produce in 
Emma a virulent reaction.  The fact that the footnote refers to Emma in the third person 
(“our heroine”) leaves little doubt that it is voiced by the prefatory ‘Hays’:  she has already 
referred to Emma as “my heroine” (35) in the preface.  In this instance, the extradiegetic 
narrator’s intervention again reinforces the preface’s warning in a specific way.  Of Emma’s 
character flaws, heretical notions would be equally as offensive as her sexual aggression 
would for Hays’s late-eighteenth-century audience; therefore, in the very moment of Emma’s 
doubting the existence of God, ‘Hays’ cannot but immediately appear on the scene to 
condemn her heroine.  But Hays’s rhetorical astuteness manifests itself again, for she still 
allows Emma to voice such strong feelings despite the disapproval.  Another variation of the 
figure of paralepsis, this instance encapsulates the duality of the Emma-‘Hays’ dialectic.  
Despite the narrator’s intervention, intended to negate the sentiments of Emma’s outburst, 
the utterance’s emotional force cannot be retracted.  The dynamic between footnote and 
utterance replicates the wider dynamic between the moralizing prefatory figure and the 
character of Emma, playing out the repeated staging of an imposed moral.  But the logic of 
paralepsis involves mentioning that which should remain unmentioned—to manifest what is 
otherwise latent—thus permitting Emma’s original utterance to remain on the page.  Of 
course Hays could just as easily have deleted the offensive passage, but she justifies her 
decision to allow Emma free rein to express her feelings by offsetting them with a 
disapproving footnote.    
 
Epitext:  Letters to Godwin / Intratext:  Letters to Francis 
 Emma’s correspondence with Mr. Francis—a fictionalized version of Godwin—
forms another of the novel’s narrative layers, and I will conclude my analysis with a 
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discussion of how the fictional letters and Hays’s letters to the real-life Godwin further 
complicate the novel’s narrative scheme.   In the Memoirs’ context, Godwin’s influence 
extends beyond his intellectual and personal friendship with Hays:  Godwin had suggested 
the novel in the first place, encouraging Hays to present a fictionalized account of her 
relationship with Frend.  And much of the content of the fictional letters to Francis consists 
of verbatim transcriptions or paraphrases of actual letters exchanged between Hays and 
Godwin.   Ultimately, however, Godwin was unsatisfied with the novel.  Although his 
critique focuses on narrative aspects, his real dissatisfaction might very well stem from his 
feelings that Hays had in fact gone too far with her depiction of Emma’s unrestrained 
passion.  In this sense, Hays’s thematizing of Godwin as Francis takes issue with the 
expectations Godwin had when he suggested writing the novel, and Hays continues the 
work she has begun in the Cursory Remarks:  to carve out a female space within the 
Dissenting public sphere.  The prominence of passion as a defining feminine characteristic is 
part of Hays’s depiction of the feminine, and in the context of a strongly rationalist 
Dissenting ideology, her advocacy of passion is bound to meet resistance.  Indeed, the 
Dissenting bias against women that I identified earlier in the chapter, founded on the belief 
that the sensual and emotional nature of women’s bodies hindered their ratonality, is directly 
confronted by Hays in the Memoirs, where she seeks to valorize passion as concomitant with 
reason.   
As figured in the character of Mr. Francis, Godwin takes on the role of straw man, 
seeking to uphold strict principles of Dissenting rationality, against whose ideals Emma 
stands in relief.   His letters become progressively didactic, chastising Emma for indulging in 
such capricious habits of obsessive desire.  His second letter to Emma, and Emma’s 
response to it, encapsulates the dynamics of their epistolary debate.  In this letter, Francis 
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derides Emma for her conduct:  “you nursed in your mind a passion, which . . . is the 
unnatural and odious invention of a distempered civilization . . . You addressed a man 
impenetrable as a rock, and the smallest glimpse of sober reflection, and common sense, 
would have taught you instantly to have given up the pursuit” (169).  Emma’s rebuttal, 
however, conflates reason with passion in an attempt to justify her conduct within the 
parameters of Godwinian prinicples:  “do you not perceive, that my reason was the auxiliary 
of my passion, or rather my passion the generative principle of my reason”?” (172).   In thus 
presenting passion and reason in dialectical terms, Hays seeks to overturn the 
Godwinian/Dissenting emphasis on reason at the expense of passion.  Not only does Emma 
justify her conduct here, but more widely at stake is the issue of women’s right to 
philosophy, in the sense that women cannot be denied philosophical, intellectual, or 
theological authority simply because their passion supersedes their reason.  
The letters to Godwin raise the issue of private vs. public, questioning the very 
nature of the preface as the laying something before the “public” with consequent 
expectations of objectivity.   Just as prefaces straddle the boundary between the inside and 
outside of a text, so too do the Memoirs’ letters to Francis straddle the boundary between the 
‘private’ realm of personal correspondence and the ‘public’ realm of the novel.   But if the 
letters to Francis seek to extend Hays’s argument for the rights of female Dissenters, and if 
the novel’s elaborate paratextual apparatus serves to perpetuate the prefatory Hays’s warning 
throughout the novel, two letters from the real-life Hays to Godwin expose a slightly 
different ‘Hays’ lurking beneath the moralizing voice’s duplicitous method.  These two 
letters—both from May of 1796—chronicle Hays’s reaction to Godwin’s comments on an 
early draft manuscript of the Memoirs.  These letters comprise what is almost an alternative 
preface, addressed to the Dissenting public sphere as represented by Godwin.  As such, 
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Hays’s concern with morality and convention, which dominates the content of the Memoirs’ 
preface, diminishes; in its place, Hays conflates herself with the fictional Emma in ways that 
contradict her attempts in the preface to separate them.  In many ways, these letters undo 
the moralizing of the preface to reveal the ‘private’ motives for Hays’s composition of the 
memoirs.   In the first letter, she responds to Godwin’s charges that the narrative is 
uninteresting because it chronicles a “hopeless, persevering & unrequited attachment,” 
because of its “austerity of character,” and because the heroine displays “no mixture of hope 
or encouragement” (Memoirs 251).   
But even in this private correspondence, in which she ostensibly assumes a tone 
much more sincere than that of the dissimulating prefatory voice, she again calls her own 
sincerity into question.  Responding to what must have been Godwin’s suggestion to alter 
the relationship between Emma and Augustus, Hays argues for the necessity of ambiguity in 
their relationship:  “Whether the relationship was reciprocal must still remain, in some 
measure, equivocal & at present it is not, nor did I mean it to be, a circumstance perfectly 
clear & unambiguous” (252).  Thus, Hays characterizes the novel’s focal point as 
intentionally obscured, an attempt to withhold from the reader the full story of what actually 
transpired between Augustus and Emma.  Godwin, seeking sincerity in the form of full 
disclosure, advises Hays to clarify whether or not the relationship was actually reciprocated; 
Hays, in keeping with the novel’s rhetorical method, refuses to oblige him.  Her reasoning 
makes explicit to Godwin what remains latent in the novel:  the Memoirs’ autobiographical 
dimension.  For nowhere in the novel does Hays make reference to any connection between 
the novel’s contents and her own life.  But to Godwin, she admits that “the wound is too 
recent, & the scar too deep . . . I cannot be unaffected by private motives” (252).  Further 
elaborating the “motives” for her writing, Hays admits the purpose of Emma’s composition 
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has been “to divert, perhaps to disburthen, my mind under the immediate pressure of 
disappointment” (252).  She does, however, acknowledge her failure to achieve catharsis 
through having narrated her tale:  ultimately, she admits, “I have entangled myself . . . I 
cannot hide from myself” (252-3).  Thus despite her attempts to cathect her pent-up 
frustration into the fictional realm of the Memoirs, Hays instead finds herself caught up 
within the very narrative she intends to free her. 
Hays’s admission that she cannot “hide from [her]self” (253) underscores her 
ambivalence about the effectiveness of her rhetorical subterfuge.  In one sense, her 
comments anticipate the public furor that would arise after the Memoirs’ publication.74  While 
she has attempted in the preface to characterize her novel in a scientific spirit, and to 
dissociate herself from its protagonist, the public would not be persuaded by the prefatory 
warning.  But the second letter to Godwin goes even further in its emphasis on the Memoirs’ 
autobiographical strain, as she admits to displacing her private affect into the public forum 
of the novel.  This letter contains Hays’s most self-conscious revelation of her duplicity, 
elaborating on the ulterior motives already hinted at in her first letter: 
I will not deceive you, unless I first deceive myself.  My MS was not written 
merely for the public eye – another latent, & perhaps stronger, motive lurked 
beneath . . . my story is too real, I cannot violate its truth, by making Augustus 
either a coquet or a lover . . . I urged him too far – carried on headlong by 
                                                        
74 A rumoured 1799 incident involving Charles Lloyd best embodies the extent to which Hays was publicly 
equated with Emma:  after Hays spent an evening with Lloyd, he reported to acquaintances that she, just as 
Emma had done in the Memoirs, had declared her love for him and offered herself to him sexually (Luria, 
Growth 200).  Lloyd claimed to have rejected her advances, which caused her to break down emotionally.  
Whether or not Hays actually offered herself to him, or whether Lloyd misread her motives was irrelevant to 
him.  After the event, he allegedly claimed that “he felt free to slander her because her principles were so 
immoral that he suspected her conduct towards him (200).  Thus, one of the primary motives for Hays’s 
description of the novel as a “hazardous experiment” is to distance herself from its protagonist. 
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my own sensations I did not sufficiently respect his.  I confess my fanaticism.  
(255) 
Hays’s language here, characterized by its emphasis on deception, latent and lurking motives, 
again reconfigures the structure of the Memoirs’ rhetorical dissimulation, now positing a 
different purpose.  Notably, Hays does not actually identify the “stronger” motive, just as, in 
the preface, she does not name the passion that her novel will analyze; rather, she leaves it 
implicit, to be defined in contrast to the novel’s “public” dimension.  Presumably, then, she 
revisits the territory of her previous letter to Godwin, where she stresses the 
“disburthen[ing]” function of the Memoirs.  But again, Hays remains forthright and 
unapologetic about the nature of her attachment to Frend:  the “fanaticism” inherent in her 
pursuit of him discloses the madness of her passion.  Thus, in contrast to the novel’s 
carefully crafted warning, this letter ambivalently posits an altogether different motive for the 
Memoirs.  What precisely that motive is remains somewhat mysterious because of Hays’s 
circumlocutionary description, but in keeping with the Memoirs’ rhetorical method—and the 
pattern established throughout the prefaces to all three of Hays’s publications thus far—
Hays’s equivocating perpetually complicates easy understanding of her meaning, making the 
necessity of individual readers negotiating their own tendencies especially crucial in the 
absence of any firm interpretive ground. 
The novel’s closing letter to Augustus, Jr. finishes the novel with yet another recital 
of Emma’s moral:  she has “unfolded the errors” of her past life, “laid bare” the contents of 
her mind, and through these “experiments,” she hopes to have benefited her son (220).  But 
this final letter concludes with sentiments that could more appropriately be attributed to the 
Hays of the preface, rather than to the fictional Emma.  For here Hays speculates about her 
place in posterity in remarks addressed to Augustus, Jr., who represents the novel’s future 
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audience.  Hyperbolically implying that “moral martyrdom” will be the “fate” of those bold 
enough to question the prejudices and ideologies of a society in dire need of reformation, 
Hays recapitulates the language of the preface to depict the moral value of her novel: 
Posterity will plant the olive and the laurel, and consecrate their mingled 
branches to the memory of such, who, daring to trace, to their springs, errors 
the most hoary, and prejudices the most venerated, emancipate the human 
mind from the trammels of superstition, and teach it, that its true dignity and 
virtue, consist in being free.  (221; Hays’s emphasis) 
Hays’s sentiments here elaborate the preface’s emphasis on the use-value of the Memoirs.  As 
she does in the preface, she highlights the novel’s methodology of ‘tracing’; however, 
distinguishing the closing letter from the preface is a modulated depiction of the ‘traced’ 
object.  For whereas the preface depicts the Memoirs as concerned with “tracing the 
consequences of one strong, indulged, passion, or prejudice . . . [to] calculate the powers of 
the human mind, and learn the springs which set it in motion” (35), the closing letter 
broadens this scope considerably to gesture towards what is more a genealogy of morals 
than an analysis of an individual mind’s passions.  Notably, the concept of warning has 
completely disappeared from this rehearsal of the novel’s moral.  Hays lets down her guard 
subtly enough to abandon her prefatory pleading, to reveal the novel for its true purpose:  
not to condemn Emma for her inappropriate conduct, but to begin the work of constructing 
a new model of femininity permitting women to express their passions, to reincarnate a 
femininity long buried through age-old efforts of what Clarissa Pinkola-Estes has called 
“extincting the instinctual” (2) of feminine nature.  Thus, the novel’s subversive intention is 
finally made explicit at its conclusion, in the form of a claim for the Memoirs’ contribution to 
a nascent reformation of gender codes.  But as quickly as she reveals this incendiary motive, 
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Hays covers herself again with one final gesture calculated to reinforce the novel’s prefatory 
moral.  The final letter ends with Emma apostrophizing to Augustus, Jr.:  “let me behold my 
Augustus, escaped from the tyranny of the passions, restored to reason, to the vigor of his 
mind, to self control, to the dignity of active, intrepid virtue” (221).  Fulfilling the dictum of 
Hays’s prefatory warning, Augustus Jr. emerges as a rehabilitated subject, having absorbed 
the lessons learned through Emma’s erroneous behaviour.  Again, as proxy, Augustus Jr. 
functions as a substitute for the novel’s actual reader.  Thus, having witnessed the 
“humiliating” (220) excesses of Emma’s conduct, the reader also should be rehabilitated, 
restored to reason after such a display of unbridled passion.  But Augustus Jr. also represents 
a future audience, which crucially mediates between the other two and keeps the 
interpretation of the text open.  Closing the novel with a plea to the future reader, Hays 
ensures the novel’s tendencies always remain speculative and open-ended, forever containing 
the potential to override the ‘moral’ she has been compelled to impose on the text.    
 
 
 The Vanished Authoress:  Appeal to the Men of Great Britain 
 Given the staggering comprehensiveness of the Memoirs’ meticulous rendering of a 
fictionalized Mary Hays, it is somewhat surprising that her next publication, An Appeal to the 
Men of Great Britain in Behalf of Women, would excise all traces of Hays.  Significantly, if one 
believes the preface’s narrative, she had written the Appeal several years earlier, but she did 
not publish it until 1798 for reasons I will discuss below.  The Appeal was published 
anonymously and although the evidence to support Hays’s authorial identity is not 
incontrovertible, it is generally accepted as having been written by her.75  Why Hays chose to 
                                                        
75 Gina Luria Walker, in her ‘Note on the Authorship’ to a reprint of the Appeal, believes there is “every 
internal evidence” (i) to suggest that Hays is its author.  Gary Kelly, however, is not entirely convinced, 
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publish anonymously is not known,76 but her publisher, Joseph Johnson, was preparing to 
defend himself against charges of seditious libel.77  The danger of being associated with 
                                                                                                                                                                     
pointing out that, stylistically, the book does resemble sister Eliza Hays’s contributions to the Letters and Essays 
(Women 113).  According to Kelly, the book is generally attributed to Mary only because she is cited as its 
author in an 1825 book by William Thomson and Anna Wheeler, Appeal of One Half of the Human Race, Women, 
Against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men, to Retain Them in Political and Thence in Civil and Domestic Slavery (113).      
 
76 In the eighteenth century and throughout the Romantic period, anonymous publication was quite common.  
Robert Griffin emphasizes that, contrary to what we might surmise given the connections between the author-
function and its economic imperative, the “history of publication shows unequivocally that there is no cause-
and-effect relation between the ownership of literary property, or the lack of it, and the presence or absence of 
the name of the author” (4).   Suggesting some of the reasons for anonymity, Griffin suggests “aristrocractic or 
a gendered reticence, religious self-effacement, anxiety over public exposure, fear of prosecution, hope of an 
unprejudiced reception, and the desire to deceive” (7) as some of the primary factors.  James Raven, in his 
analysis of anonymously published novels, charts the fluctuating statistics of publication:  from 1750-1790, over 
80 percent of novels were anonymously published; in the 1790s, 62 percent were anonymous; from 1800-1810, 
less than 50 percent; but in the 1820s, the number again rose to 80 percent (143).  Perhaps most surprisingly, in 
the 1810s, of the 44 percent of novels named, the vast majority were written by women. In addition to reasons 
suggested by Griffin, Raven also surmises motives for anonymous authorship.  For instance, new writing, the 
“stock-in-trade” of booksellers and circulating librarians, attracted many new writers to the trade, resulting in 
an influx of first-time and write-to-order writers who tended to keep themselves anonymous for lack of 
discursive authority (146).  Raven also points to the dramatic socio-economic change in authorship occurring 
between 1780 and 1820, during which women writers became much more prominent.  For instance, between 
1788 and 1790, 33 novel title pages named women authors compared to only eight with named male writers.  
This imbalance suggests, according to Raven, that female authorship was being “deliberately promoted,” 
especially given that an “unprecedented number” of other title pages were attributed to “a Lady.”   Borrowing 
“furtively” (154) from foreign originals is also cited as a reason for anonymity, as a means of distancing one’s 
signature from what might be plagiarized material. Some writers, such as Walter Scott, chose anonymity if their 
“authorial persona conflicted with their daily one”:  Scott did sign his poetry, but did not sign Waverley so as not 
to compromise the dignity of a court officer.  Also, writers might “test the waters” (8) before signing:  Horace 
Walpole, for instance, famously signed his seminal gothic novel Castle of Otranto under the pseudonym William 
Marshall, Gent., who allegedly had translated it from a sixteenth-century original.  Griffin also emphasizes the 
practice as an “officially tolerated form of sanctuary” (5), noting that in cases where booksellers or printers 
were prosecuted, anonymous authors could sometimes avoid persecution.  For instance, Percy Shelley’s 
anonymous 1812 broadsheet “The Devil’s Walk,” which slandered the Prince Regent, was seized by authorities, 
yet only Shelley’s Irish servant, Daniel Healy, was imprisoned for its circulation as no clue existed as to the 
printer or the author (5).  Furthermore, almost all reviews and magazine articles in the periodicals were 
anonymous, an attempt to project a sense of objectivity in their judgments.  See also Genette, 37-54, who 
discusses anonymity and pseudonymity, noting that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, “anonymity 
generally had nothing to do with a fiercely protected incognito:  quite often the public knew the identity of the 
author by word of mouth and was not in the least surprised to find no mention of the name on the title page” 
(43). 
 
77 Johnson was convicted, on 17 July 1798, of seditious libel for selling Gilbert Wakefield’s Reply to the Bishop of 
Llandaff.  Labeled a “malicious, seditious, and ill-disposed person” in the court’s indictment, Johnson was 
charged on grounds that he “wickedly and seditiously did publish and cause to be published a certain 
scandalous and seditious libel” (qtd. in Andrews 154).  He served six months in prison; after his release, he 
ceased his radical book-publishing and selling endeavours.  For his part, Wakefield was sentenced to two years 
in Dorchester Gaol for writing the pamphlet.  A polemical reply to the Bishop of Llandaff’s pamphlet, which 
sought to rally support for war against the French and to raise national taxes to support the war, Wakefield’s 
Reply expressed his unflagging support for the French Revolution and attacked the privileges of the wealthy.   
Pitt’s administration “seized the opportunity Wakefield gave them to make an example of a leading polemicist, 
along with two leading radical publishers—J.S. Jordan (publisher of the Rights of Man) and the eminent Joseph 
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Johnson, in addition to the increasing conservative backlash against radicals, likely motivated 
Hays to publish anonymously.  I will situate my discussion of Hays’s final two texts of the 
1790s—the Appeal and her 1799 novel The Victim of Prejudice—within the context of a late-
eighteenth century political climate within which the feminist ideals espoused by Hays and 
Wollstonecraft were no longer tolerated in the public sphere. The brevity of this nascent call 
for women’s equality has been well documented.78  Generally, the movement begins with 
Wollstonecraft’s seminal 1792 Vindication of the Rights of Woman and ends with the publication 
of Godwin’s 1798 Memoirs of the Author of a Vindication of the Rights of Woman, his biography of 
the recently deceased Wollstonecraft.  A combination of public outcry over lurid details of 
Wollstonecraft’s life, combined with mounting British resistance to revolutionary ideals, 
stunted the growth of the early feminist movement in its infancy.  The popularity of a writer 
like Mary Hays, whose works were generally well received up until the decade’s end, 
fluctuated according to the dictates of popular opinion.  Just as Godwin’s name fell into 
disgrace following the publication of Caleb Williams, so too did the names of other ‘Jacobin’ 
writers associated with him.   
In this phase of the development of her discursive authority, Hays stands at a 
crossroads:  the intellectual climate within which the Memoirs were published has proven 
ephemeral.  One can sense the difficulty faced by Hays as she attempts to navigate the 
indeterminate terrain of a changing public sphere increasingly intolerant of radical ideas. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Johnson” (Butler 220).  Tellingly, as an index of the restriction of liberal free expression, Johnson’s conviction 
happened only a fortnight before the Anti-Jacobin Review, the Analytical Review’s ideological enemy—and Mary 
Hays’s most vocal detractor—published its first issue (Andrews 154). 
 
78 See, for instance, Jump, who notes that “by the mid-1790s . . . the excesses of the Terror led to a 
conservative, anti-Revolutionary backlash which affected all but the most radical thinkers . . . The small number 
of radical feminist texts that did appear after [Wollstonecraft’s] death were either published anonymously, like 
Mary Hays, Appeal to the Men of Great Britain (1798), and Mary Ann Radcliffe, The Female Advocate (1799), or, as in 
the case of Mary Robinson’s A Letter to the Women of England (1799), under a pseudonym (‘Anne Francis 
Randall’).  As the eighteenth century came to a close, Revolutionary feminism effectively ceased to exist” (xiv). 
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Hays’s rhetorical subterfuge, however, allows her to navigate the minefields of what has 
become a dangerous historical moment.  Again, through her construction of a prefatory 
figure designed to obscure the subversiveness of her feminist argument, Hays reincarnates 
the essence of Eusebia to depict a persona calculated to convey her radical message in a 
disarmingly understated guise.  After the professionalized voice of the Letters and Essays’ 
preface and the strident, if not duplicitous, voice of the Memoirs’ preface, the return to a 
Eusebia-like figure at first seems out of sync with the development of Hays’s prefatory 
personae.  But as a tactic calculated to conceal the subversive force of her message, Hays’s 
prefatory strategy provides her with an innocuous cover under which to disseminate her 
feminist message.79   After the death of Wollstonecraft, Hays stood alone as a voice of 
radical feminism.  But through the very act of continuing to publish, Hays ensures that her 
ideals, despite their unpopularity, continue to reach an ever-widening reading audience.  As a 
product of the historical moment within which the Appeal was published, its preface is 
obsessed with its own belatedness. But Hays’s emphasis on her own belatedness only serves 
to distract the reader from recognizing that the revolutionary energies that have supposedly 
waned by 1798 in fact continue to emanate from her pen.  Anonymity thus contributes to 
the concealing of Hays’s authorial persona, a maneuver that reveals itself simultaneously as a 
capitulation to the forces of ideological repression and as a redeployment of authorial 
energies, a complex negotiation of authorial identity learned from the Memoirs’ 
overdetermined terrain.     
                                                        
79 William Stafford points out that even the Anti-Jacobin Review agreed with much of the Appeal’s sentiments, 
even though in 1798 its tirades against Mary Hays were at their most “virulent” (18).  The review stated that the 
Appeal contained nothing “‘offensive to the feelings of delicacy, nor injurious to the interests of religion and 
morality’” (qtd. in Stafford 18), suggesting that the reviewer was fooled by the book’s “modest and unassuming 
tone” (18), which obscured Hays’s authorship.   
  141
Perhaps the most notable aspect of the Appeal’s advertisement is how it, like 
Godwin’s preface to Caleb Williams’ second edition, situates the work within a repressive 
political context, thus creating a sense of greater urgency or relevance for the book.  But 
Hays manages this prefatory tactic in ways that differ from Godwin’s.  Godwin published 
Caleb Williams under his own name, and as such the prefatory figure in that novel is clearly 
Godwin himself.  By contrast, the Appeal’s prefatory figure, effaced by its lack of association 
with an authorial name, remains shadowy and obscure.  And whereas Godwin’s preface 
tersely and directly alludes to the conditions that resulted in the original preface’s 
suppression, Hays’s preface stages the precariousness of her situation in a more 
circumlocutionary manner.  From its first paragraph, the Appeal’s advertisement reveals an 
anxiety with the timing of its publication.  Hays informs the reader that the Appeal was 
written “some years ago” with the intention of “advancing and defending the pretensions of 
society” (1).  When originally conceived, earlier in the decade, the Appeal would have likely 
been well received by the public.  Hays describes the reading public at that time as “at leisure 
. . . to encourage the endeavours of individuals to instruct, or amuse” (1).  A few short years 
previous, her “little work” (1) would have “come in for its share of notice.”  In 1798, 
however, she perceives a significant change in public tastes:  “times and circumstances are 
now so different, that some apology is necessary for obtruding it on the public; after having 
kept it back at a moment, when it might have been better received” (2).  The preface’s 
narrative revolves around the reasons why the Appeal was not published earlier in the decade.  
Because of the appearance of two prominent works on similar subjects, both of which were 
published when Hays was composing the Appeal, she felt as though her work was rendered 
obsolete.  The first work she cites is Alexander Jardine’s 1788 Letters from Barbary, France, 
Spain, Portugal, &c., a work she praises for “the author’s opinions with regard to women” (2).  
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Jardine’s work presents a proto-feminist argument that bears similarities to Hays’s ideas.  
Professing his belief in the innate equality of men and women, he laments the constricts of 
an English society which systematically denies women the rights accorded to men.  Jardine 
proposes the “best remedies to those evils” as “the admission of women to a better 
education, and to more influence in the councils of taste and learning” (310).  Linking 
cultural evolution with gender equality, Jardine is optimistic about the “progression” (310) he 
has observed in Europe, and he expresses his hope that England will absorb some of these 
positive ideological changes.  In its emphasis on female education and its insistence on the 
necessity of transforming cultural gender assumptions to maximize individual and social 
potential, Jardine’s book indeed anticipates the fundamental arguments put forth by Hays.  
Thus, having been beaten to the press, Hays acknowledges her sense of frustration:  “it 
could not but occur to me, that, as he had—though, but incidentally—treated the subject of 
it so well; those who should come immediately after him, could have little claim to notice” 
(3).   
 The second publication alluded to in the Appeal’s preface is Wollstonecraft’s 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman.  The treatment of Wollstonecraft in the Appeal’s preface has 
changed notably from her depiction in the preface to Letters and Essays.  In the latter’s 
preface, Hays praises Wollstonecraft at length, acknowledging her genius and significance as 
a cultural revolutionary.  In the Appeal’s preface, however, Wollstonecraft is portrayed as 
more of a competitor than an influence.  Indeed, to borrow Harold Bloom’s taxonomy, one 
could argue that the ephebe Mary Hays struggles to overcome her precursor’s influence 
through creative misprision.  For having outlived Wollstonecraft, Hays could sense the 
potential of assuming the mantle of feminist renegade, herself taking on the role of “Master” 
with which she imbued Wollstonecraft in the Letters and Essays’ preface.  In this context, one 
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could identify Hays as engaging in clinamen, the swerve through which the precursor is 
‘corrected’; Hays manages this swerve by reinventing herself as a sort of populist author, in 
contrast to her characterization of Wollstonecraft as one who writes for an elite readership.  
As she neared completion of the Appeal, Hays complains that, “as if the very demon of 
intelligence were let loose, to persecute me with information, though in an obscure corner of 
the kingdom—the Rights of Woman was sent by a friend, for my perusal” (4).  Hays recalls 
her reaction to the Rights of Woman upon receiving her copy of the book:  one might expect 
Hays to remember the feelings of delight she experienced when reading it, yet she admits to 
being “mortified” (4).  This sense of mortification stems from her awareness that, once 
again, her Appeal has been obviated by the appearance of a similar work:   
It [Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman] was more likely than even the first, to 
impede the success of an attempt, which now had less claim to that novelty 
which endures at least temporary notice; I flung aside my little sketch in 
favour of women, with a degree of disdain, which, I begin to hope, it did not 
deserve.  (4)      
Hinting that “envy” (4) might have been the true motive for her reaction to Wollstonecraft’s 
book, Hays then chronicles the subsequent difficulties she experienced in her efforts to 
complete the Appeal.  She admits to being “discouraged” and “despairing” about her ability 
to finish it.  The reasons why Hays might have reconfigured her relation to Wollstonecraft 
align with her decision to publish the work anonymously.  Hays was well known as a close 
collaborator with Wollstonecraft, so more excess praise of Wollstonecraft could divulge 
Hays’s identity.  Hays had already published an obituary of Wollstonecraft in the September 
1797 Monthly Magazine, and Hays’s use of her authorial name for that publication proved to 
be a source of anxiety as well.  The original obituary is unsigned; however, in the following 
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month’s Monthly Magazine, she published a brief note explaining her desire to have affixed 
her name to the obituary:  “To the paragraph in your Magazine for September, announcing 
the decease of mrs [sic] Godwin, it was my desire and intention to have affixed my name, as 
a public testimony of respect and affection for my late admirable friend.  But by some 
misconception, this intention appears to have been defeated” (Memoirs 336).  Hays was 
clearly concerned about the implications of her authorial name at this point, as indicated by 
the unusual step she takes in publishing the note.  The Appeals were published shortly after 
Godwin published his Memoirs of the Author of the Vindication of the Rights of Woman, after which 
public opinion of Wollstonecraft and her associates turned outright hostile due to Godwin’s 
frank treatment of her affairs with Imlay and Fuseli and her suicide attempts.  So whereas 
late in 1797 Hays might have still possessed the courage to publicly associate herself with 
Wollstonecraft, by 1798 her resolve may have diminished.   
 The second half of the Appeal’s preface, however, cleverly takes off from the premise 
of the first half.  Hays’s lament for the book’s belatedness reveals itself as somewhat 
disingenuous as one strand of her rhetorical strategy becomes clear.  Ultimately, this preface 
seeks to distinguish the Appeal from Jardine’s and Wollstonecraft’s books through its 
emphasis on the Appeal’s intended audience.  Hays points out that works like Jardine’s Letters 
and Wollstonecraft’s Vindication targeted a limited, intellectually elite audience, another 
prototype of the “clerisy” identified by Klancher as one of the reading audiences envisioned 
by Coleridge as developing in the late eighteenth century:   
That which raises them in the eyes of the few, either sets them beyond the 
reach of the multitude; or, what is infinitely worse, renders them obnoxious 
to its hatred and persecution.  If any thing indeed can be objected to, in the 
works to which I have alluded, it is an error but too commonly attendant on 
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genius; who seldom deigns, by managing, and sympathizing with, the 
prejudices of mankind, to make new and unexpected truths palatable to 
common minds. (5)            
This second part of the preface thus positions the Appeals as the populist extension of 
feminist ideals already disseminated among the intelligentsia.  In the wake of 
Wollstonecraft’s death, Hays seeks to broadcast her message to an even wider middle-class 
audience.  Paradoxically, however, at the very moment Hays makes the attempt to reach “the 
generality of mankind” (5), negative public opinion against radicals has doomed her attempt 
in advance to failure.  Nonetheless, she steadfastly argues for the need to convey her 
message to the masses:  the “multitude” must be persuaded that “all prejudices are inimical 
to its happiness and interests” (5).  And stressing the Godwinian principle of gradualism, she 
adds her intention to “recommend this gradual reformation, this gentle emancipation from 
error” (5).   But again, just as Godwin’s emphasis on gradualism becomes suspect in the 
context of a preface that contradicts its gradualist precepts, so too does Hays’s rhetoric 
disfigure itself:  stressing the necessity of “gentle” reform cathects stereotypically feminine 
attributes onto the site of ideological revolution, a tactic that reveals itself as a synecdoche of 
Hays’s rhetorical strategy for the Appeal as a whole.     
 The Appeal’s preface closes with a return to the question of authorship, in which 
Hays is provocatively coy about her identity.  She claims that “the fear of appearing in a new 
character before them [her friends], though not a very numerous body, is one of the reasons 
which determine me to take shelter behind the scenes” (6).  What exactly Hays means by 
“new character” is not exactly clear, but she likely alludes to her revamped public persona as 
a populist author.  This change in character, however, is not as radical as she makes it out be; 
after all, the Memoirs were conceived as a novelization of her philosophical ideals for the 
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same reason:  to disseminate her revolutionary feminist ideals to as wide an audience as 
possible.  To this end, she describes her “ludicrous” situation, which consists of “having 
written a book which I wish to expose to the public; I yet have not the resolution to submit 
it, to the eye of friendship or affection” (5).  One can discern traces of Wollstonecraft’s 
advice from late 1792, when Wollstonecraft chided her for begging praise from friends who 
in turn feel put upon to flatter her with compliments.  The Hays of the Appeal is a shadowy 
presence “behind the scenes” who wishes to avoid revealing her identity and subjecting her 
writing to her friends’ criticism.  To further obscure her identity, Hays ends the preface with 
comments that depict her as an amateur, or a newcomer to the literary scene, returning full-
circle to the Cursory Remarks’ rhetorical method.  “[Here] I am with my Appeal in my hand, 
determined to print and publish,--yet not knowing a printer or publisher in the whole world, 
to whom to apply” (6).  Of course Hays is deliberately misleading here, as she was good 
friends with Johnson, who published the book.  Hays thus predicates her strategy for 
connecting with a more general audience on this depiction of her character as an amateur.  
Shorn of her name’s Jacobin and Wollstonecraftian associations, the Hays of the Appeal 
attempts to create a persona whose naïveté about the publishing world positions her as a sort 
of everywoman fit to converse with the masses rather than as a representative of the literary 
elite.   
 Finally, just as the Memoirs’ prefatory strategy pervades the novel’s multi-layered 
narrative structure, so too does the Appeal diffuse its prefatory figure throughout its narrative 
levels.  In addition to her shadowy prefatory identity, Hays also reverts to a Eusebia-like 
persona in the book’s “Introduction.”  In this section, situated amidst her outline of the 
book’s argument, one can perceive a return of the self-conscious authorial voice that 
characterized Hays’s earliest authorial endeavours.  To this end, she assures her readers that  
